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The Maputo Protocol is the leading women’s rights treaty in Africa. However, the treaty 
can only be effectively implemented if resources, aimed at its realisation, are 
generated and spent through government policies and budgets. Article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol provides that state parties are obligated to adopt all necessary 
measures, which include budgetary and other resources, for the full and effective 
implementation of the rights therein recognised. After examining how state parties to 
the Maputo Protocol and the supervisory bodies currently mobilise resources to realise 
women’s rights, it was established that article 26(2) is severely underutilised and/or 
incorrectly applied by state parties. Some of the main reasons for this is a misallocation 
of resources and that state parties do not fully understand their obligations under the 
Maputo Protocol. Thus, women are left disempowered and unprotected.  
To address these concerns, this thesis establishes the nature of state obligations 
under article 26(2) through developing an interpretative framework for resource 
allocation to realise women’s rights. Anti-essentialist feminist legal theory and gender 
responsive budgeting are used as the theoretical framework guiding the research. As 
Africa is such a diverse continent, the analysis of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory 
ensures that the complex needs of women with multiple identities and lived realities 
are considered. The substantive realisation of human rights cannot be separated from 
resource allocation; thus, gender responsive budgeting provides a lens through which 
holistic budgeting for women’s rights can be understood. This thesis also considers 
how other international supervisory bodies, such as the CEDAW Committee and the 
CESCR, have interpreted resource allocation for the realisation of human rights. 
These supervisory bodies have, through their various mandates, provided a rigorous 
interpretation of how state parties should generate and spend resources to ensure 
human rights are kept at the forefront.  
This thesis finds that state parties to the Maputo Protocol, and the supervisory 
bodies, still have a long way to go to ensure that article 26(2) is fully interpreted and 
implemented. However, there are immediate steps which all parties can take, including 
commencing long-term strategies, which will result in more holistic gender responsive 
budgets and policies. The African Court, the African Commission, the Special 
Rapporteur, civil society and state parties all need to work together to ensure that 





Die Maputo-protokol is die voorste vroueregteverdrag in Afrika. Die verdrag kan egter 
slegs effektief geïmplementeer word indien hulpbronne, wat op die verwesenliking 
daarvan gerig is, deur regeringsbeleid en -begrotings gegenereer en bestee word. 
Artikel 26(2) van die Maputo-protokol bepaal dat staatspartye verplig is om alle nodige 
maatreëls, wat begrotings- en ander hulpbronne insluit, vir die volle en effektiewe 
implementering van die regte wat in die protokol erken word, te tref. Nadat daar 
ondersoek ingestel is na hoe staatspartye tot die Maputo-protokol asook 
toesighoudende liggame tans hulpbronne mobiliseer om vroueregte te verwesenlik, is 
vasgestel dat artikel 26(2) ernstig onderbenut word en/of verkeerd deur staatspartye 
toegepas word. Van die hoofredes hiervoor is die foutiewelike toewysing van 
hulpbronne asook die feit dat staatspartye nie hul verpligtinge ingevolge die Maputo-
protokol ten volle verstaan nie. Vroue word dus ontmagtig en onbeskermd gelaat. 
Om hierdie bekommernisse aan te spreek, vestig hierdie tesis die aard van 
staatsverpligting in terme van artikel 26(2) deur ‘n interpretatiewe raamwerk vir die 
toewysing van hulpbronne om vroueregte te verwesenlik, te ontwikkel. Anti-
essensialistiese feministiese regsteorie asook geslagsresponsiewe begrotings word 
as teoretiese raamwerk vir hierdie navorsing gebruik. Aangesien Afrika so 'n 
uiteenlopende vasteland is, verseker die ontleding van die anti-essensialistiese 
feministiese regsteorie dat die komplekse behoeftes van vroue met veelvuldige 
identiteite en lewende realiteite in ag geneem word. Die substantiewe verwesenliking 
van menseregte kan egter nie van die toewysing van hulpbronne geskei word nie, dus 
bied geslagsresponsiewe begrotings 'n lens waardeur die holistiese begroting vir 
vroueregte verstaan kan word. Hierdie tesis oorweeg ook hoe ander internasionale 
toesighoudende liggame, soos die CEDAW-komitee en die CESCR, die toekenning 
van hulpbronne vir die verwesenliking van menseregte geïnterpreteer het. Hierdie 
toesighoudende liggame het, deur middel van hul verskillende mandate, ‘n noukeurige 
interpretasie van hoe staatspartye bronne moet genereer en bestee om te verseker 
dat menseregte op die voorgrond bly, gelewer. 
Hierdie tesis bevind dat staatspartye tot die Maputo-protokol asook die 
toesighoudende liggame nog 'n lang pad het om te stap om te verseker dat artikel 
26(2) volledig geïnterpreteer en geïmplementeer word. Daar is egter onmiddellike 




wat meer holistiese geslagsresponsiewe begrotings en beleide tot gevolg sal hê. Die 
Afrika-hof, die Afrika-kommissie, die Spesiale Verslaggewer, die burgerlike 
samelewing asook staatspartye moet almal saamwerk om te verseker dat vroueregte 





“I wish it need not have happened in my time,” said Frodo.  
“So do I,” said Gandalf, “and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them 
to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.” 
JRR Tolkien The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (1954) 
 
“Frodo: ‘What are we holding on to, Sam?’ 
Sam: ‘That there’s some good in this world, Mr Frodo. And it’s worth fighting for.’” 
P Jackson’s 2002 Film Adaptation: JRR Tolkien The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers 
(1954) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1 1 Research problem 
For the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (“Maputo Protocol”) to be effectively implemented and, 
subsequently, the rights contained therein to be realised, resources have to be 
mobilised and allocated through government policies and budgets.1 Under article 
26(2) of the Maputo Protocol states are obligated to adopt “all necessary measures 
and in particular, shall provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective 
implementation” of the rights recognised. As Govender argues, a “budget reflects the 
values of a country – who it values, whose work it values and who it rewards … and 
who and what and whose work it doesn’t”.2 
The Maputo Protocol has been ratified by 42 out of 55 African Union (“AU”) member 
states.3 It was designed as a tool to realise women’s rights on the African continent 
and to integrate a gender-equality perspective in regional and national policy.4 The 
Maputo Protocol covers the full spectrum of women’s rights, including civil, political, 
social, cultural and economic rights. However, because it lacks a rigorous 
interpretative framework, state parties are still uncertain as to how to effectively realise 
women’s rights in terms of the Maputo Protocol. This has resulted in an underutilisation 
and/or incorrect application of the Maputo Protocol in state parties’ policies and 
national planning.5 
In March 2017, the AU alongside the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and 
the Empowerment of Women (“UN Women”) and United Nations Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner released a report on the state of African women’s human 
 
1 (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) CAB/LEG/66.6. 
2 P Govender Former Chair of the South African Parliamentary Committee on the Improvement of the 
Quality of Life and Status of Women in D Budlender (ed) The Women’s Budget (1996) Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa 7. 
3 AU “List of countries which has signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on 




(accessed 07-07-2020).  
4 R Gawaya & RS Mukasa “The African Women’s Protocol: A New Dimension for Women’s Rights in 
Africa” (2005) 13 Gender & Development 42 42.  
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rights.6 This report highlighted key areas where the Maputo Protocol has not yet been 
effectively implemented. The report indicated, amongst other concerns that globally, 
62% of all pregnancy and childbirth-related deaths occur on the African continent.7 
The report furthermore established that 125 million African girls are married before the 
age of 18.8 The report attributed the lack of effective implementation to different factors 
such as limited state reporting in terms of article 26(1), maladministration, corruption 
and, importantly for the topic of this research, a misalignment of resources.9  
There is little guidance in the Maputo Protocol as to how to interpret and apply the 
obligations provided in article 26(2). Without this guidance, there will be, as argued in 
this thesis, a lack of consistency in how state parties interpret and implement the 
Maputo Protocol, resulting in the ineffective realisation of women’s human rights. The 
main objective of this research is therefore, to analyse the meaning and scope of “all 
necessary measures” and “budgetary and other resources” in article 26(2) to enhance 
the effective implementation of the rights contained in the Maputo Protocol. The 
research suggests that, relying on the correct interpretation of article 26(2), the Maputo 
Protocol has the potential to effectively protect African women’s rights as well as 
provide appropriate remedies for violations of the rights contained therein.10  
While this research focuses on women’s rights, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
women in Africa are not a homogenous group who all face similar restrictions to 
realising their full human rights. Women face gender inequality as well as intersecting 
forms of discrimination on grounds such as age, economic status, racial or ethnic 
background, religion, nationality, citizenship, marital status, health, human 
immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (“HIV/AIDS”) 
status, disability, poverty, gender identity and sexual orientation among others.11 
These various forms of discrimination often compound the discrimination that African 
women face. As Africa is such a vast, complex continent with multiple nationalities, 
religions, races, and languages, it stands to reason that African women share its 
 






9 52.  
10 Article 25 of the Maputo Protocol.  
11 AU “Women’s Rights in Africa” (2017) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 16. See further chapter three part 3 3 1 below.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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complexity. Therefore, this research’s theoretical framework will be considered from 
the viewpoint that women have diverse identities which can result in multiple levels of 
discrimination.12  
In April 1998, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African 
Commission”) established the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(“Special Rapporteur”) to emphasise the challenges of women’s human rights.13 To 
assist in the effective implementation of the Maputo Protocol, the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur was aligned to include the domestication and realisation of the 
rights in the Maputo Protocol.14 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur includes 
assisting African states to develop and implement policies, which seek to promote and 
protect women’s rights under the Maputo Protocol.15 The Special Rapporteur, 
therefore, plays a pivotal role in the realisation of women’s rights in Africa. The work 
of the Special Rapporteur in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol is accordingly 
also assessed in this research.16 
 
1 2 Research aims and hypotheses 
The primary research question of this thesis is: What is the nature of state obligations 
under article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol? The primary hypothesis guiding the 
research in this regard acknowledges that article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol has not 
been adequately interpreted by the relevant supervisory bodies to effectively realise 
women’s rights. To fully engage with the primary research question, three secondary 
research questions, along with three secondary hypotheses, are considered.  
The first considers how the African Commission and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”) have interpreted resource allocation for the 
effective realisation of human rights in terms of the Maputo Protocol and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights17 (“ACHPR”)? The hypothesis aligned with 
this question is that a lack of sufficient, rigorous interpretation of resource allocation 
 
12 See further chapter three part 3 3 below for a discussion on multiple levels of discrimination and its 
role in anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. 
13 ACHPR “Special Rapporteur on Rights of Women” (2018) African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights <https://www.achpr.org/specialmechanisms/detail?id=6> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
14 A Budoo “Analysing the monitoring mechanisms of the African Women’s Protocol at the level of the 
African Union” (2018) 18 African Human Rights Law Journal 58 64. 
15 ACHPR “About: Mandate and Biographical Notes” (2018) African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights <http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/about/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
16 See part 1 3 below for a discussion on the methodology of this research. 
17 (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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under the Maputo Protocol combined with minimal interpretation under the ACHPR 
has led to discrepancies in the guidance provided to state parties with regard to their 
obligations to realise women’s rights.   
The second considers to what extent feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting can be used to assist in the interpretation of the resource allocation 
instruction under article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol? The hypothesis aligned with 
this question is that feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting provides a 
comprehensive theoretical approach, which can assist in guiding the research in 
interpreting and evaluating state obligations relating to the resource allocation under 
the Maputo Protocol.  
The third considers how an analysis of the interpretation of resource allocation for 
the effective realisation of human rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)18 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)19 can assist in guiding 
supervisory bodies to interpret and evaluate article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol? The 
hypothesis aligned with this question is that resource allocation for the realisation of 
human rights has already been interpreted and analysed under CEDAW and the 
ICESCR and can thus provide guidance when interpreting article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol.   
 As mentioned above, this research aims to create a framework within which the 
resource allocation and related state obligations prescribed in article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol can be evaluated. Such a framework will be useful to supervisory 
bodies, state parties, civil society and rights holders in terms of the Maputo Protocol 
because state parties’ efforts to realise their obligations under the Maputo Protocol 
can be effectively interpreted and evaluated. It will furthermore be of value to 
supervisory bodies, such as the African Commission, the African Court, and the 
Special Rapporteur, to interpret and evaluate state parties’ resource allocation to 
realise women’s rights. This framework will also be of value to state parties who would 
be able to evaluate and adjust their own efforts to meet their own obligations in terms 
of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Rightsholders and non-governmental 
 
18 (Adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
19 (Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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organisations (“NGOs”) will also benefit from such a framework as they would be able 
to hold state parties accountable for their obligations under the Maputo Protocol.  
1 3 Methodology and theoretical framework 
This research commences by establishing the current interpretative practices relating 
to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Because neither the African Commission nor 
the African Court have analysed or applied article 26(2), this research relies on the 
interpretation of resource allocation and state obligations under the ACHPR. This 
includes analysing how the African Commission and the African Court have 
interpreted resource allocation and state obligations in terms of the ACHPR. African 
regional communications are consulted in this regard, as well as comments and 
observations released by the African Commission. The analysis of interpretative 
practices assists in identifying the gaps and shortcomings of interpreting article 26(2) 
of the Maputo Protocol. The effect of these shortcomings, such as inconsistencies in 
how state parties interpret their obligations under the Maputo Protocol, are identified 
and addressed.  
The interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol and the allocation of 
resources also depends on a substantive interpretation of the various rights protected 
in the Maputo Protocol. However, a detailed interpretation of the substantive 
obligations imposed by all the rights in the Maputo Protocol will not be provided, as it 
falls outside the scope of the current research project. Instead, this thesis aims to 
identify the general principles that should guide the interpretation of article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol, as informed by feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting. 
Feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting are applied as a theoretical 
framework to aid in bridging the gaps that exist when interpreting resource allocation 
for women’s rights. The theoretical framework assists in interpreting resource 
allocation for the realisation of women’s rights as well as state obligations under the 
Maputo Protocol.  
Feminist legal theory developed during the 1960s yet, feminist scholars only started 
analysing the legal structures that impeded justice for women instead of advancing it 
during the 1980s.20 Today, feminist legal theory is focused on analysing law in three 
 
20 P Smith “Four Themes in Feminist Legal Theory: Difference, Dominance, Domesticity and Denial” in 
MP Golding & WA Edmundson (eds) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(2006) 90 90.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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ways: first, to identify sources of bias and injustice within it; secondly to utilise it in a 
way that advances justice for women within institutions and social practices; and 
thirdly, to identify and overcome devices of denial and other barriers to reform.21  
This research particularly analyses the anti-essentialist strand of feminist legal 
theory to identify how anti-essentialism can be used to interpret and implement the 
Maputo Protocol. In essence, anti-essentialist scholars argue that the issue of 
“sameness” or “difference” does not only separate men and women but also women 
and women.22 Anti-essentialism also forms an important part of post-modern 
feminism. Post-modern feminism contends that individuals do not have fixed identities 
but rather have an identity that is “continuously constructed in different contexts by 
competing discourses”.23 This allows for an intersectional understanding of feminism 
which aids in the interpretation and implementation of resource allocation under the 
Maputo Protocol. In this way, anti-essentialist feminism focuses the research on the 
importance of the Maputo Protocol as an African regional instrument that must serve 
all African women.  
Gender responsive budgeting provides a practical governance tool to give effect to 
some of the key findings of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. Gender responsive 
budgeting, as a concept, was developed in Australia in the 1980s. As a method, it 
sought to raise awareness within government of the impact the budget and policies 
have on women, to keep government accountable to gender equality goals and to 
bring about changes that would improve the socio-economic status of women.24 
Gender responsive budgeting requires an assessment of public policy and budgeting 
through a gender lens to ensure that resources are effectively allocated to realise 
women’s human rights.25 
Following the theoretical analysis, the practices of the Committee on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) are analysed to assist 
in interpreting article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The interpretation of resource 
 
21 90. 
22 JC Williams “Dissolving the sameness/difference debate: a post-modern path beyond essentialism 
in feminist and critical race theory” (1991) 2 Duke Law Journal 296 299.  
23 K van Marle & E Bonthuys “Feminist Theories and Concepts” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 15 38.  
24 D Elson UNIFEM Budgeting for Women’s Rights: Monitoring Government Budgets for Compliance 
with CEDAW (May 2006) 1-932827-47-1 39.  
25 10.  
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allocations under these treaties are explored from the viewpoint that the Maputo 
Protocol, similarly to CEDAW and the ICESCR contains rights which cannot be 
effectively implemented without adequate resources.  
The ICESCR is assessed because of its clear reference to resource allocation in 
article 2(1) and the interpretative work that has been done in terms of resource 
allocation. The CESCR has conducted extensive interpretative work on resource 
allocation as well as state parties’ obligation to mobilise resources. The ICESCR also 
contains a non-discrimination clause and a clause which ensures the equal enjoyment, 
for men and women, of the rights contained therein.26  
Resource allocation under CEDAW is analysed on the basis that it focuses on 
women’s rights and could be considered similar to the Maputo Protocol in that regard. 
This analysis provides an insight into gender-specific resource allocation. The Maputo 
Protocol has also been referred to as a version of CEDAW which was designed for 
“Africans by Africans”.27 The CEDAW Committee has furthermore analysed state 
parties’ obligation to mobilise resources for women’s rights. The extensive literature 
on gender responsive budgeting in terms of CEDAW will consequently prove 
paramount to this research.  
The final part of the research includes developing an interpretative framework for 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The core concepts of anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory and gender responsive budgeting are utilised as the theoretical lens 
through which the new framework will operate. The insight gained through the analysis 
of the work done by the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR guides the framework 
for resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol. This new framework includes 
recommendations as to how the African Commission, African Court and Special 
Rapporteur can appropriately assess state parties’ obligations in terms of the Maputo 
Protocol to determine if these bodies prioritise women’s rights in their resource 
allocation.  
 
26 Art 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR respectively. These two clauses are addressed by the CESCR in two 
different, yet, closely related general comments. See, respectively, UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20 (forty second session, 2009) Non-discrimination in economic, 
social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 16 (thirty fourth session, 2005) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4. 
27 Gawaya & Mukasa (2005) Gender & Development 44.  
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1 4 Limitations 
Resource allocation is important for the realisation of all human rights. This research, 
however, only focuses on resource allocation for the realisation of African women’s 
rights. Women in Africa are considered a particularly vulnerable group who require the 
full protection and empowerment of the law.28 This research considers the role that 
effective resource allocation plays in ensuring that African women are adequately 
protected and empowered under the Maputo Protocol. Consequently, this research 
takes a regional perspective in that it considers women’s rights specifically under the 
African human rights system. Accordingly, the work of the AU, the African Commission 
and African Court plays a significant role throughout the research.  
Furthermore, this research analyses and evaluates practices established under 
other international human rights treaties to establish an interpretive framework 
relevant to the Maputo Protocol. It focuses on international instruments which are 
closely related to the Maputo Protocol in their purpose or under which rigorous 
resource allocation interpretations have taken place. CEDAW is closely related to the 
Maputo Protocol in its mandate and purpose, as it also provides for women’s rights.29 
The ICESCR contains a resource allocation provision, in terms of article 2(1) that is 
relevant to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.30 For this purpose, CEDAW and the 
ICESCR are analysed to provide an interpretative foundation for article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child31 protects the rights of the girl child and 
refers to maximum available resources to be made available to realise these rights.32 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child33 similarly considers the 
rights of the child, as well as the girl child. However, these treaties are not considered 
as it is beyond the scope of this research focusing particularly on women’s rights.34 
These treaties provide for areas of further research and analysis in subsequent 
academic work.35 
 
28 See part 1 1 above.  
29 See part 1 3 above.  
30 See part 1 3 above. 
31 (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1989) 1577 UNTS 3.  
32 Art 4. 
33 (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
34 Article 1(k) of the Maputo Protocol states that the treaty’s referral to “women” includes “girls”.  
35 See chapter six part 6 3 below. 
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1 5 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2, The interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, focuses on the 
interpretation and implementation of resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol. 
Any interpretation by the African Court or the African Commission on resource 
allocation, not related to article 26(2), or the implementation of the Maputo Protocol is 
assessed. State reports submitted in accordance with article 26(1) of the Maputo 
Protocol and article 62 of the ACHPR are considered and the work of the Special 
Rapporteur is analysed. Resource allocation under the ACHPR to provide more 
substance to the provisions under the Maputo Protocol is analysed. In this regard, the 
interpretation by the African Commission and African Court of resource allocation and 
states’ obligations in terms of the ACHPR is considered. Communications submitted 
to the African Commission by individuals and NGOs as well as the decisions on these 
communications are analysed.  
Chapter 3, Feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting: a theoretical 
lens, evaluates and explains feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting. 
This chapter focuses on anti-essentialist feminist legal theory, its history, the differing 
views presented within this theory as well as its relevance to the research.  
Particular attention is paid to anti-essentialist feminist legal theory because of its 
responsiveness to intersecting grounds of discrimination. The second part of this 
chapter examines the role of gender responsive budgeting in interpreting budgetary 
and resource allocation obligations under the Maputo Protocol. Gender responsive 
budgeting represents a practical governance tool to give effect to some of the key 
insights of feminist legal theory. The connection between gender responsive 
budgeting and feminist legal theory is furthermore analysed and evaluated within the 
context of the Maputo Protocol.  
Chapter 4, Resource allocation under CEDAW and the ICESCR, focuses on the 
interpretative practices of resource allocation under CEDAW and the ICESCR. 
CEDAW is analysed to ascertain which methods have been most successful in terms 
of allocating resources for women’s rights. State reporting under CEDAW is 
considered, as well as an analysis of the provisions in CEDAW that have been widely 
interpreted to require substantial resource allocation. Communications, as decided by 
the CEDAW Committee and concluding observations on state reports, are analysed 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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to establish best practices to effectively realising women’s rights through appropriate 
resource allocation decisions. The implementation mechanisms of CEDAW and the 
special measures which state parties can take to realise their obligations as well as 
how they should budget to realise the rights in CEDAW, are further analysed.  
 In terms of the ICESCR, article 2(1) and the interpretation of “maximum available 
resources” by the CESCR are explored. Article 2(1) is interpreted considering the 
ICESCR, general comments, statements from the CESCR and concluding 
observations on state reports.36 The different doctrinal norms which encompass article 
2(1) are discussed and analysed.37 This discussion is followed by an analysis of 
different resource allocation strategies under the ICESCR from the CESCR and 
scholars in this field. Generating resources to realise the rights in the ICESCR and 
spending resources to realise the rights in the ICESCR are then further considered. 
Chapter 5, Developing an interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol, discusses new possible interpretations of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol 
considering the evaluation of resource allocation under the ACHPR, CEDAW and the 
ICESCR. An interpretative framework is suggested to realise women’s rights together 
with possible guidelines and principles for effective implementation. This chapter 
begins by considering the interpretative framework for resource allocation for women’s 
rights that the supervisory bodies need to follow within their various mandates. Then, 
the budgetary process is examined as well as how state parties should align this 
process with the principles of gender responsive budgeting and anti-essentialist 
feminist legal theory. What follows is an analysis of how state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol should be generating resources in ways which are sensitive to women with 
various identities and considers how state parties should spend their resources to 
realise their obligations in article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Specific resource-
intensive provisions and how state parties to the Maputo Protocol can best allocate 
resources to realise these rights are considered. As resource constraints are an issue 
that many African states face, this also forms a focal point of the discussion.  
Chapter 6 concludes the research, summarises the main findings and sets out the 
significance of the interpretation of resource allocation and state obligations under the 
 
36 In terms of the CEDAW Committee, the clarifications released on certain provisions are called general 
recommendations, while the CESCR refers to it as general comments. The terminology utilised by the 
two committees will be used throughout this research.  
37 The doctrinal norms include maximum available resources, progressive realisation, retrogressive 
measures, minimum core obligations, extraterritorial obligations and non-discrimination and equality. 
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Maputo Protocol. Particular attention is paid to how this new interpretation will assist 
in the effective realisation of women’s rights. Recommendations based on the findings 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 26(2) OF THE MAPUTO 
PROTOCOL 
2 1 Introduction  
Article 26(2) of Maputo Protocol obliges states to adopt “all necessary measures and 
in particular, [to] provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective 
implementation of the rights” recognised therein. Neither the African Commission nor 
the African Court has directly applied article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. This chapter 
examines how the African Commission and the African Court have interpreted 
resource allocations for the effective realisation of human rights as guaranteed in the 
Maputo Protocol and the ACHPR. This analysis departs from the hypothesis that 
resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol has not been rigorously interpreted, 
which has led to inconsistencies in the guidance provided to state parties in terms of 
their obligations.   
 
2 2 Resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol 
2 2 1 Specific provisions of the Maputo Protocol 
Article 26(2) is essential in understanding the obligations of state parties to ensure the 
realisation of the rights in the Maputo Protocol. It is the operational clause establishing 
the overarching obligations in relation to all the protected rights of the Maputo Protocol. 
However, as stated above, the Maputo Protocol provides little clarification as to what 
“full and effective implementation” entails. As suggested by Yeshanew, the obligation 
to “fully” realise the rights stipulated in the Maputo Protocol is not equivalent to 
realising these rights immediately.38 These rights are resource intensive and will take 
time to realise fully. Thus, Yeshanew suggests that this provision could imply the 
progressive realisation of the relevant rights.39 This would require states to constantly 
move towards the full enjoyment and improvement of these rights, even with apparent 
resource constraints.40 Viljoen argues that this provision along with article 10(3) of the 
 
38 S Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights System: Theories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (2011) 290. 
39 290. 
40 L Chenwi “Unpacking ‘progressive realisation’, its relation to resources, minimum core and 
reasonableness, and some methodological considerations for assessing compliance” (2013) 46 De 
Jure 742 743.  
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Maputo Protocol, establishes a “basis for review” by the African Commission.41 Article 
10(3) of the Maputo Protocol stipulates that “[s]tate parties shall take the necessary 
measures to reduce military expenditure significantly in favour of spending on social 
development in general, and the promotion of women in particular”.  
Yeshanew argues further that the obligations that articles 10(3) and 4(2)(i) of the 
Maputo Protocol create need to be read together with article 26(2).42 These provisions 
enable the African Commission and African Court to hold state parties accountable for 
the “misallocation of their budgetary resources”.43 Thus, these rights may not need 
intensive budgetary allocations over time, and a reallocation of resources may suffice 
to realise these rights. While there are no guidelines as to how the obligation created 
in article 10(3) should be realised in practical terms, this provision shows that the 
promotion of women’s rights should be a priority for state parties, especially 
concerning military expenditure. This provision forms part of an agreement that state 
parties to the Maputo Protocol undertake to channel resources to the promotion of 
women’s rights.44 However, as Budoo explains, this provision is difficult to enforce 
because the African Commission or the African Court will have to ascertain whether a 
state party has taken sufficient “necessary measures” to redirect this spending.45 In 
this regard, they would in all likelihood have to assess the validity of an argument that 
non-compliance with article 10(3) is in the best interests of state security.46  
Moreover, article 4(2)(i) of the Maputo Protocol stipulates that “[s]tate parties shall 
take appropriate and effective measures to … provide adequate budgetary and other 
resources for the implementation and monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and 
eradicating violence against women”. This article recognises that transforming the 
pattern of violence against women is not possible without adequate resource 
allocation.47 State parties often argue that it is challenging to prevent violence against 
women because of budgetary constraints.48 They argue that realising this right would 
 
41 F Viljoen “An Introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa” (2009) 16 Wash & Lee J Civil Rts & Soc Just. 11 33. 
42 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 294. 
43 A Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting in Implementing the Obligation to Provide Resources to 
Realise Women’s Human Rights in Africa LLD thesis, University of Pretoria (2016) 83. 
44 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 291.  
45 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 84. 
46 84. 
47 82. 
48 M Mutiithi “An analysis of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa” in B Kombo et al Journey to equality: 10 years of the Protocol on the Rights 
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require significant budgetary allocation to, for example, increase police training, 
provide women’s shelters, provide support services for survivors of sexual or domestic 
violence and equal access to justice for all women.49  
Articles 2 and 5 of the Maputo Protocol do not refer to resource allocation, but they 
do have resource implications for state parties because of the obligations they create. 
Article 2 calls for state parties to combat all forms of discrimination against women 
through “appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures”. This entails 
including the principle of equality in national legislation, enacting legislation for the 
promotion of women’s rights, integrating a gender perspective in policy decisions, 
taking corrective action where discrimination still exists and supporting initiatives 
focused on eradicating discrimination against women.50 Article 2(2) states that:  
 
“[S]tate parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and 
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and 
traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men”.  
 
The obligations created in article 2 to enact legislation and combat all forms of 
discrimination against women, are arguably resource intensive for state parties.  
Article 5 of the Maputo Protocol states that state parties shall, “prohibit and 
condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights of 
women and which are contrary to recognised international standards”. This includes 
the enactment of necessary legislation, creation of public awareness, the prohibition 
of all forms of female genital mutilation, provision of necessary support to victims of 
harmful practices and protection of women at risk of such harmful practices.51 As this 
provision also contains the requirement for the enactment of legislation and other 
measures, it will also prove resource intensive for state parties. While, as indicated 
above, articles 2 and 5 do not explicitly provide for resource allocation, the obligations 
created through these provisions, read together with the substantial rights set out in 
articles 3 to 24, will require a substantial resource investment from state parties.   
 
of Women in Africa (2013) 44 <http://www.soawr.org/images/JourneytoEquality.pdf> (accessed 07-07-
2020).  
49 44.  
50 Article 2(1)(a)-(e) of the Maputo Protocol.  
51 Article 5(a)-(d).  
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2 2 2 African Court  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, where the supervisory bodies have 
interpreted resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol, it has not been done in 
terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. However, the indirect interpretation is 
relevant, as it illuminates the inadequacies in the current implementation. Article 27 of 
the Maputo Protocol states that the African Court shall be seized with matters of 
interpretation and implementation arising from the Maputo Protocol. The African Court 
was established under article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“Court Protocol”)52 to “complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission”.53  
Currently, 30 states have signed and ratified the Court Protocol.54 Of these 30 
states, 10 have made declarations allowing NGOs, with observer status before the 
African Commission, and individuals to bring cases directly to the African Court.55 Due 
to two withdrawals, there are now only 8 state parties with existing declarations to 
allow NGOs and individuals to have observer status before the African Court.56 This 
declaration, in terms of article 34(6) and by virtue of article 5(3) of the Court Protocol, 
provides locus standi to individuals and NGOs with observer status before the African 
Commission. The locus standi requirements make it difficult for individuals and NGOs 
to approach the African Court to hold state parties accountable.57 In this regard, 
Rudman states that it appears that the capacity of individuals and NGOs to take a 
 
52 (Adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004) CAB/LEG/66.5.  
53 Article 2 of the Court Protocol. 
54 AU “List of Countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
(2018) AU <http://en.african-
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration_final-
jan_2017.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
55 AU “The Gambia becomes the Ninth Country to allow NGOs and Individuals to access the Africa 
Court directly” (2018) AU <http://en.african-court.org/index.php/news/press-releases/item/257-the-
gambia-becomes-the-ninth-country-to-allow-ngos-and-individuals-to-access-the-african-court-
directly> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
56 Rwanda, who had made an article 34(6) declaration in the past, officially withdrew their declaration 
in 2016. See Ministry of Justice “Clarification” (2016) Ministry of Justice 
<http://www.minijust.gov.rw/fileadmin/Documents/Photo_News_2016/Clarification2.pdf> (accessed 
07-07-2020. Tanzania, who had also made an article 34(6) declaration in the past, officially withdrew 
their declaration in 2019. See International Justice Resource Centre “As African Court releases new 
judgments, Tanzania withdraws individual access” (2019) International Justice Resource Centre 
<https://ijrcenter.org/2019/12/05/as-african-court-releases-new-judgments-tanzania-withdraws-
individual-access/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
57 Budoo (2018) AHRLJ 58 62. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  16 
 
matter directly to the African Court was traded off against the “increased willingness 
of states to commit to the [Court] Protocol without the immediate burden of having to 
face aggrieved individuals in court”.58 Another barrier for NGOs to access the African 
Court is the fact that in order for NGOs to bring a matter to the African Court, it needs 
to be accredited before the African Commission in terms of African Commission 
Resolution 361.59  
To date, the African Court has only heard two cases under the Maputo Protocol. 
The President of the African Court, the Honourable Justice Oré, has indicated that 
despite the number of ratifications of the Maputo Protocol, the expectations regarding 
the volume of litigation is “disappointing”.60 The first case, Mariam Kouma and Another 
v Republic of Mali61 was declared inadmissible on the basis of non-exhaustion of local 
remedies.62 This case could potentially have provided significant interpretational 
guidance relating to the alleged violations of the rights to dignity, protection against 
violence, and access to justice contained in the Maputo Protocol.63  
APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali (“APDF”)64 was the first case that the African 
Court heard on the merits under the Maputo Protocol. The main point of contention in 
this case related to the fact that the Malian Persons and Family Code65 provided for 
marriages to be concluded with girls from the age of sixteen and, with the consent of 
her parents, even at the age of fifteen.66 The litigants referred to violations of the 
obligation to modify harmful social and cultural practices, to have full consent in 
marriage, the minimum age of marriage, discrimination, and inheritance rights.67 The 
African Court ordered the Persons and Family Code to be amended to ensure Mali 
abides by its obligations to protect girls from discrimination and marriage under the 
 
58 A Rudman “The protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation under the African 
human rights system” (2015) 15 AHRLJ 1 25.  
59 African Commission Resolution 361: Resolution on the Criteria for Granting and Maintaining Observer 
Status to Non-Governmental Organizations working on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa. African 
Commission’s 59th Ordinary Session 21 October – 5 November 2016 Banjul, Islamic Republic of the 
Gambia ACHPR/Res361(LIX) 2016.  
60 Final Communiqué of the 59th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 21 October to 4 November 2016, Banjul, Islamic Republic of The Gambia, para 10.  
61 Application No 040/2016.  
62 Rule 40(5) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights <http://en.african-
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Final_Rules_of_Court_for_Publication_after_Harmonization_-
_Final__English_7_sept_1_.pdf>. 
63 Articles 3(1), 3(4) and 8(a). 
64 Application No 046/2016.  
65 Law No 2011 – 087 of 30 December 2011.  
66 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali  Application No 046/2016 paras 59, 60. 
67 Articles 2(2), 6(a)-(b) and 21 of the Maputo Protocol. 
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age of 18 in terms of the Maputo Protocol.68 The African Court did not refer to resource 
allocation in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol despite the instruction to 
amend legislation being substantially resource intensive. Practically, this would require 
a large investment from the state party’s side to establish a task team to amend the 
legislation and ensure the effective administrative procedure and implementation.  
The African Court also referred to article 25 of the ACHPR in its judgment, despite 
the applicants not having referred to a violation in terms of the ACHPR.69 The 
applicants in APDF made specific reference to the obligations in the Maputo Protocol, 
yet the African Court tied the obligations and its recommendations to the ACHPR. 
Concerning article 25 of the ACHPR, the state party has an obligation to promote the 
rights and freedoms in the ACHPR. The respondent state, in this case, has an 
obligation to develop programmes and educational initiatives that would ensure all 
citizens are aware of the amendments to the Persons and Family Code.70 The African 
Court could have, however, further applied articles 2 and 5 of the Maputo Protocol 
which would have supported the instruction to develop educational initiatives for 
citizens. The African Court would have then subsequently had to acknowledge the 
extensive resource commitment that articles 2 and 5 require from state parties. This 
case shows that while the African Court is hesitant to apply article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol, it can still create obligations that require substantial resources for state 
parties through other provisions in the Maputo Protocol and the ACHPR. However, the 
question remains why the African Court did not mention and apply article 26(2) in this 
case as a direct indication to Mali to mobilise resources to extend and protect the rights 
violated.  
 
2 2 3 African Commission 
As mentioned above, the African Commission, which was established under article 30 
of the ACHPR, is concurrently mandated to oversee the implementation of the Maputo 
Protocol.71 This mandate is derived from article 45(2) of the ACHPR and article 32 of 
 
68 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 para 130.  
69 Article 25 of the ACHPR states that state parties, “have the duty to promote and ensure through 
teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present 
Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties 
are understood”.  
70 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 para 131. 
71 See part 2 2 2 above.  
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the Maputo Protocol. Article 32 of the Maputo Protocol states that the African 
Commission “shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application 
and implementation of this Protocol” pending the establishment of the African Court. 
As discussed in part 2 2 2 above, the African Court’s ability to engage with the Maputo 
Protocol is limited as only 30 state parties have ratified the Court Protocol72 and only 
ten state parties made article 34(6) declarations. In cases where a state party has not 
ratified the Court Protocol or made an article 34(6) declaration, a complaint can be 
submitted to the African Commission.73 Such a complaint is referred to as a 
communication. The African Commission has, to date, not interpreted or implemented 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol in its decisions on communications submitted to 
it. It has furthermore not referred any case to the African Court, under rule 118 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Rules 
of Procedure”)74 and article 5(1)(a) of the Court Protocol, involving alleged violations 
of the Maputo Protocol.75  
Reference has, however, been made to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol in the 
African Commission’s general comments. For example, General Comment 2 focuses 
on article 14 of the Maputo Protocol (dealing with health and reproductive rights) and 
states clear requirements as to how these rights should be realised.76 These include 
allocating “adequate financial resources for the strengthening of public health 
services” and making “specific budget allocations under the health budget at national 
and local level”.77 General Comment 1, which also focuses on article 14 of the Maputo 
 
72 African Court “Welcome to the African Court” (2019) African Court <http://www.african-
court.org/en/index.php/12-homepage1/1208-welcome-to-the-african-court1> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
73 It is still uncertain how the African Commission will react in a case where a state party has ratified 
the Maputo Protocol and the Court Protocol but has not made an article 34(6) declaration. This is a 
complex matter as it is unclear whether the African Commission will refer the case to the African Court, 
in terms of article 27 of the Maputo Protocol, or whether the African Commission will hear the matter as 
an individual compliant. Article 27 of the Maputo Protocol indicates that the African Court shall be seized 
with matters of interpretation and implementation arising from the Maputo Protocol. 
74 AU “Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2010) AU 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf> 
(accessed 07-07-2020). 
75 The cases that have been referred to the African Court are The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Libya (Application No 002/2013), The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights v Republic of Kenya (Application No 006/2012) & The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Application No 004/2011). 
However, these cases made no mention of women’s rights or resource allocation. 
76 General Comment 2 on Article 14(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14(2)(a) and (c) of the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2014) Adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session.  
77 Para 62. 
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Protocol, states that “state parties … should fund and empower public health 
authorities to provide a comprehensive range of services for the prevention and 
treatment of every person’s sexual and reproductive health”. 78 
General comments are used as a “tool for the interpretation and development of the 
provisions of relevant international legal instruments so as to guide the States in 
implementing their obligations”.79 In this way, the African Commission fulfils its 
mandate to “formulate and develop rules and principles that address legal problems 
regarding the enjoyment of human and peoples’ rights”.80 The general comments have 
been described as a “tool for advocacy and for interaction with policymakers at 
national and regional levels”.81 Arguably, state parties should also include, in their 
state reports, the measures that they have put in place to actualise the general 
comments.82  
While there are conflicting opinions as to the exact legal status of these general 
comments, where most scholars consider them non-binding,83 the documents do 
constitute authoritative statements by the African Commission. The documents, 
themselves, also elaborate on their importance. This is evident in General Comment 
1 where it is stated that “[f]ailure by a State Party to comply with article 14(1)(d) and 
(e) as clarified and enumerated in these General Comments will amount to a violation 
of the provisions of the said article”.84 The general comments thus hold significance 
because they explain the legally binding provisions in the Maputo Protocol. Durojaye 
has elaborated on the status of the general comments by referring to article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties85 which states that, “recourse may be had 
to supplementary means of interpretation” to establish the meaning of the treaty.86 
 
78 General Comment 1 on Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(2012) Adopted at the 52nd Ordinary Session para 48. 
79 Para 1 of General Comment 1 and General Comment 2.  
80 Article 46(1)(b) of the ACHPR. 
81 E Durojaye “The General Comments on HIV adopted by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as a tool to advance the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Africa” (2014) 127 
International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 305 307.  
82 307.  
83 See R Murray & D Long The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (2015) 67.  
84 Para 50.  
85 1969 1155 UNTS 331. 
86 E Durojaye “The Role of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Developing Norms 
and Standards on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights” (2017) 17 Global Jurist 58 63. 
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Thus, the general comments could fall under these “supplementary documents” which 
can assist in the interpretation of the Maputo Protocol.  
General Comments are described as “authoritative interpretive guidance” as they 
clarify the obligations of the state as a duty-bearer.87 The Special Rapporteur has 
described these general comments as a response to the need to articulate measures 
that state parties should take in order to fulfil their obligations in terms of the Maputo 
Protocol.88 Thus, these general comments provide guidance as to what state parties’ 
obligations are in terms of resource allocation for the health and reproductive rights in 
article 14 of the Maputo Protocol. The general comments are supplementary to the 
Maputo Protocol, which is binding on state parties.  
The African Commission has dealt with the violations of women’s rights in one 
decision on communications through interpreting relevant articles in the ACHPR. In 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt89 the African 
Commission applied articles 290 and 18(3)91 of the ACHPR to find a violation of 
women’s rights. This decision dealt with gender-based violence and discrimination that 
four female journalists faced during a political demonstration in 2005. This decision 
recognised gender-based violence as a serious form of discrimination and a violation 
of women’s human rights.92 The complainants argued further that the respondent state 
had failed in its obligation to protect the victims from sexual violence.93 Egypt has not 
ratified the Maputo Protocol and this decision could therefore not be decided in terms 
of the Maputo Protocol. However, the complainants in this decision referred to article 
1 of the Maputo Protocol and argued that it emphasises violence against women as 
 
87 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 22 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/news/2017/11/d313/achpr_srrwa_newsletter_30th_anniversary_eng.pdf>.  
88 AU “General Comments on Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2012) AU 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/general-comments-rights-women/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
89 Communication 323/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt (2011). 
90 “Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other 
status”. 
91 “The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the 
protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declaration and 
conventions”.  
92 “EIPR and Interights v. Egypt” (2016) LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security 
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/eipr-and-interights-v-egypt/> (accessed 07-
07-2020).  
93 Communication 323/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt para 68.  
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all acts perpetrated against women that cause physical, sexual or psychological 
harm.94 The African Commission also referred to articles 6 (suppression of all forms 
of traffic in women and exploitation of the prostitution of women) and 7 (elimination of 
discrimination against women in the political and public life) of CEDAW. The African 
Commission reiterated CEDAW’s view that violence against women hinders women’s 
right to equality and enjoyment of basic human rights.95  
 
2 2 4 State reporting 
In terms of article 26(1) of the Maputo Protocol, states parties are obligated to submit 
state reports in accordance with article 62 of the ACHPR. The African Commission’s 
interpretation of the Maputo Protocol can thus be ascertained through an analysis of 
state reports and the concluding observations on state reports that have been made 
in terms of the Maputo Protocol. Some state party reports undertake an analysis of 
resource allocation and gender responsive budgeting. The African Commission’s 
response to these initiatives can be found in the concluding observations. Despite 
these concluding observations being non-binding on state parties, they are 
authoritative interpretation of states’ obligations under the ACHPR and the Maputo 
Protocol. Durojaye describes these concluding observations as having the potential to 
create “norms and standards on human rights”.96 However, a mechanism does not 
exist by which the African Commission can ensure that state parties comply with the 
recommendations made in the concluding observations. Instead, the state reporting 
mechanism forms part of open communication between the African Commission and 
the state parties.   
   Budoo argues that more could be done by the African Commission to encourage 
state parties to elaborate on their gender responsive budgeting initiatives.97 One such 
way would be for the African Commission to seek clarifications on these initiatives 
from state parties in terms of rule 75(3) of the Rules of Procedure. This rule states that 
“[r]epresentatives of State Parties shall respond to the questions prepared by the 
Commission … and provide when necessary, any other information requested during 
or after the sessions”.  
 
94 Communication 323/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt para 87.  
95 Paras 88 and 165.  
96 Durojaye (2017) Global Jurist 66. 
97 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 213. 
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On the issue of the implementation and effectiveness of the gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives, the African Commission could consider shadow reports from 
NGOs and civil society. The African Commission could “invite specific institutions to 
submit information relating to the state report” which could supplement the information 
supplied by the state party.98 In this way, the African Commission could formulate 
specific questions on implementation to the state party in terms of rule 75(3) of the 
Rules of Procedure.99 In addition, shadow reports could also be submitted directly by 
NGOS and civil society to illuminate implementation challenges of gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives to the African Commission.100  
The African Commission, while acknowledging some resource allocation initiatives, 
has not made specific reference to gender responsive budgeting initiatives of state 
parties in their concluding observations on state reports. Concluding observations 
provide an opportunity for the African Commission to provide concept and 
implementation guidance on gender responsive budgeting. Especially since the state 
parties who have mentioned resource allocation for women’s rights, have not analysed 
the effectiveness of it nor provided information on its implementation strategy. Gender 
responsive budgeting is discussed and analysed in greater detail in chapter 3. Through 
applying that analysis, a better understanding of the concept and implementation 
challenges of gender responsive budgeting will be gained. This is key to understanding 
the supervisory role the African Commission could provide in their concluding 
observations.  
 
2 2 4 1 Reporting guidelines 
As indicated above, article 26(1) of the Maputo Protocol stipulates that states parties 
are obligated to submit state reports in accordance with article 62 of the ACHPR. In 
terms of the latter provision, state reports are due every two years and are required to 
set out the legislative or other measures taken in order to give effect to the rights in 
the ACHPR. These state reports give insight into how state parties have viewed their 
obligations in terms of the Maputo Protocol, specifically concerning resource 
 
98 Rule 74(3) of the Rules of Procedure.  
99 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 214. 
100 Rule 74(2) of the Rules of Procedure.  
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allocation. State reports, in this way, should be a significant interpretative source for 
other state parties.101  
The process of state reporting is considered a “forum for constructive dialogue” and 
enables the African Commission to monitor the implementation of the ACHPR and the 
Maputo Protocol.102 However, the state parties who have reported on resource 
allocation in terms of the Maputo Protocol, provide little guidance as to what they 
consider to be effective implementation. Therefore, the concluding observations of the 
African Commission are relevant. These indicate the African Commission’s response 
to state parties’ efforts, as well as how state parties are held accountable to the Maputo 
Protocol.  
In terms of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (“Solemn 
Declaration”), state parties committed to report annually on progress made in gender 
mainstreaming.103 The Solemn Declaration was adopted in 2004 by member states of 
the AU to show their continued commitment and action towards achieving gender 
equality.104 Thus, it is not a binding, legal document. Despite the commitment made to 
report annually on progress made in terms of the Solemn Declaration, state parties 
rarely report on the Solemn Declaration.105 
Despite the availability of reporting guidelines, there are still disparities in the 
structure and content of most state reports that have been submitted.106 This provides 
problems for supervisory bodies because more work needs to be done in interpreting 
and analysing state reports. When state parties comply with the available guidelines, 
supervisory bodies are able to address key issues more efficiently because it is easier 
to pinpoint the necessary information relating to the promotion of women’s rights and 
resource allocation. States parties are required to report in two parts: part A reports 
on the ACHPR and part B on the Maputo Protocol.107 However, many state parties 
 
101 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 106. 
102 African Commission “State Reporting” (2019) African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
<http://www.achpr.org/states/> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
103 AU Assembly “Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa” (2004) 
Assembly/AU/Decl.12(III)Rev.1 para 12. 
104 LSE “Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA)” (2016) LSE Centre for Women, 
Peace and Security <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/sdgea/> (accessed 11-11-2020) 1. 
105 1 
106 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 12. 
107 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP 
<http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/wru/documents_/gender_expert_meeting_state_repor
ting_guidelines.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
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conflate these two parts into one report. Many state reports, therefore, only refer to 
the Maputo Protocol or women’s rights briefly in their ACHPR reports.108 The risk of 
such a conflation is that state parties do not rigorously engage with women’s rights. 
As such, the provisions in the Maputo Protocol may not get the necessary 
consideration.   
In terms of the reporting guidelines, state parties are also obligated to provide 
general information on gender responsive budgeting.109 The theory underlying gender 
responsive budgeting is, as mentioned above, discussed in Chapter 3. The Republic 
of Rwanda (“Rwanda”) and the Republic of South Africa (“South Africa”) have 
submitted state reports where the Maputo Protocol has been extensively addressed, 
and both countries have developed policies and reports on resource allocation or 
gender responsive budgeting. Thus, the individual state reports of these two countries 
are analysed in the following sub-section, as they, thus far, have contributed the most 
to the development of resource allocation for women’s rights. There have been other 
state parties that have mentioned resource allocation for women’s rights in their state 
reports. However, as there is very limited analysis or policy discussion pertaining to 
the issue in these state reports, they are not discussed further in this research.110 
 
2 2 4 2 Individual state reports 
2 2 4 2 1 Rwanda 
Rwanda has submitted an initial report on the Maputo Protocol and has provided for 
the “mainstreaming of gender perspective” in their government programme by 
implementing gender responsive budgeting.111 In terms of this programme, all 
 
108 UP “Panel Discussion on the State Reporting Obligations and Guidelines on Reporting under the 
Maputo Protocol” (2019) UP <https://www.up.ac.za/faculty-of-law/news/post_2807209-panel-
discussion-on-the-state-reporting-obligations-and-guidelines-on-reporting-under-the-maputo-protocol> 
(accessed 07-07-2020).  
109 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP 2.  
110 The other state parties which have addressed the Maputo Protocol or resource allocation for 
women’s rights in state reports are Togo, Angola, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Namibia. 
They have been excluded from this discussion because of the lack of policy and analysis which 
accompanies the state reports. Thus, they would not contribute to the analysis of resource allocation in 
this research. 
111 Republic of Rwanda “The 11th, 12th and 13th periodic reports of the Republic of Rwanda on the 
implementation status of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights & the Initial Report on the 
Implementation status of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the 
Rights of Women in Africa" (2016) <http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/60th/state-reports/11th-16th-
2009-2016/rwanda_11th_3th_periodic_report_eng.pdf> 73.  
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government budget agencies are required to submit “[g]ender [b]udget statements” 
with their complete budgets to the government.112 These initiatives are reported to 
have started in 2003 with the aim to integrate gender equity into the country’s 
development agenda and process.113 However, the first initiatives were unsuccessful 
due to a lack of continuity.114 The government perceived the reasoning behind this to 
be that the Rwanda Minister of Finance and Economic Planning was not at the 
forefront of the programme. Instead, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development led the initiative and its implementation.115 Stotsky et al 
conclude that gender responsive budgeting is proving to be most effective in countries 
where the ministers responsible for finance and economic planning are taking the 
lead.116   
The second initiative commenced in 2008, which focused on building local capacity 
to implement gender responsive budgeting, instead of relying on international 
consultants.117 These initiatives were led by the Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning. The initiatives started with the goal to increase gender responsive budget 
allocations in the health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors.118 The 
approach to select pilot sectors was developed because of the comprehensive 
attention given to sectors where gender equality was lacking.119  
Rwanda rolled out its gender responsive budgeting initiatives in three phases. This 
was first, to prepare an institutional framework with a core team and a steering 
committee; secondly to sensitise all layers of government, civil society and donors to 
the programme; and lastly to provide in-depth training and support to the pilot 
sectors.120 These pilot sectors would again be health, education, agriculture and 
infrastructure. Stotsky et al submit that in the period following the implementation of 
 
112 73. 
113 Times Reporter “How gender responsive is the budget?” (15-04-2012) The New Times 1 
<https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/54006> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
114 J G Stotsky, L Kolovich & S Kebhaj “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of Gender Budgeting Efforts” 
(2016) IMF Working Paper 18. 
115 18. 
116 3.  
117 18.  
118 O Kabaya “Presentation to “Gender in MENA Projects: Promoting Women’s Economic 
Empowerment, Tunisia” (2009) Worldbank 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/336003-
1244137886626/May21_OdetteKabaya_AnalyticalToolsGB.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020) 7. 
119 Stotsky et al (2016) IMF Working Paper 19. 
120 Kabaya “Presentation to “Gender in MENA Projects: Promoting Women’s Economic Empowerment”” 
(2009) Worldbank 8.  
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gender responsive budgeting in Rwanda, females closed the gap with males in primary 
and secondary school enrolment and the maternal mortality ratio had significantly 
decreased.121 
As stated in Rwanda’s state report, this initiative would later be rolled out to all state 
sectors. This forms part of Rwanda’s goals for gender responsive initiatives to ensure 
that all sectors understand the responsibility of addressing gender inequalities.122 To 
achieve this, five steps are recommended in Rwanda’s Gender Budgeting Guidelines. 
These steps include, first, that each sector should conduct a situational analysis to 
collect gender-disaggregated data within the sector.123 The second step is an 
assessment of the impact that all policies within that sector have on women’s rights.124 
All sections of the budget need to be assessed with regard to cost and resources 
needed in the third step.125 The fourth step is to monitor spending within that sector.126 
The fifth step is to require each sector to submit a gender budget statement through 
which the government can make comments and recommendations.127 This ensures a 
unified approach to gender responsive budgeting as well as accountability for all 
sectors.128 The unified gender budget statement forms part of the annual budget 
framework as required by Rwanda’s Organic Budget Law.129 
According to the World Economic Forum, the Rwandan government is also a great 
example of how taxation revenue can be raised equitably and spent efficiently.130 
Rwanda has, through the combination of effective legislation and administration, 
managed to increase their taxation revenue by nearly 50% from 2001 to 2013.131 This 
significant increase in revenue is crucial when implementing Rwanda’s Gender 
 
121 Stotsky et al (2016) IMF Working Paper 23. 
122 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning “Gender Budgeting Guidelines” 
(2008) MINECOFIN 24 
<https://migeprof.gov.rw/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/GENDER_BUDGETING_GUIDELINES
-2.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
123 24. 
124 26. 
125 26.  
126 28.  
127 28. 
128 Stotsky et al (2016) IMF Working Paper 24. 
129 No 12/2013/OL of 12/09/2013. Article 4 includes the achievement of gender-orientated goals as one 
of the six key principles of the legislation and article 32 requires a “gender budget statement” to form 
part of each year’s budget framework paper.  
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Budgeting Guidelines and, in particular, positively impacted the capacity of health care 
spending.132 
 
2 2 4 2 2 South Africa 
In its state report under the Maputo Protocol, South Africa specifically provided for 
gender responsive budgeting.133 In this way, South Africa aims to ensure that 
“resources are deployed as a positive measure to equalise opportunities between men 
and women”.134 In its 2015 state report, reference was made to its Women’s Budget 
Initiative, which had been running, in some form, since 1996. The early goals of this 
initiative were to develop doctrines which prioritise the socio-economic needs of 
poorer women, to develop a tool to monitor spending and to empower the Joint 
Standing Committee on Finance to supervise government spending.135 Further goals 
of the initiative were to “empower government to take responsibility for drawing up 
gender sensitive budgets and to empower civil society”.136 
Following the Women’s Budget Initiative of 1996, the 2005 Women’s Budget 
Initiative was introduced which was considered a continuation of the previous 
initiative.137 This initiative reiterated that the government has to adopt gender 
budgeting as a step to abide by its obligation to allocate resources to realise women’s 
human rights. This was done with the aim of highlighting the significance of 
mainstreaming gender into policies, programmes and plans. In an appraisal of gender 
responsive budgeting in South Africa, Chakraborty and Bagchi referred to South Africa 
as a “pioneer” in gender responsive budgeting.138  
The African Commission presented concluding observations on the state report of 
South Africa, however, no mention was made of the gender responsive budgeting 
 
132 1. 
133 Republic of South Africa “Combined Second Periodic Report under the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights and Initial Report under the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women 
in Africa” (2015) ACHPR 
<https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/staterep2_southafrica_2003_2014_eng.pdf>. 
134 151.  
135 151. 
136 151. See also, D Budlender, D Elson, G Hewitt & T Mukhopadhyay Gender Budgets Make Cents 
(2002).  
137 Stotsky et al (2016) IMF Working Paper 25.  
138 LS Chakraborty & A Bagchi “Fiscal decentralisation and gender responsive budgeting in South 
African: An Appraisal” (2007) Working Papers 07/45, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.  
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initiative.139 This is concerning as the African Commission with regard to every state 
report, has, as mentioned above, an opportunity to raise awareness around the 
concept of gender responsive budgeting in its concluding observations.140 This is 
especially acute when reference has been made to the allocation of resources for 
women’s rights but no specific implementation plan is provided, as in South Africa’s 
state report.  
 
2 2 5 Special Rapporteur  
In April 1998, the African Commission established the Special Rapporteur to address 
the challenges of women’s human rights.141 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
includes assisting African states to develop and implement policies, which seek to 
promote and protect women’s rights under the Maputo Protocol; as well as following 
up on the implementation of the Maputo Protocol.142 Where the Special Rapporteur 
deems it necessary, he or she can draft resolutions or intersession reports to the 
African Commission on the status of women’s rights in Africa.143 The first Special 
Rapporteur was appointed in 1999.144 
The Special Rapporteur has not yet presented any intersession reports to the 
African Commission where the interpretation or implementation of article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol was directly addressed. The need for gender responsive budgets has 
only briefly been mentioned in some intersession reports but there was no reference 
made to article 26(2) or how these budgets should be implemented.145 The Special 
 
139 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “Concluding observations and 
recommendations on the combined second periodic report under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the initial report under the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women 
in Africa of the Republic of South Africa” (2016) <http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th-eo/conc-
obs/2nd-2003-2014/co_combined_2nd_periodic_republic_of_south_africa.pdf>. 
140 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 214. See part 2 2 4 1 above. 
141 ACHPR "Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women" (2018) African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights <http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
142 ACHPR “About: Mandate and Biographical Notes” (2018) African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights <http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/about/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
143 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 5. 
144 ACHPR/res.38 (XXV) 99: Resolution on the Designation of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. 
145 Intersession Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during 
the 59th Ordinary Session of the African Commission (2016) 
<https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=245> para 12; Intersession Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during the 58th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission (2016) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=244> para 15; Intersession 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during the 57th Ordinary 
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Rapporteur has however noted in a statement that “several countries” have 
established funds for women’s empowerment.146 Side sessions have been held at the 
ordinary sessions of the African Commission where the Special Rapporteur has 
addressed guidelines for state reporting with regard to the Maputo Protocol. The 
Special Rapporteur, along with the Centre for Human Rights of the University of 
Pretoria, also developed guidelines for state reporting under the Maputo Protocol 
which was referred to above.147  
To promote the ratification and enforcement of the Maputo Protocol, the Special 
Rapporteur undertakes advocacy campaigns to African states.148 These missions can 
entail fact-finding and women’s rights promotion. During such visits, the Special 
Rapporteur can also make recommendations to the state parties on how to increase 
the enjoyment of women’s rights in these states.149 These missions could prove 
invaluable when combined with sessions on periodic reporting and best practices for 
resource allocation. The Special Rapporteur also organised the first Regional 
Conference of the Commission in 2010 in Mali.150 This conference was entitled, “The 
Role of the African Commission in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women in Africa” and the conference aimed to ensure the visibility of the Special 
Rapporteur.151 The procedures and protective mandate of the African Commission 
were emphasised and promoted. 
  
2 3 Resource allocation under the ACHPR  
Article 1 of the ACHPR states that state parties shall “adopt legislative or other 
measures” to realise the rights contained therein. There is, however, no other specific 
 
Session of the African Commission (2015) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=189> para 
19: Intersession Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during 
the 56th Ordinary Session of the African Commission (2015) 
<https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=179> para 25. 
146 Status of implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa. Commissioner, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) (2016) New York, United States of America 12.  
147 UP “Guidelines for State Reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP <https://www.up.ac.za/faculty-of-
law/news/post_2807209-panel-discussion-on-the-state-reporting-obligations-and-guidelines-on-
reporting-under-the-maputo-protocol>. See part 2 2 4 1 above. 
148 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 6.  
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provision within the ACHPR which provides guidance as to how resources should be 
allocated and how it should be interpreted. Thus, as the analysis of the Maputo 
Protocol set out above highlighted, other sources of interpretation become relevant. 
The main sources will be communications to the African Commission by individuals 
and NGOs,152 the decisions on these communications and the Principles and 
Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Principles 
and Guidelines”).153  
2 3 1 African Commission Decisions on Communications  
In Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Another v Nigeria (“SERAC”)154 the 
African Commission referred to the state parties’ obligations in terms of the ACHPR. 
The communication states that the military government of the state party had 
condoned and facilitated the operations of oil corporations in Ogoniland, in Nigeria.155 
These oil operations caused environmental degradation and health problems for the 
people residing in Ogoniland.156 The complainant alleged a violation of articles 2, 4, 
14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the ACHPR.157  
In this communication, the African Commission made it clear that state parties have 
a duty to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the ACHPR.158 In terms of 
the duty to fulfil, the African Commission confirmed that this entails an allocation of 
resources that would lead to the realisation of these rights.159 The African Commission 
furthermore stated that the state parties have an obligation to “take reasonable and 
other measures” to realise the right to a general satisfactory environment, favourable 
to development as set out in article 24 of the ACHPR.160  
 
152 The communications by NGOs and individuals are considered persuasive in nature but are, 
ultimately, non-binding. See Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 176. 
153 ACHPR “Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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People’s Rights <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-
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However, Chenwi argues that the African Commission failed in its obligation in that 
it neglected to elaborate on what constitutes reasonable steps.161 In the Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (“Endorois”)162 Communication, the 
African Commission stated that the state party bears the burden of proving that a 
measure it has adopted is reasonable.163 This decision considered the eviction of the 
Endorois people from their ancestral land to create a game reserve for tourism. The 
complainants alleged a violation of articles 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 of the ACHPR.164 This 
decision required the state party to prove that a restriction on these aforementioned 
rights, particularly the right to practice their religion on their ancestral land, was 
reasonable. The African Commission stated that it may, in some circumstances, be 
necessary for state parties to limit the rights in the ACHPR. However, they must be 
related and directly proportionate to the need being fulfilled through the restriction.165  
Thus, the African Commission has strengthened its jurisprudence through 
elaborating that state parties bear the burden of proof to show that an action has 
reasonably been taken and that rights have reasonably been limited. Chenwi argues 
further that the decision in Endorois would be beneficial to poor litigants who lack 
sufficient resources to prove unreasonableness on behalf of the state party.166 This 
could be used in future litigation where state parties need to prove that their resource 
allocation for women’s rights, or lack thereof, has been reasonable. Subsequently, the 
Endorois decision elaborates on the “reasonable steps” as described in SERAC.167  
SERAC shows that there rests a positive duty on the state party to ensure that steps 
are taken to realise these rights despite apparent resource constraints. Thus, the 
African Commission expects state parties to fulfil its obligations in terms of the ACHPR 
even if there is a lack of available resources. In SERAC the African Commission stated 
that it did not wish to “fault governments that are labouring under difficult 
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circumstances to improve the lives of their people”.168 However, in the African 
Commission’s own words, there is no right in the ACHPR that “cannot be made 
effective”.169 
In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia (“Purohit”)170  the African Commission further 
grappled with resource allocation for mental health care under the ACHPR. The 
communication dealt with the poor conditions in The Gambia’s psychiatric health units 
as well as the effects of mental health legislation in The Gambia.171 The complainants 
alleged a violation of articles 2, 3, 5, 7(1)(a), 7(1)(c), 13(1), 16 and 18(4) of the 
ACHPR.172 In response, the African Commission read into article 16 of the ACHPR 
(right to health), an obligation to take “concrete and targeted steps” to realise this 
right.173 This was after having due regard to the fact that many individuals were not 
enjoying the right to health because of resource constraints.  
Amin argues that “concrete and targeted steps” incorporates the obligation on state 
parties to take immediate steps towards the progressive realisation of the right to 
health.174 The African Commission concluded that state parties need to take “full 
advantage of its available resources”. Ssenyonjo adds that the concept of “progressive 
realisation subject to available resources” was thus read into article 16.175 From this 
approach, it is possible to conclude that article 16(2) of the ACHPR creates an 
obligation on state parties to take defined steps in order to fully realise the right to 
health. A similar approach could prove useful under the Maputo Protocol.  
Yeshanew, in his analysis of Purohit concludes that “[t]here is also nothing wrong 
with issuing remedies with resource implications, but the [African] Commission could 
have rationalized its recommendations with appropriate justifications and indication of 
more specific mode of execution”.176 This reiterates the fact that while the African 
Commission is making progressive decisions regarding resource allocation, there still 
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remains a lack of certainty around exact implementation. Purohit also showed that the 
African Commission is cognisant of resource constraints that many state parties face. 
It acknowledged that:  
 
“[I]t is aware that millions of people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally 
because African countries are generally faced with the problem of poverty which renders 
them incapable to provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that 
facilitate the full enjoyment of this right.”177  
 
This further highlights that the African Commission is mindful of the resource 
constraints that state parties face and that the realisation of these rights are resource 
intensive. This is, furthermore, a recognition of how poverty and scarce resources 
result in some African states not being able to facilitate the full enjoyment of the right 
to health.178 However, despite this acknowledgement, the African Commission still 
made the decision that these rights need to be realised within the available resources 
of the state party. Yeshanew argues that the lack of implementation guidelines in 
relation to resource allocation could be attributed to the African Commission’s 
cognisance of resource constraints.179  
The analysis of the African Commission in Purohit and SERAC show that state 
parties have clear obligations when it comes to resource allocation in terms of the 
ACHPR. It is not enough for state parties to allege that resource constraints are 
hindering the realisation of rights. State parties need to take active steps to realise 
these rights. These communications are, as indicated by Mbazira, considered 
progressive because of the extensive way in which they protect the rights in the 
ACHPR.180 
 
2 3 2 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
The African Commission has further elaborated on resource allocation in the 
Principles and Guidelines. These were created in accordance with article 45(1)(b) of 
 
177 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication 241/01 (2003) para 84.  
178 Ssenyonjo (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 388.  
179 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 284. 
180 C Mbazira “Enforcing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Twenty Years of Redundancy, Progression and Significant Strides” (2006) 6 AHRLJ 
358 348.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  34 
 
the ACHPR as they are “principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating 
to human and peoples’ rights”. The Principles and Guidelines were presented in 2011 
after the African Commission presented its findings in SERAC and Purohit.  
The Principles and Guidelines indicate that article 1 of the ACHPR requires state 
parties to “recognise” the rights, duties and freedoms in the ACHPR which should 
include budgetary measures.181 The African Commission further stated that these 
rights need to be made available “regardless of how this is achieved”.182 Amin, relying 
on a teleological methodology for interpreting the ACHPR, argues that article 1 of the 
ACHPR implicitly includes the notions of “progressive realisation” and “within 
maximum available resources” where it states “to adopt other measures”. She further 
argues that the phrase allows states to “take into account non-legislative measures, 
such as resource consideration, planning, and budgeting to realise the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter [ACHPR].”183 State parties are also obligated, 
in terms of the Principles and Guidelines, to allocate sufficient resources within 
national budgets to realise each right in the ACHPR.184 These national budgets and 
national policies should also include an analysis of budget allocation and 
implementation.185 The Principles and Guidelines state that the available resources 
that a state party has to its disposal include international assistance and 
cooperation.186  
The Principles and Guidelines also define the concept of progressive realisation 
within the context of economic, social and cultural rights. This refers to the “obligation 
to progressively and constantly move towards the full realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, within the resources available to a State, including regional and 
international aid”.187 This concept requires state parties to implement a “reasonable 
and measurable plan” which prioritises the needs of “members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups”.188 The Principles and Guidelines also state that the minimum 
 
181 ACHPR “Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2011) African Commission on Human and 
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level of each of the economic, social and cultural rights in the ACHPR should always 
be met. This “obligation exists regardless of the availability of resources and is non-
derogable”.189 Durojaye states that the African Commission could have been inspired 
by the ICESCR when incorporating the concepts of progressive realisation and 
minimum core values into the Principles and Guidelines.190 These concepts, in the 
context of the ICESCR, are analysed further in chapter 4.  
The Principles and Guidelines elaborate further on the right to health191 which was 
addressed in both SERAC and Purohit.192 In terms of the Principles and Guidelines, 
states are obligated to set a target of allocating at least 15 per cent of their annual 
budget to the advancement of the national health sector.193 Of the amount that makes 
up this 15 per cent, an adequate and appropriate portion must go to the authorities 
responsible for the fights against malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other related 
diseases. Other strategies laid out in the Principles and Guidelines, such as ensuring 
that National Poverty Reduction Strategies include specific plans to realise the right to 
health, are also resource intensive.194 Thus, the Principles and Guidelines have 
provided more concrete implementation strategies regarding resource allocation for 
the right to health following the SERAC and Purohit communications.  
As discussed above, the SERAC communication stated that “reasonable and other 
measures” were necessary to realise the right to a satisfactory environment in article 
24 of the ACHPR.195 The Principles and Guidelines elaborate on what this would 
entail. The Principles and Guidelines importantly include the right to water and 
sanitation as being implied in various articles in the ACHPR, including articles 4, 5, 15, 
16, 22 and 24. To effectively realise this right, state parties need to implement 
resource-intensive measures such as comprehensive water strategies and 
responsible usage monitoring systems.196  
The Principles and Guidelines are not binding on state parties, nevertheless, they 
provide an interpretative tool for addressing economic, social and cultural rights 
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obligations within the ACHPR.197 The non-binding nature is also evident in article 
45(1)(b) of the ACHPR as “African Governments may base their legislations 
[emphasis added]” on these Principles and Guidelines. The Principles and Guidelines 
ensure that state parties understand their obligations in terms of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Durojaye describes the Principles and Guidelines as a “marking 
scheme to measure states’ commitments to their obligations to realise socioeconomic 
rights”.198  
2 4 Conclusion  
The analysis in this chapter established that there has been no direct interpretation of 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol by the supervisory bodies responsible for 
overseeing its implementation. The African Court has, in its jurisprudence, provided 
limited interpretation of the Maputo Protocol as a whole. The Maputo Protocol has also 
only been addressed in two cases before the African Court. APDF revealed how the 
African Court generated resource-intensive obligations derived from other provisions 
of the Maputo Protocol, without referring directly to article 26(2) of the Protocol. The 
African Commission has equally not analysed article 26(2) in any of its decisions, but 
has referred to it in General Comment 2 by stating that adequate resources need to 
be allocated to strengthen public health offerings.  
The analysis of state reports filed under the Maputo Protocol established that state 
parties are unclear as to how resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol should 
be interpreted and very few referred to gender responsive budgeting initiatives in their 
state reports (as is required by reporting guidelines). Despite the glaring irregularities 
of the reporting, the content is also lacking with regard to resource allocation and 
gender responsive budgeting.  
In addition, the interpretation of resource allocation under the ACHPR has been 
sparse and has not provided adequate guidance to state parties. The analysis of 
resource allocation under the ACHPR showed that the African Commission has made 
progressive decisions for the realisation of human rights. This is especially prevalent 
in the unwavering response to rights not being fully realised in the SERAC and Purohit 
decisions. This chapter presented that a lack of sufficient, rigorous interpretation of 
resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol, has led to discrepancies and gaps in 
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the guidance provided to state parties to fulfil their obligations under the Maputo 
Protocol.  
Thus, there is a need for new interpretive and implementation guidelines for African 
countries on allocating resources to realise women’s rights. Chapter 3 considers the 
role that feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting can play as a 
theoretical framework for resource allocation decisions. This analysis further considers 
the shortfalls in interpretation and implementation identified in this chapter through the 
lens of feminist legal theory. 
 
CHAPTER 3: FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND GENDER RESPONSIVE 
BUDGETING: A THEORETICAL LENS  
3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 focused on the current interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. 
It was shown that the supervisory organs of the Maputo Protocol have failed to develop 
a sufficiently rigorous interpretation of article 26(2). This has resulted in an inadequate 
normative framework guiding states parties in the fulfilment of their obligations under 
the Maputo Protocol. This chapter analyses the role that feminist legal theory and 
gender responsive budgeting can play as a theoretical lens in developing the 
interpretation of the obligations in article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol to remedy some 
of the defects identified in chapter 2.  
The research question guiding this chapter asks to what extent feminist legal theory 
and gender responsive budgeting can be used to assist in the interpretation of the 
resource allocation instruction under article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The 
hypothesis aligned with this question is that feminist legal theory and gender 
responsive budgeting provides a comprehensive theoretical approach, which can 
assist in guiding the research in interpreting and evaluating state obligations relating 
to the resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol.  
 
3 2 Feminist legal theory  
Feminists seek “the empowerment of women and the transformation of institutions 
dominated by men”.199 Feminist legal theory developed in the 1960s, during the 
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second wave of the women’s movement.200 One of the goals of feminist legal theory 
is to ensure that advocacy for women’s rights is grounded in women’s lived 
experiences.201 Thus, the law needs to respond to existing patriarchal patterns within 
social relations and seek to redress them. This redress is especially necessary to 
rectify social inequalities between men and women.  
Feminist legal theory has been categorised into three “waves” or “generations” 
which signify periods of intensive development.202 Legal scholars use “waves” and 
“generations” interchangeably, however, for consistency, the term “generation(s)” will 
be used in this research. Chamallas points out that a defining characteristic of these 
generations is that they tend to respond to and criticise the preceding generation.203 
She describes these three generations as the “generation of equality”, the “generation 
of difference” and the “generation of complex identities”.204 
The first generation, which became prominent in the 1970s was characterised by 
the struggle to assert the similarities between men and women and to win equal 
rights.205 It was argued that, due to these similarities, men and women should enjoy 
equal access to benefits and opportunities in society.206 Thus, the “generation of 
equality” was coined.  
During the 1980s, the second generation of feminism emerged, which was 
characterised by a recognition of the inherent differences between men and women. 
While the first generation emphasised the similarities between men and women, the 
second generation highlighted the importance of acknowledging the difference in men 
and women’s histories and social standing. The focus of the second generation was 
to show how women were prevented from attaining substantive equality because of 
social and organisational structures that failed to consider gender differences.207 
These gender differences included, for example, sexual and reproductive rights. 
Gender difference was analysed through its origins in cultural attitudes, ideology, 
discourse, and socialisation.208 Women and men could no longer be treated equally 
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as fought for in the first generation because the law had always catered for men. More 
extensive legal redress was thus needed.  
The third generation of feminist theory emerged during the 1990s and is still 
developing today. This generation emphasised the complex identities that made up 
women, particularly where these identities create differences amongst women 
themselves.209 This is in contrast to the second generation where the difference 
between men and women was emphasised. The multiplicity among diverse women’s 
lived experiences came to the forefront during the third generation. This included race, 
age, class, sexuality, culture, and religion.210  
The first and second generations have also been criticised and further developed 
through the third generation. Because of the extensive development of the third 
generation, the first and second generations are no longer relevant to a modern 
application of feminist legal theory. The third generation of feminist legal theory is 
where the concept of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory developed. Anti-
essentialism is further discussed below.211 
In the 1980s, feminist scholars started analysing legal structures that impeded 
justice for women instead of advancing it.212 Today, feminist legal theory is focused 
on analysing law in three ways: first, to identify sources of bias and injustice within it; 
secondly to utilise it in a way that advances justice for women within institutions and 
social practices; and thirdly, to identify and overcome systems of oppression and other 
barriers to reform.213  
A feminist perspective of the law is one that questions the application of legal rules 
with the ultimate objective of helping to craft a legal system that is empowering to all. 
This perspective specifically considers the impact that policy and the law have on 
women and whether such impact is detrimental to them. Through this constant 
questioning, the law is developed and strengthened. Furthermore, this questioning 
occurs specifically through the lens of women’s experiences because of the law’s 
patriarchal history. This questioning has become known as asking the “women 
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question”.214 By asking the women question, the ways in which the law has failed to 
consider the lived experiences of diverse women can be identified and possibly 
rectified.215 The application of feminist legal theory is, thus, twofold: first, it analyses 
the way in which the law is affecting and promoting women’s rights. Secondly, if the 
law is not effectively promoting women’s rights, the law must be “reworked” or re-
evaluated.216 Wishik describes feminist jurisprudential inquiry as follows:  
“Feminist jurisprudence … inquires into the politics of law. Yet feminist jurisprudential 
inquiry focuses particularly on the law’s role in perpetuating patriarchal hegemony. Such 
inquiry is feminist in that it is grounded in women’s concrete experiences. These 
experiences are the source of feminism’s validity and its method of analysis. Feminist 
inquiry involves the understanding and application of the personal is political. … We who 
wish to look at law and society from the point of view of all women’s experience may help 
ensure our ability to see from that point of view by collectivising our process of inquiry. This 
may mean both asking questions which by their scope are careful to be inclusive of all 
women’s experience and working collectively with other women in the formulation and 
exploration of our questions [emphasis added].”217 
 
Wishik’s description thus ensures that the feminist legal inquiry is inclusive of all 
women’s lived experiences. However, the guiding voices during the first and second 
generations of feminist legal theory have been white, Western, middle-class women. 
This has created tensions between white feminists and feminists of colour. The third 
generation of feminist legal theory is thus grounded in ensuring the law remains 
inclusive of all women who face varying degrees of discrimination. In so doing, legal 
responses seek to empower and protect all women.  
Wishik states that feminist jurisprudence can “help us envision the world we wish 
to create”.218 Because it is necessary to consider present social inequalities as well as 
how to redress them, Bonthuys and Albertyn concur with this idea and conclude that 
any feminist legal inquiry needs to be “concerned with both the law as it is, as well as 
the law as it ought to be”.219 Van Marle and Bonthuys suggest that we can redefine 
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existing legal dilemmas by placing women’s experiences at the centre of our legal 
reasoning.220  
Within the context of the Maputo Protocol, Budoo argues that it reflects feminist 
legal theory in Africa.221 Particularly because it is aimed at the promotion of women 
and the redress of patriarchal systems that seek to impede the advancement of 
women’s rights.222 To ensure that this inquiry is grounded in the inclusivity of all African 
women’s experiences, this research will utilise this third generation of feminist legal 
theory. Particular attention will be paid to the anti-essentialist strand of feminist legal 
theory to identify how the theory could be best used to interpret and implement the 
Maputo Protocol. 
 
3 3 Anti-essentialist feminist legal theory  
3 3 1 The relevance of anti-essentialism in interpreting the Maputo Protocol  
The theory underlying this research needs a lens through which to view and aim to 
redress the discrimination that diverse African women continuously face. Africa, being 
a vast continent with diverse inhabitants and countries, has many differing, yet 
intersecting human rights issues. Women face gender inequality as well as 
intersecting forms of discrimination on grounds such as age, economic status, racial 
or ethnic background, religion, nationality, citizenship, marital status, health, HIV/AIDS 
status or disability, poverty, and sexual orientation among others.223 These 
intersecting grounds can compound the discrimination that women face.224 Tamale 
suggests that the varied backgrounds of Africans stem from the diverse socio-cultural 
circumstances as well as the political differences in each region.225 Africa also has a 
vast number of different cultural and religious practices (including Christianity, Islam, 
and many different African traditional religions) which impact the way women and other 
intersecting factors, such as sexuality, are viewed. Differing customary practices, 
cultures, and religions affect the way that women are treated in society as well as in 
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the household. It also affects their sexual and reproductive rights, including gender 
identity and sexuality.226 De Vos describes writing about the complexity of Africa as 
“precarious” because of the vastness and diversity of the continent.227  
As Africa is such a diverse continent, it stands to reason that African women also 
share its complexity. Chiwara points out that in Africa, women still bear a 
disproportionate burden of poverty, non-monetised care work, discriminatory land 
ownership, discriminatory inheritance rights as well as limited access to education and 
adequate health care services.228 The burden of poverty and a lack of education are 
frequently connected. Families facing severe poverty often need to decide whom to 
send to school, and often it is the girl child who has to stay at home and help the 
family.229 Thus, the cycle of African women in poverty, having diminished access to 
education and carrying the weight of non-monetised care work, continues.230 
Therefore, gender equality in Africa is a complex issue that cannot be solved without 
understanding the intersecting issues faced by African women. The differences among 
African women are so significant when attempting to understand their lived 
experiences that it has been described as “substantive diversity”.231 Gender equality 
in Africa consequently requires an understanding of the complexities of the lived 
experiences of African women.  
Chirwa argues that the only way to achieve gender equality is through substantive 
equality.232 Formal equality requires people to be treated the same without taking into 
consideration their different contexts.233 Substantive equality requires laws and 
policies to take into consideration women’s lived experiences and patriarchal customs 
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that disempower women.234 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women avers that substantive equality can only be achieved through laws 
and policies specifically designed to advance women’s rights, and not through gender-
neutral measures.235 Discrimination and gender inequality can occur even when law 
and policy are seemingly gender neutral. For example, aid programmes that benefit 
the “head of the household” tend to directly disadvantage women since men are 
considered the head of the house in many cultures.236 
A 2017 AU Report on Women’s Rights in Africa affirms that the Maputo Protocol 
promotes substantive equality.237 The Maputo Protocol advocates for equality that can 
only be achieved through a holistic understanding of the context of African women and 
a redistribution of resources.238 Only when policies and measures implemented by 
state parties take into consideration these intersecting grounds of discrimination, can 
substantive equality be achieved.239 The Maputo Protocol thus requires state parties 
to take active steps to realise substantive equality.240  
Rebouché argues that the Maputo Protocol incorporates various understandings of 
feminist legal theory that have been expressed in other women’s rights instruments 
over the years.241 However, the relevance of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory is 
the main focus of this research. Africa is a vastly diverse continent, requiring legal 
solutions that are responsive to these diversities. Nyanzi concludes that “feminist … 
knowledge in Africa must use innovative stylistics to capture the imagination and 
thinking of its consumers in order to undo normative and often oppressive modes of 
thought and knowing”.242 These solutions need to be cognisant of the multiplicity of 
women which includes race, age, class, sexual orientation, disability, culture and other 
factors, as mentioned above. Tamale acknowledges that the “African renaissance or 
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the transformation that we are striving for” will only be realised when the gap between 
the different voices seeking justice and equality is closed.243 The struggle for gender 
equality in Africa cannot stand in isolation from these other intersecting issues.  
 
3 3 2 Critiques of essentialism  
Anti-essentialism was born out of criticism of the essentialism of the second generation 
of feminist legal theory.244 This gender essentialism refers to the assumption that there 
is a commonality between all women, such as oppression by men, which needs to be 
addressed through feminism.245 Furthermore, it postulates that all women share the 
“same inherent characteristics”.246 This leads to an over generalisation of women’s 
struggles from the perspective of only some groups of women.247  
Bartlett describes anti-essentialism as “internal criticism” against feminist theory 
itself.248 Chamallas also described essentialism as an “internal enemy” which has the 
potential to “tarnish feminist-inspired reforms, rendering them inadequate to meet the 
needs of large numbers of women”.249 Van Marle and Bonthuys consider essentialism 
as a “pitfall” by regarding women as “sharing an ahistorical, uncontextualised feminine 
identity”.250 Anti-essentialism is thus a critical component of the third generation 
because of the inclusive way women’s diverse lived experiences are brought to the 
forefront of feminist legal theory. 
Anti-essentialism also forms an important part of post-modern and intersectional 
feminist theory. Post-modern and intersectional feminism are strands of feminist legal 
theory that emerged in the third generation and are still developing today. Post-modern 
feminism contends that individuals do not have fixed identities but rather have an 
identity that is “continuously constructed in different contexts by competing 
discourses”.251 Intersectional feminism examines how multiple factors of one’s being 
intersect to create distinctive forms of discrimination.252 Crenshaw developed the 
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concept of intersectionality and characterised it as a complex system of simultaneous 
areas of oppression and disempowerment that can affect a person.253 Post-modern 
and intersectional feminism are broader theories of feminism, of which anti-
essentialism is an integral strand.  
Harris is considered one of the first scholars to apply an anti-essentialist philosophy 
to feminist legal theory. She describes essentialism as a “notion that a unitary, 
‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, 
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”.254 She warns that gender 
essentialism, while intellectually convenient to the feminist movement, can pave the 
way for unconscious racism.255 It places “white women on the throne of essential 
womanhood”.256 As argued by Minow, the unifying expression of women helps to 
categorise experience, even to the detriment of denying the experiences of some 
women.257 Essentialism, thus, has the potential to oversimplify the diverse 
experiences of women.  
Bartlett has identified some of the problems created by essentialism. The first is 
false generalisations or universalisms. This operates through a “particular privileged 
norm – that of the white, middle class, heterosexual woman” being presupposed and 
therefore, ignoring other characteristics that construct a woman’s identity.258 Another 
problem that Bartlett describes as “gender imperialism” arises from overemphasising 
sex as a basis of discrimination and so diminishing other grounds of 
disempowerment.259 These issues can become particularly prevalent when the law is 
interpreted and applied in ways that do not take into account the different contexts of 
the women whose situations it aims to improve.  
In essence, anti-essentialist scholars argue that the issue of “sameness” or 
“difference” does not only separate men and women but also women and women.260 
Feminist legal theory seeks to put women, as a category, at the forefront of the legal 
inquiry, while anti-essentialism asks who this woman is and how the law empowers 
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this particular woman. Women have multiple complex identities that Chamallas 
describes as follows: 
 
“The intersectional commitment requires feminists to consider the different social positions 
of various subgroups of women and to appreciate that some women may experience 
distinctive forms of discrimination or escape harm altogether. It also leads to the 
uncomfortable realisation that women can and do oppress other women. Like men, women 
can be privileged because of their race, class, or other social advantage and can use that 
privilege to injure others.”261  
 
Women undoubtedly have multiple identities, and any one or combination of these 
identities such as race or gender can give rise to discrimination. These identities are 
also indivisible. As expressed by Harris, for women who also face racial discrimination, 
“the experience of self is precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of race 
and gender – of being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory, discourses 
of sexuality and color”.262 Wong, however, criticises Harris for focusing her analysis of 
anti-essentialism on black women.263 Nevertheless, while the experiences of black 
women were central to Harris’ argument, it was used to illustrate how essentialism can 
oversimplify women’s experience of discrimination. Feminist legal theory should not 
only reflect the experiences of a subgroup of women. Harris reiterates that a move to 
anti-essentialism would not threaten feminism itself. Instead, feminists would “begin to 
attack racism and classism and homophobia” together under the banner of feminist 
legal theory.264  
Anti-essentialism will be the main lens through which the Maputo Protocol will be 
interpreted given its ability to respond to women’s diverse realities and identifies in 
Africa. While anti-essentialist feminist legal theory has been identified as the most 
appropriate theory by which to guide this research, it is necessary to also consider 
criticisms of the theory. This research will remain cognisant of these criticisms to 
ensure that the research is not hindered or blind to potential shortcomings.  
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3 3 3 Critiques of anti-essentialism  
Wong argues that anti-essentialism is mainly criticised because, through trying to 
define the various complexities of a woman’s identity, anti-essentialist authors fall into 
an essentialist trap themselves.265 By attempting to capture and explain all the 
complexities and multiple identities that make up a woman, another “essential woman” 
is being created. Wong suggests that this will also be the case regardless of how 
“women” is defined or interpreted.266  
Another criticism of anti-essentialism is that, by focusing on this array of complex 
identities, we potentially move away from feminist legal theory and women’s rights.267 
This could be considered as distancing the analysis from the aim of feminist legal 
theory, towards the protection of human rights in general. Wong argues that 
essentialism is unavoidable because “there is always a need to define the category of 
‘woman’” that we are trying to empower and protect.268  
However, despite the potential problems that anti-essentialism could create, Wong 
remains optimistic that an anti-essentialist feminist legal theory could constitute a 
useful analytical tool. She states that all feminist legal theory should be cognisant of 
the essentialism and anti-essentialism debate.269 In so doing, a theorist is able to 
understand all aspects of the debate as well as the possible pitfalls. These pitfalls are 
particularly prevalent when trying to define the category, “women” which also, 
inadvertently, privileges a particular type of woman.270  
Consequently, when applying anti-essentialist feminist legal theory, we need to 
ensure that the inquiry is focused on the diverse circumstances of all women and the 
way that different identities and experiences intersect and affect women’s lived 
realities. The inquiry needs to remain focused on the experiences of all women and, 
in particular, the women who are directly affected in the context of the particular law 
being analysed. Oloka-Onyango and Tamale argue that in order to ensure that the 
theory being applied is effective, there is a need for a common foundation binding 
 
265 Wong (1999) William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 291.  
266 292.  
267 291.  
268 292.  
269 295.  
270 296.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  48 
 
together the social movement – in this case, women.271 Charlesworth similarly argues 
that the strength of the feminist message lies in the generality of women, although the 
particular circumstances of women need to be analysed and applied in specific 
contexts.272 Thus, to realise the rights of the collective, attention needs to be paid to 
the particular circumstances of women.273  
Particular care must be taken to ensure that the interpretation and application of the 
Maputo Protocol are responsive to the diversity of women’s experiences of oppression 
in Africa. Harris refers to the application of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory as a 
“creative struggle that reflects a multiple consciousnesses.”274 The use of anti-
essentialism to realise the rights in the Maputo Protocol is one of the creative ways in 
which it can be applied. Particularly, how anti-essentialism can influence the 
development of gender responsive budgeting. The following part includes an analysis 
of gender responsive budgeting as a practical application of feminist legal theory. 
Particular attention will be paid to how states parties can meet their obligations in terms 
of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol through gender responsive budgeting.  
 
3 4 Gender responsive budgeting 
3 4 1 The significance of budgeting for human rights 
As reiterated throughout this research, resources are integral to the realisation of 
human rights. All human rights, whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural, 
can only be effectively protected through public funds which are efficiently allocated to 
the relevant sector.275 Thus, the relationship between resource allocation and human 
rights is critical. The substantive realisation of human rights makes “demands on public 
finance well beyond what is required for the basic administration of justice”.276 These 
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resources include human, technological, organisational, natural, informational and 
financial resources.277 The realisation of human rights, thus, create obligations for 
state parties in terms of the drafting and effective implementation of national budgets 
and public policies.278 Resource allocation by governments plays a vital role in the 
realisation of human rights. As noted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights:  
 
“On a day-to-day basis, governments fulfil their human rights obligations through 
developing and implementing well-thought-out policies, plans, institutions, and budgets – 
ones that hold the promise of being effective – and then assessing them to determine 
whether they have, in fact, been successful in realizing people’s rights”.279   
 
The allocation of resources through budgets and policy reflects the government’s 
values and priorities.280 Thus, states which prioritise the advancement and protection 
of women’s rights need to reflect that in their resource allocation decisions. The 
national, provincial and local budgets and policies could be described as indicating 
one way in which governments intend to further human rights.281 Thus, it is possible 
to consider state budgets and policies to assess whether these states will meet their 
human rights obligations.282 Similarly, state parties need to mobilise resources to meet 
their obligations in terms of the Maputo Protocol and to realise women’s rights.  
States are not able to meet their obligations in terms of the treaties they have ratified 
without the mobilisation of resources. Thus, gender responsive budgeting, as a way 
for state parties to meet their obligations in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol is considered.283 To do this, it is necessary to first evaluate the relation 
between feminist legal theory and gender responsive budgeting. In particular, gender 
responsive budgeting as an application of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory will be 
integral to the discussion.  
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3 4 2 Gender responsive budgeting as a response to feminist legal theory 
While budgeting is essential for state parties to meet their human rights obligations, 
gender responsive budgeting is integral for states to fulfil their obligations in relation 
to women’s rights. Since the main aim of gender responsive budgeting is to ensure 
that state parties meet their obligations to mobilise resources for the realisation of 
women’s rights, it can be considered a “manifestation of feminist legal theory”.284 
However, the reach of gender responsive budgeting is broader than simply protecting 
women. The term “gender” refers to all socially constructed identities, attributes, roles 
and power relationships as a result of the social and cultural significance attached to 
the biological differences between men and women.285 Thus, gender responsive 
budgeting has the potential to address gender-based discrimination, which includes 
the promotion and empowerment of women. Some gender budgeting frameworks 
discussed in this chapter only refer to the promotion of women, without acknowledging 
gender relations.286  
Gender responsive budgeting was the outcome of a long struggle by feminists to 
have women’s needs reflected in every aspect of the budgeting process.287 Gender 
responsive budgeting can thus actualise the commitments of feminist legal theory. By 
implementing gender responsive budgeting initiatives, states acknowledge the 
significance of the work of women’s rights activists and theorists.  
This section considers whether gender responsive budgeting can constitute a viable 
tool for interpreting and implementing article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Gender 
responsive budgeting has been established as an effective way for states to meet their 
obligations in terms of CEDAW.288 The use of gender responsive budgeting in other 
international instruments, including CEDAW, is further analysed in chapter 4. This 
analysis assists in establishing best practices for effectively realising women’s rights 
through resource allocation. 
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It will be shown, through the analysis of gender responsive budgeting 
implementation, that the main concepts of gender responsive budgeting are not 
directly aligned with anti-essentialist feminist legal theory.289 As argued above, anti-
essentialist feminist legal theory represents the optimal theoretical framework for 
interpreting the Maputo Protocol.290 Few gender responsive budgeting initiatives 
implement elements of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. However, Elson 
discusses anti-essentialism in the taxation systems of revenue frameworks for gender 
responsive budgeting.291  
A misconception of budgeting for the realisation of women’s rights is that a singular 
budget, aimed at women, should be created. A singular “women’s budget” does not 
reflect an understanding that women’s rights should be integrated into all aspects of 
government policy. However, many feminist theories argue that a general budgetary 
reform aimed at realising the rights of all women will eventually filter down to realise 
the rights of the most marginalised groups of women.292 An anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory approach to gender responsive budgeting would call for a holistic analysis 
of all government budgets to ensure that differently situated groups of women are 
considered at every stage of state planning, policy and budgets. Gender responsive 
budgeting has the potential to ensure that feminist legal theory is practically 
implemented, and women’s rights are realised effectively.293  
 
3 4 3 Definition and purpose of gender responsive budgeting 
Gender responsive budgeting as a concept was developed in Australia in the 1980s. 
It forms part of gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming has been defined as 
the “reorganisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, 
so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and all 
stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”.294 Gender responsive 
budgeting seeks to raise awareness within government of the impact of budgets and 
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social policies on women, to keep government accountable to gender equality goals, 
and to facilitate reforms to improve the socio-economic status of women.295 Each level 
of government had to assess their individual budget to determine what the effect was 
on women and girls and if there were any achievements in terms of gender equality.296 
Various countries have since implemented this approach as a means to realise gender 
equality. The Council of Europe has described gender responsive budgeting as: 
 
“[A]n application of gender mainstreaming in the budgetary process. It means a gender-
based assessment of budgets, incorporating a gender-perspective at all levels of the 
budgetary process and restructuring revenues and expenditures in order to promote gender 
equality.”297  
 
This definition, as argued by Budoo, identifies the key objectives of gender 
responsive budgeting.298 It assesses public policy and budgeting through a gender-
oriented lens in order to ensure that resources are effectively allocated to realise 
women’s human rights.299 Such gender-sensitive public budget analysis is likely to 
promote better outcomes in terms of the realisation of women’s rights at all levels of 
government policy.300 It accordingly offers an optimal methodology for interpreting, 
implementing and assessing states parties’ obligations in terms of article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol.  
Another definition of gender responsive budgeting is that of the Southern African 
Development Community Guidelines on Gender Responsive Budgeting (“SADC 
Guidelines”).301 The SADC Guidelines contain a definition that is more cognisant of 
the intersection of gender with race, class and age.302 It states that “further categories 
of inequality” need to be considered when developing a gender responsive budget. 
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The SADC Guidelines emphasise the fact that gender responsive budgeting needs to 
be integrated into all public finance and economic policy and not merely constitute a 
separate budget aimed at women’s rights.303  
By mainstreaming gender responsiveness into all spheres of a country’s public 
finance policies, women’s rights can be strengthened in all relevant areas, including 
education for girls, reproductive health, gender equality in the workplace, the 
recognition of non-monetised care work and domestic violence. This mainstreaming 
would not be possible if gender responsive budgeting relied exclusively on a definition 
that ignored intersecting grounds of inequality and discrimination. Gender responsive 
budgeting thus encompasses the theory of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory by 
ensuring that state budgets include a gender perspective that is cognisant of 
intersecting forms of inequality and discrimination. However, the current expenditure 
implementation strategies for gender responsive budgeting do not adequately reflect 
the intersecting issues of inequality and discrimination.304 The current expenditure 
strategies only refer to how budgets need to be formulated to empower women and 
not how different groups of women would require individualised budgetary allocations. 
This issue will be further addressed in chapter five when a new interpretative 
framework for resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol will be developed.  
As the SADC Guidelines state, an important aspect of gender responsive budgeting 
is that is it not simply about dividing a state’s budget 50-50 for men and women or 
about creating a separate budget exclusively for the promotion of women. Instead, as 
Budlender and Hewitt point out, all government budgets are analysed “from a gender 
perspective to assess how it will address the different needs of women and men, girls 
and boys.”305 In this way, gender responsive budgeting would also ensure better 
substantive equality outcomes for women. This, in turn, requires state parties to 
contextualise gender responsive budgeting in terms of the assessment of gender 
equality within that country. Thus, each state will need to establish how their gender 
responsive budgets should be effectively designed and managed to ensure that 
resources are allocated to meet the needs of women within their region.  
Gender responsive budgeting initiatives can serve multiple purposes which include 
improving the allocation of resources to women, supporting gender mainstreaming in 
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macroeconomics, encouraging civil society participation in government policy 
planning, strengthening the link between economic and social policy goals, and 
tracking government expenditure against gender and development policy 
obligations.306  
Another major advantage of gender responsive budgeting is that it enhances 
accountability and transparency of the state’s policies. The SADC Guidelines draw 
particular attention to the international commitments that state parties have and how 
gender responsive budgeting should be used as a tool to achieve the “gender-specific 
benchmarks and targets”.307 Gender responsive budgeting can be used as a yardstick 
for governments to ascertain whether they are meeting their obligations to fulfil 
women’s rights.308 The SADC Guidelines also refer to gender responsive budgeting’s 
role in exposing areas where states’ policies are “gender-blind”.309 When policies and 
laws are gender-blind, they cannot advance substantive gender equality due to their 
lack of responsiveness to the particular needs and situations of different groups of 
women. Gender-blindness could be exposed by asking how policies affect different 
groups of women.310 Once problematic areas are exposed as being gender-blind, 
state parties can rectify these patterns by creating policies that are cognisant of the 
fact that the differing needs of men and women influence how these policies affect 
them.311  
 
3 4 4 Civil society’s role in gender responsive budgeting 
The gender responsive budgeting process in Africa can greatly benefit from the 
participation of NGOs dedicated to gender issues as well as the participation of civil 
society. The term civil society refers to a “range of groupings in society that participate 
in some way in public life”.312 Civil society accordingly includes NGOs as well as 
“professional associations, research and policy centres, philanthropic foundations, 
community-based groups … the media, business organisations and trade unions”.313 
When examining the gender responsive budgeting process, civil society should 
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include NGOs focused on gender related issues, such as sexual and reproductive 
health, education for girls, and domestic violence to name a few.  
As previously indicated, gender responsive budgeting originated in Australia.314 It 
has been argued that one of the main reasons why government took limited action to 
implement gender responsive budgeting effectively in Australia was because pressure 
from civil society was weak.315 Hence, civil society involvement can have a significant 
impact on the implementation and effectiveness of a country’s gender responsive 
budgeting initiative. The budgetary process can also be seen as a social development 
mechanism because of the involvement and possible training of civil society at every 
phase.316 State parties are also encouraged to report on the involvement of civil 
society in the preparations of state reports on the Maputo Protocol to the African 
Commission.317 By including civil society in the reporting guidelines to state parties of 
the Maputo Protocol, the African Commission recognises the significant impact these 
organisations can have on state parties’ realisations of women’s rights.318 
The involvement and engagement with civil society can help ensure adherence to 
the principles of human rights. These principles include participation, accountability, 
non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law 
(informally referred to as the “PANTHER” principles).319 These principles are not 
effective in isolation and are often more effective when a combination of the principles 
are being utilised.320 Yeshanew has described the use of the human rights principles 
as a “paradigm shift in the understanding of development as a multidimensional 
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improvement in people’s capability to lead lives that they value”.321 Essential to a 
human rights-based approach should be the focus on marginalised groups.322 More 
efficient and quality outcomes can then be anticipated from the process.  
While all the principles apply to gender responsive budgeting, participation and 
accountability have been identified as being crucial to a successful gender responsive 
budgeting initiative.323 Participation is relevant at all stages of the budgetary process 
and it is particularly prevalent during the initial stages of information gathering for 
resource allocation. Participation during the initial stages ensures that civil society has 
direct access to information and decision-making power in determining budgetary 
allocations.324 In order for accountability to be effective, there needs to be 
transparency in relation to budgetary processes and the evaluation of outcomes.325 
When that is achieved, civil society is able to ensure that governments meet their 
obligations in terms of gender equality. The principle of non-discrimination is also 
essential to a successful gender responsive budgeting initiative. Yeshanew notes that 
the principle of non-discrimination should be read alongside the principle of 
participation.326 Adherence to the principle of non-discrimination will ensure that 
women enjoy equal participation in decision making and management. 
The participation of civil society and NGOs in the budgeting process can have a 
positive impact on the greater public sector budgeting capacity.327 Krafchik argues that 
civil society has a crucial role to play at all stages of the budget process, including the 
drafting stage, the legislative stage, the implementation stage, and the auditing 
stage.328 Some of the benefits of civil society being involved throughout the budget 
process are that the budget debate is well-rounded, that there is an independent 
critical analysis of government activities, that new information is brought to the budget 
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decision-making table and that accountability is increased.329 However, it has been 
more common for civil society to merely analyse government budgets, once they have 
been published, in order to present government with potentially problematic areas.330 
This is due to the closed nature of the budgetary process in many countries.331 Due to 
the lack of opportunities for participation in the budgetary process, civil society will only 
be able to analyse the budget once it has been published and entered the 
implementation stage. 
Another barrier experienced by many women and gender-based NGOs in 
participating effectively in the budgetary process is the requirement for certain skills in 
economic analysis and development.332 These technical skills can place a restriction 
on which NGOs and community groups are able to actively participate and influence 
national budgets. There are also other skills, such as negotiation and advocacy skills, 
which could hinder the participation of women in any stage of the budgetary 
process.333 Despite these potential barriers, Budlender and Hewitt argue that the 
required skills could be advantageous to some NGOs and community groups because 
it provides the opportunity for collaboration and partnerships with groups that they 
have not traditionally been associated with.334  
When considering civil society in Africa, it is also necessary to mention the 
significance of grassroots initiatives. The term “grassroots” is considered a loose term 
for citizens living in generally rural, poor areas or informal settlements.335 Bamanyaki 
and Holvoet theorise that NGOs can play a two-pronged role in targeting district level 
actors and grassroots community members.336 At a district level, female councillors 
and technocrats can be trained to analyse government gender responsive budgets as 
well as basic training on the most prominent issues that affect women.337 At the 
grassroots level, community members (mainly women) can be educated and 
mobilised on gender, advocacy and health issues, as well as local government 
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planning and budget processes.338 These initiatives will increase the awareness and 
understanding of gender responsive budgeting at the grassroots level as well as 
facilitate governments’ accountability to community members. There is also a need to 
ensure a diverse group of women form part of the budget initiative. This will guarantee 
a diverse range of ideas and representation throughout the process.  
The involvement of civil society and an application of human rights principles are 
thus paramount to an effective gender responsive budgeting initiative with better 
quality outcomes. Some implementation strategies for gender responsive budgeting 
already include elements of participation and accountability.339 These principles will 
be used in chapter 5 as a basis for proposing a framework for state parties to meet 
their obligations in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.  
 
3 4 5 Gender responsive budgeting implementation strategies 
Different views exist on what constitutes optimal strategies for implementing gender 
responsive budgeting. However, there are some basic implementation frameworks 
that are considered the basis of all gender responsive budget initiatives.340 This 
research will consider those that are most relevant to the African context. In so doing, 
best practices can be determined and utilised to create a framework that is likely to 
result in the most effective realisation of women’s rights in the Maputo Protocol. The 
implementation frameworks on gender responsive budgeting that are discussed 
include those that were developed by Sharp, Budlender, Elson and the one developed 
within the SADC.  
Sharp’s three broad goals for an effective gender responsive budgeting initiative,341 
as well as her three-way categorisation of expenditure,342 are discussed because of 
their relevance and use within most gender responsive budgeting initiatives. The 
expenditure strategies that are discussed include the SADC Guidelines’ entry points 
for finance ministers to implement gender responsive budgeting, the five-step 
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approach described by Budlender,343 and the budget cycle framework developed by 
Elson.344 Budlender’s analysis of taxation and her revenue strategy is then added.345  
Sharp formulated three broad goals within the context of Australia’s original gender 
responsive budgeting initiative. These goals have since been developed to a set of 
phases to effectively implement a gender responsive budgeting initiative. These three 
goals include awareness, accountability, and change.346 Awareness refers to 
identifying the inequities within a given sector of the budget that is being analysed. 
The aim is to make gender disparities more visible.347 Accountability then takes it 
further by ensuring that not only the budget is considered, but rather all the policies 
surrounding that sector as well as the strategic and performance plans.348 The final 
goal is change or acting. This refers to an actual alteration in that sector’s budget and 
policies which is, as argued by Sharp, the ultimate objective of gender responsive 
budgeting.349  
These goals are broad enough to be incorporated into any gender responsive 
budgeting initiative. Sharp’s strategy has been widely applied as the baseline 
framework for gender responsive budgeting strategies. The AU, for example, applied 
Sharp’s work within their Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment.350 
The AU utilised Sharp’s strategy by casting a gender responsive spotlight on their 
mainstream expenditure as well as proposing general alterations which would promote 
gender equality on a continental, regional and national level.351 These alterations 
included the involvement of women in gender equality management and planning 
teams.352   
Sharp has further described the three-way categorisation of expenditure which is 
based on the initial Australian Women’s Budget initiatives. The first category is 
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“gender-targeted expenditure”.353 This is expenditure which has been particularly 
targeted to women’s or men’s individual needs.354 This could include women’s health 
programmes or domestic violence counselling for men and women. The second 
category is “equal opportunity expenditure for civil servants”.355 This would include 
spending by government agencies on their employees for initiatives such as parental 
leave or childcare facilities for children of employees.356 The third, and final, category 
is “mainstream budget expenditures which are assessed for their gendered impact”.357 
This would include an analysis of who would be the main users of certain goods and 
services such as primary health care and agricultural support services.  
This categorisation’s main purpose is to illuminate where most government’s 
spending is going and how it can be optimised. As set out by Budlender, when state 
parties focus on the first category, they have missed the point of gender responsive 
budgeting.358 Instead, there should be a focus on category three, which considers the 
government budget holistically to establish the impact that it has on gender equality.  
Budlender has furthermore identified two potential problems with Sharp’s 
categorisation. The first is that the focus on women (in category one) could prove 
detrimental if the goal of gender equality is not at the forefront of the study.359 This 
could manifest, for example, in situations where expenditure on family planning is 
focused on controlling women’s bodies.360 Thus, the structural gender relations which 
disadvantage women need to play a central role in gender responsive budgeting 
initiatives.361  
Another potential weakness of Sharp’s categorisation is that there is no reference 
to revenue. However, as further pointed out by Budlender, this could be as a result of 
the vast differences in revenue between developed and developing countries.362 Thus, 
a framework for revenue would not be broadly applicable. Despite the differences in 
revenue experienced by developed and developing countries, tax policies still need to 
be designed in a way that supports substantive gender equality. An effective 
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framework for revenue policies which are gender responsive is, thus, a crucial part of 
gender responsive budgeting initiatives.  
In addition, the SADC Guidelines provide what they refer to as “entry points” for 
state parties to implement gender responsive budgeting at a domestic level. These 
have been divided into entry points for the ministers responsible for finance and the 
ministers responsible for gender.363 This discussion focuses on strategies for finance 
ministers because they have direct access and influence over national budget 
allocations. These guidelines are specifically directed at the SADC member states.364 
However, they could have relevance in other African states.365  
The SADC guidelines provide five entry points for ministers of finance. The first of 
these is creating systems which ensure that gender responsive budgeting is well 
institutionalised at the initial phases of planning and programming.366 This stage 
includes promoting initiatives by other committees or ministers to include gender-
specific strategies within their budgets.367 The SADC Guidelines emphasise that this 
first entry point should be considered a continuous process within any state parties’ 
planning and organisation processes.368 This process should also include coaching by 
expert consultants or NGOs within the country to ensure that the strategies are 
supported by the latest information and context-specific data.369 These consultants or 
NGOs could represent women’s interest groups or have knowledge about economic 
and budgetary planning. The involvement of NGOs and community groups in this 
process ensures that the human rights principle of participation is integrated at the 
beginning of the budgetary process. This entry point is one that can be applied to any 
state party because it encourages planning and learning about programmes that 
would best serve a specific region.  
The second entry point provided for by the SADC Guidelines is to integrate gender 
equality in expenditure frameworks and macroeconomic models.370 This entry point 
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also requires state parties to acknowledge that their current budgets and 
macroeconomic models may contain gender-blindness and that these should be 
identified.371 This includes the variable of the non-monetised care economy. Gender 
responsive budgeting emphasises that non-monetised care work in the home is 
usually performed by women. This time spent performing non-monetised care work 
needs to be considered in policy assessments and economic models.372 This work 
includes cooking, shopping, childcare, care for the elderly and odd jobs.373  
By including this work, the SADC Guidelines conclude that state parties will have a 
clearer idea of how men and women spend their time in relation to the absence and 
presence of certain services or interventions.374 The CEDAW Committee, through their 
general recommendations, has also urged state parties to use time-use studies to 
measure the non-monetised care work that women do and include them in the national 
budgets.375 Elson suggests that economists need to start viewing non-monetised care 
work as paid work within their policies, to provide the recognition that is needed.376 
The inclusion of non-monetised care work is particularly prevalent considering these 
activities are central to low-income African countries.377 Extensive work has been done 
by the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR on non-monetised care work. This is 
further discussed and analysed in chapter 4.378  
The third entry point is developing gender-sensitive budget call circulars.379 This 
refers to the finance ministers who need to send out budget call circulars to local 
government at the beginning of the fiscal year. These circulars should include policy 
priorities and frameworks that are gender sensitive and aid in the implementation of 
national gender responsive budgeting.380 This will ensure that the gender responsive 
budgeting goals and aims are implemented at every level of government. It will also 
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express an unambiguous commitment to gender responsive budgeting as well as 
providing for uniformity within implementation.  
Producing and delivering gender-sensitive budget speeches is the fourth entry 
point.381 This entry point ensures a clear articulation of the state parties’ commitment 
to gender responsive budgeting at all levels of government. A gender-sensitive budget 
speech should also include clear strategies as to how the government intends to 
achieve these substantive gender equality results through their budgeting process.382 
The fifth, and final, entry point as set out by the SADC Guidelines is integrating 
gender into performance contracts.383 This entry point is designed to act as an 
accountability mechanism for state parties. If these contracts are entered into with 
other ministries, departments, NGOs or agencies, they can be held accountable to the 
gender responsive budgeting goals they set for themselves.384 When states enter into 
these contracts, they commit themselves to key activities and goals that will be 
achieved within a fiscal year.  
Budlender has similarly developed five steps for the implementation of gender 
responsive budgeting. These five steps consider the value of gathering information 
about gender disparity. This framework has been used by African countries such as 
South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, but was initially developed for South Africa’s 
gender budgeting initiative.385 The first step is analysing the situation of women and 
men.386 Through this analysis and fact-finding, the context of the specific region can 
be accurately understood so that gender responsive budgeting initiatives will take into 
account the specificities of that region.387 This step provides an opportunity for 
participation from civil society and NGOs in information gathering  
The second step is assessing the gender responsiveness of all government 
policies.388 This step aims to assess whether a particular policy is increasing gender 
inequality or decreasing it.389 Some state parties may already have gender policies in 
place, in which case these policies would be at the forefront of this assessment 
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required by step two. However, even if there are no specific gender policies, it is 
important to examine the mainstream policies of the state party in order to detect their 
potential impact on gender equality goals.390 
The third step is assessing budget allocations.391 This step is directly linked with the 
second step because if the second step reveals that policies are adversely affecting 
substantive gender equality, then the third step can reveal to what extent funds are 
being misallocated.392 Along with step two, the third step should be used to ascertain 
where funds are currently being allocated and what the effectiveness of these 
allocations have been. Step three could also be considered alongside Budlender’s 
step four which is monitoring the spending and service delivery.393 The results from 
monitoring the spending and service delivery would be able to get a clearer picture of 
where funds are being allocated and where they are possibly being allocated 
ineffectively. The monitoring of poor service delivery would, thus, be able to illuminate 
where the focus of the budget needs to be directed.  
The fifth, and final, step is assessing the outcomes.394 This step is crucial to any 
effective gender responsive budgeting initiative. The step provides for reflection to 
ensure that the desired outcomes are being met. If gender equality goals are not being 
met, there is an opportunity to rework and rectify the initiative. Thus, the final step 
allows for constant improvement of the programme, as well as the programmes being 
monitored against its initial purpose for the improved rights of women.  
In a similar vein, Elson presents a framework for relating budgets to their impact on 
gender equality. This could be implemented within a specific province, department, or 
governmental programme.395 The framework assesses the financial inputs, activities 
financed, outputs delivered and impacts on people’s wellbeing.396 The inputs consist 
of the money collected within a certain ministry or programme. This analysis would 
include exactly which groups of society are bearing the disproportionate burden of 
direct and indirect taxation. The activities consist of the services that were planned 
and delivered. The outputs consist of the actual planned and delivered utilisation of 
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the services rendered. This could include how many patients were treated in medical 
facilities or how much taxes were collected. The impact refers to the planned and 
actual achievement in relation to the broader goals of gender equality. This could be 
the number of healthy people who benefitted from medical facilities.  
The next part of Elson’s framework entails applying a gender analysis to each of 
these dimensions to determine who is benefitting from each dimension of inputs, 
activities, outputs and impacts.397 The gaps in gender equality need to be identified 
and as well as any policy changes that need to be made in order to optimise the 
budgetary framework for gender equality.398 This information then needs to be 
conveyed to the appropriate ministry or governmental department in order to bring 
about the desired change to budgetary and policy decisions.399 A framework like this 
can be easily applied to different states and governmental organisations. This 
framework can also be utilised by NGOs and civil society to hold government 
accountable to gender equality goals, thus making it a convenient gender responsive 
budgeting initiative.  
The above strategies, apart from Elson’s framework, only address the expenditure 
side of gender responsive budgets. A crucial part that needs to be considered is how 
countries mobilise their resources and raise revenue in order to implement their 
gender responsive budgets. Most gender responsive budgeting implementation 
strategies only provide information on expenditure strategies. As stated above, 
Budlender believes the reasoning for this is the large disparity between the taxation 
revenue of developing and developed countries.400  
Thus, there are fewer lessons that can be learned from the taxation experiences of 
different countries, as opposed to the expenditure strategies.401 However, Budlender 
adapted her five-step strategy for expenditure to apply to taxation.402 This was done 
by considering direct and indirect taxation, which forms the basis for a country’s 
revenue.403 Budlender suggests that this process would involve considering national 
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and local taxes which are imposed on individuals, companies and goods and 
services.404  
First, the situation of diverse men and women needs to be considered in respect of 
how taxation affects their lives.405 This includes considering how employment status, 
consumption patterns, income levels and government-funded goods and services 
impact the way taxation is paid.406 Secondly, the taxation policy at both the national 
and local levels are to be analysed in terms of how this may affect different groups of 
men and women.407 Thirdly, consideration should be given to how much tax has been 
collected in recent years compared to the expected amount to be collected.408 The 
analysis of amounts of taxation collected would also need to be compared to the 
current year and the future gender responsive budgeting strategies. Finally, in terms 
of Budlender’s taxation analysis, it is necessary to determine and estimate, if 
necessary, how much of each category of taxes were paid by women.409 The final 
phase involves determining which groups of women were the most affected by certain 
categories of taxation.  
Different forms of taxation affect groups of men and women differently.410 Direct 
tax, such as income tax, affect men more than women because of their increased 
involvement in the formal labour market, more senior positions and higher incomes.411 
Elson argues that in order to achieve substantive equality, taxation systems need to 
be cognisant of women’s unequal access to the labour market.412 Taxation policies 
that perpetuate traditional roles for men and women, such as “breadwinner” and 
dependant, need to be reassessed and brought in line with the goals of gender 
responsive budgeting.413 Women are also generally more prominent in non-monetised 
care labour that does not have income or income tax. The final phase in Budlender’s 
taxation strategy applies principles of anti-essentialism as consideration needs to be 
given to which groups, particularly which groups of women, carry the disproportionate 
burden of taxation. Indirect tax may appear neutral because they are attached to 
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goods and services, however, these taxes have a greater impact on poor people.414 
Lower-income groups spend a higher percentage of their income on consumable 
goods and, thus, pay a higher share of their income on indirect tax such as value 
added tax. Women are also disproportionally represented among the poor and make 
higher contributions to household consumables compared to men.415 Budlender 
theorises that pressure could therefore be alleviated from women and the poor if direct 
taxes are increased.416  
These different strategies of implementing gender responsive budgeting illustrate 
that there is no one correct and accepted framework. The strategies also show that 
there is very little consideration given to the lived experiences of diverse women. Thus, 
anti-essentialist feminist legal theory currently has limited application in gender 
responsive budgeting. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the most commonly 
used strategies, both in Africa and globally. These strategies are further applied to 
develop an interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol in chapter 
5.  
 
3 5 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to establish that feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting provide a comprehensive theoretical approach, which can assist in guiding 
the interpretation and evaluation of state obligations relating to the resource allocation 
under the Maputo Protocol. This was achieved by showing that anti-essentialist 
feminist legal theory has a specific contextual application to the Maputo Protocol 
because of the inclusion of the lived experiences of the large diversity of women in 
Africa in its analysis.  
Gender responsive budgeting is an initiative which resulted from feminist legal 
theory. The contrasting definitions and purposes of gender responsive budgeting 
illustrated how the mainstreaming of prominent issues that women face in every 
aspect of a state budget is required. The various strategies of gender responsive 
budgeting were discussed and shown to have far-reaching relevance and application. 
However, the strategies of gender responsive budgeting are lacking application of anti-
essentialism feminist legal theory. There is the potential for further development of 
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anti-essentialist legal theory and its relevance in the gender responsive budgeting 
frameworks.  
The following chapter analyses how international human rights treaty bodies, 
specifically the CESCR and CEDAW, approach the task of interpreting the obligations 
of state parties to mobilise and allocate resources towards the fulfilment of the rights 
protected in the relevant treaties. These experiences of other human rights treaty 
bodies can illuminate emerging interpretative practices on resource allocations for 
human rights and thereby assist in developing a framework for the interpretation and 
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CHAPTER 4: RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER CEDAW AND THE ICESCR 
4 1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 of this research considered feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting as a theoretical framework to analyse resource allocation in terms of the 
Maputo Protocol. The research question guiding this chapter concerns how an 
analysis of the interpretation of resource allocation for the effective realisation of 
human rights under CEDAW and the ICESCR can assist in guiding supervisory bodies 
to interpret and evaluate article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. This analysis departs 
from the hypothesis that the obligation to allocate resources for the realisation of 
human rights has been interpreted and analysed under CEDAW and the ICESCR, and 
can thus guide the interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.   
In this regard, concluding observations on state reports, statements, general 
comments, general recommendations as well as views under the respective 
communication procedures from the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR inform the 
analysis in this chapter.417  
 
4 2 Resource allocation under CEDAW 
4 2 1 Reporting guidelines 
In terms of article 18 of CEDAW, state parties must report on all legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the 
provisions of CEDAW. These reports must indicate any factors or difficulties which the 
state parties face in fulfilling its obligations under CEDAW.418 In terms of the 
Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to be Submitted by 
State Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties (“Compilation Reporting 
Guidelines”),419 state parties to CEDAW have to submit their reports in two parts: part 
one being a common core document and part two a document specifically related to 
the implementation of CEDAW.420 The common core document is the first part of any 
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state report submitted to an international human rights body and should contain 
general information about the state party.  
Part two of the state report should include a description of all practical and legal 
measures taken to implement CEDAW.421 The Compilation Reporting Guidelines state 
that the description of the measures taken needs to be analytical and results-oriented. 
In this way, the CEDAW Committee can effectively identify any possible shortcomings 
in their concluding observations on state reports. The Compilation Reporting 
Guidelines also implicitly endorses the importance of anti-essentialist feminist legal 
theory.422 This is observable in the requirement that state parties need to specifically 
address how CEDAW has been implemented with respect to different groups of 
women, in particular, those subject to multiple forms of discrimination.423 Because of 
this requirement, the CEDAW Committee can provide specific guidance to state 
parties regarding best practices on measures designed for diverse women.  
Despite the extensive guidelines provided to state parties on how to report to the 
CEDAW Committee, no reference is made to elements of gender responsive 
budgeting or public finance. However, as Elson notes, the requirement for information 
on public finance could be indirectly inferred.424 In this regard, the Compilation 
Reporting Guidelines refers to the substantive similarities between the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action (“Beijing Platform for Action”)425 and CEDAW.426 
Because of this synergy, state parties are required to include any measures taken to 
implement the Beijing Platform for Action in their state report to the CEDAW 
Committee.427 The Beijing Platform for Action discusses the relation between public 
finance, women’s rights and state party’s obligations.428 It can, therefore, be indirectly 
inferred that state parties need to report on budgetary allocations for women’s rights 
in their state reports to the CEDAW Committee. 
The Beijing Platform for Action identified twelve key areas where urgent action is 
required to ensure greater substantive equality and opportunities for women and girl 
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children.429 It also encompasses, in part, anti-essentialist feminist legal theory within 
its twelve key areas as it refers to women’s position in relation to poverty and race. 
The Beijing Platform for Action fundamentally calls for women’s empowerment and 
gender equality430 and does this by providing a policy and programmatic agenda.431 
The Beijing Platform for Action is described as being a “springboard for 
institutionalising gender equality policy and gender analysis in public policy, including 
in public finance”.432 The Compilation Reporting Guidelines state that the policy and 
programmatic agenda provided for in the Beijing Platform for Action have direct 
application to CEDAW.433 This is because the twelve key areas of concern are related 
to specific articles in CEDAW resulting in an implementation crossover.434 The Beijing 
Platform for Action also provides guidance as to how countries involved in 
development cooperation should conduct their extraterritorial obligations.435 
It goes on to state that full and effective implementation of the provisions contained 
therein would require the “integration of a gender perspective in budgetary decisions 
on policies and programmes, as well as the adequate financing of specific 
programmes for securing equality between women and men”.436 State parties are also 
required to continuously review how women benefit from public expenditure and adjust 
budgetary allocations to ensure substantive equality through public expenditure.437 
Gender responsive budgeting has been identified as a way for state parties to meet 
their obligations in terms of the Beijing Platform for Action.438 The UN Women Report 
on the Beijing Platform for Action (“UN Beijing Report”) stated that for the gender 
responsive budgeting initiatives under the Beijing Platform for Action to be effective, 
they need to consider substantive equality when generating and spending 
 
429 UN Women “Beijing Platform for Action: 12 Critical Areas of Concern” (2015) UN Women 
<https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2015/03/b20-12-critical-areas-of-
concern> (accessed 07-07-2020). These twelve areas are women and poverty, education and training 
of women, women and health, violence against women, women and armed conflict, women and the 
economy, women in power and decision-making, institutional mechanisms, human rights of women, 
women and the media, women and the environment, and the girl child. 
430 Beijing Platform for Action paras 1 and 3.  
431 Reporting Guidelines 70. 
432 A O’Hagan & E Klatzer “Introducing Gender Budgeting in Europe” in A O’Hagan & E Klatzer (eds) 
Gender Budgeting in Europe: Developments and Challenges (2018) 3 4. 
433 Reporting Guidelines 70.  
434 70.  
435 Beijing Platform for Action para 353. Extra-territorial obligations will be further discussed in part 4 2 
3 3 below.  
436 Beijing Platform for Action para 345.  
437 Para 346.  
438 UN Women The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action Turns 20 (2015) 53. 
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resources.439 Consequently, gender responsive budgeting initiatives need to be 
sensitive towards how taxation policies, fiscal policies and budgetary allocations affect 
different groups of women and different income groups, as prescribed by anti-
essentialist feminist legal theory. The UN Beijing Report state that less developed 
countries should aim to allocate 0,15% of gross domestic product  (“GDP”) to 
achieving substantive gender equality.440 If state parties to CEDAW are accordingly 
obligated to report on their initiatives to realise the Beijing Platform for Action, then all 
state reports given to the CEDAW Committee should contain gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives. 
 
4 2 2 Examples of resource-intensive provisions  
While CEDAW does not contain a specific article referring to the allocation of 
resources, like the ICESCR and the Maputo Protocol, Elson argues that resources 
play an essential role in the effective implementation of CEDAW.441 This is because it 
is inconceivable that the achievement of substantive equality, as required by CEDAW, 
would have no implications for public finance.442 The CEDAW Committee states that 
a joint reading of articles 1 to 5 and 24 form the general interpretative framework of all 
of the substantive articles in CEDAW.443 These articles impose three overarching 
obligations on state parties to eliminate discrimination against women.444 The first 
obligation is to ensure that there is no direct or indirect discrimination against women 
in legislation and that women are protected against discrimination by competent 
tribunals, sanctions and remedies.445 The second obligation aims to empower all 
women through effective policies and programmes.446 The third obligation is to 
address prevailing gender relations and gender stereotypes that affect women in law 




441 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 32. 
442 See chapter three part 3 3 1 above for a discussion on substantive equality. 
443 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25 on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures (2004) 
UN Doc HRI/GdEN/1/Rev.7 para 6 (“General Recommendation 25”).  
444 Para 6.  
445 Para 7.  
446 Para 7.  
447 Para 7.  
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The CEDAW Committee has confirmed that a delay in realising the core obligations 
in CEDAW cannot be justified on any grounds, including political, social, cultural, 
religious, economic, resource or any other constraints.448 Should a state party be 
facing resource constraints, such state is obliged to seek international assistance.449 
Elson argues that wealthier countries have an obligation to assist poorer countries by 
providing the resources to sustain adequate fiscal policies for the realisation of the 
rights in CEDAW.450 
The resource-intensive provisions which will be analysed are the prohibition of 
discrimination, gender-based violence, access to justice, health care, the prohibition 
of harmful stereotyping, and non-monetised care work. These provisions were 
selected because of the resource implications they have for state parties and the 
extensive analysis which the CEDAW Committee has conducted through general 
recommendations and concluding observations on state reports.451 These provisions 
do not represent the only rights in CEDAW which have resource implications, however, 
because of the extensive analysis done by the CEDAW Committee, the discussion of 
these provisions provides the most insight into state parties’ resource obligations 
under CEDAW. 
The CEDAW Committee utilises general recommendations to clarify the obligations 
of state parties pertaining to resources needed to realise the relevant rights. These 
general recommendations are not directly binding on state parties, but are of 
persuasive power and should guide state parties in implementing their obligations 
under CEDAW.452 The concluding observations of the CEDAW Committee on the 
periodic state reports submitted in terms of article 18(1) of CEDAW also provide 
clarification of how the CEDAW Committee interprets CEDAW and its 
recommendations to state parties on the implementation of their obligations. These 
 
448 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 29.  
449 Para 29.  
450 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 33. 
451 Further justification on the inclusion of each individual provision will be done in the discussion of the 
particular provision’s resource implications. 
452 A Byrnes “Using Gender-Specific Human Rights Instruments in Domestic Litigation: The Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” in K Adams & A Byrnes (eds) Gender 
Equality and the Judiciary: Using International Human Rights Standards to Promote the Human Rights 
of Women and the Girl-child at the National Level (1999) 51 60.  
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concluding observations on state reports are similarly not legally binding on state 
parties, but they also have persuasive power.453 
The communications discussed below were all brought in terms of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (“OP-CEDAW”).454 The OP-CEDAW provides a complaint mechanism, 
through article 2, for individuals who argue that state parties are not acting in 
accordance with their international law obligations and effectively allocating resources 
to realise women’s rights. In terms of the OP-CEDAW, communications may be 
submitted by or on behalf of an individual or groups of individuals, claiming to be 
victims of a violation of any of the rights as set out in CEDAW by the state party.455 In 
cases where state parties raise resource constraints as a defence, then the CEDAW 
Committee will be inclined to examine the state parties’ resource allocations. Cases 
could also be brought where individuals or groups of individuals claim that state parties 
have ineffectively allocated resources to fulfil its obligations. In terms of article 7(3) of 
the OP-CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee submits its views as well as any 
recommendations to the state party and the individuals who submitted the 
communication.  
 
4 2 2 1 Prohibition of discrimination 
Article 2 of CEDAW, which prohibits discrimination against women in all its forms, 
implies resource obligations for state parties. In terms of article 2, “state parties 
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women.” Resource implications can be derived from state parties being required to 
pursue “all appropriate means” a policy to end discrimination against women. To this 
end, state parties have to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures which 
embody the principle of equality between men and women as well as repeal or modify 
any legislation which directly or indirectly discriminates against women.456 State 
parties should be able to justify the appropriateness of the measures it has adopted 
 
453 MA Freeman, C Chinkin & B Rudolf (eds) The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (2012) 22.  
454 (adopted by Resolution A/RES/54/4 of 6 October 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) 2131 
UNTS 83. 
455 Article 2 of OP-CEDAW.  
456 Article 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  75 
 
and demonstrate how the intended effect will be achieved.457 The removal of laws that 
discriminate against women is arguably less resource intensive than other measures 
promoting substantive gender equality. However, the modification of existing 
legislation or the adoption of new legislation requires funding for its effective 
implementation.  
Funding is required at various stages of implementation. For example, finances are 
needed to appoint a supervisory body to monitor the implementation of new legislation. 
The training of NGOs and civil society organisations on the application of the new 
legislation ensures a wider understanding of state obligations. Such training requires 
significant resource allocation.458 Financial support is furthermore also required for 
women who wish to pursue litigation to protect their rights in terms of the new 
legislation.459  
General Recommendation 28 elaborates on the core obligations of state parties 
created under article 2. Article 2 requires state parties to ensure that women are not 
subjected to direct or indirect discrimination. The main obligation created in article 2 is 
twofold: First, state parties must assess the situation of women; and, secondly, 
formulate and implement policies which work towards the goal of eliminating all forms 
of discrimination against women to achieve substantive gender equality.460 The 
CEDAW Committee reiterates that the emphasis of the core obligations created in 
article 2 is the progressive movement forward towards substantive gender equality.461 
The CEDAW Committee acknowledges that the formulation and implementation of 
such policies are resource intensive at every stage of the process. State parties must 
ensure that resources are devoted to women to enable their participation in the 
development, implementation and monitoring of the policy.462 Thus, women’s groups 
and NGOs must be well-informed, consulted and able to play an active role in the 
development of such policies.463 In terms of General Recommendation 28, adequate 
resources need to be allocated to ensure that relevant benchmarks and monitoring 
mechanisms are created.464 To achieve this, the CEDAW Committee unequivocally 
 
457 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 23. 
458 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 32. 
459 32. 
460 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 24.  
461 Para 24. 
462 Para 27.  
463 Para 27.  
464 Para 28.  
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stipulates that such policies must be linked to mainstream governmental budgetary 
processes.465 Budoo argues that these steps, as set out in General Recommendation 
28, require state parties to adopt a gendered lens to resource allocation decisions.466 
The CEDAW Committee has also, in general recommendations, addressed various 
groups of women that suffer disproportionately due to intersecting forms of 
discrimination and how they should best be protected.467 General Recommendation 
28 states that an understanding of the concept of intersecting identities is needed 
when interpreting article 2 of CEDAW.468 Thus, state parties must always be aware of 
these multiple layers of discrimination when implementing measures to advance 
substantive gender equality. Thus, anti-essentialist feminist legal theory helps explain 
how article 2 of CEDAW could affect women with diverse identities.469  
CEDAW also requires that there must be substantive equality in the allocation of 
budgetary resources.470 Substantive equality of resource allocation ensures that men 
are not favoured above women in respect of certain opportunities and access to 
services.471 This is relevant to provisions such as article 10 (elimination of 
discrimination in education), article 11 (elimination of discrimination in employment), 
article 12 (elimination of discrimination in health), article 13 (elimination of 
discrimination in other areas of economic and social life) and article 14 (elimination of 
discrimination against women in rural areas). Substantive equality also makes 
provision for additional resources to be allocated to the meeting of women’s specific 
needs without violating the principle of equality. Such affirmative allocations are 
evident in budgeting for sexual and reproductive rights within the health care budget, 
as well as any temporary special measures which may be put in place to advance 
women’s involvement in the budgetary planning process.472  
 
465 Para 28.  
466 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 58. 
467 For example, General Recommendation 18 Disabled Women (1991) UN Doc A/46/38; General 
Recommendation 27 on Older Women and Protection of Their Human Rights (2010) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/27; General Recommendation 26 on Women Migrant Workers (2008) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R; and General Recommendation 34 The Rights of Rural Women (2016) UN 
Doc CEDAW/C/GC/34 (“General Recommendation 34”).  
468 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 18. 
469 See chapter three part 3 3 above. 
470 33.  
471 See chapter three part 3 3 1 above for a discussion on substantive equality.  
472 Article 4(1) states that temporary special measures shall not be considered discrimination and 4(2) 
states that any special measure aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory. 
See part 4 2 3 1 below for a discussion on temporary special measures.  
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The CEDAW Committee has acknowledged, in various general recommendations, 
the impact of multiple layers of discrimination on women.473 Additional grounds such 
as “ethnicity, race, indigenous or minority status, colour, socio-economic status, caste, 
language, religion or belief, political opinion, national origin, marital status, maternity, 
parental status, age, urban or rural location, health status, disability, property 
ownership”, sexuality, illiteracy, pursuing asylum, refugee status, “internally displaced 
or stateless, widowhood, migration status, heading households, living with HIV/AIDS, 
being deprived of liberty”, partaking in sex work, circumstances of armed conflict, 
geographical remoteness, as well as the stigmatisation of women who are women’s 
rights activists have been identified as having the potential to compound the 
discrimination that women face.474  
Thus, state parties must acknowledge that women can never be considered a 
homogenous group and government budgets and policies should reflect this fact.475 
Byrnes states that the exploration of intersectionality is one of the most prominent 
developments that the CEDAW Committee has made.476 The CEDAW Committee has 
also acknowledged the significance of intersectional discrimination in the Kell v 
Canada (“Kell”) communication.477 The author of the communication, a Canadian 
aboriginal woman, argued that she was discriminated against when claiming 
possession of property which was lawfully hers but she had been denied access to by 
her abusive partner. She also argued that she was discriminated against when 
reporting domestic abuse, because of her sex and cultural heritage.478  
The CEDAW Committee stated that an understanding of intersectional 
discrimination is paramount when state parties interpret their obligations under article 
 
473 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 25 on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures (2004) 
UN Doc HRI/GdEN/1/Rev.7; General Recommendation 27 on Older Women and Protection of Their 
Human Rights (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/27; General Recommendation 28 Core Obligations of 
States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28; General Recommendation 33 Women’s Access to Justice 
(2015) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/33; General Recommendation 34 The Rights of Rural Women (2016) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/34; and General Recommendation 35 Gender-based Violence Against Women, 
Updating General Recommendation No. 19 (2017) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
474 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 12. 
475 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 34 para 14. 
476 A Byrnes “The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women” in A Hellum & H 
Aasen (eds) Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law (2013) 41. 
477 Communication No 19/2008, CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 (27 April 2012).  
478 Paras 1 and 3.1.  
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2 of CEDAW.479 The author in Kell was in a vulnerable position because of her status 
as an aboriginal woman, and the state party was obliged to ensure the elimination of 
such discrimination.480 Hodson suggests that the Kell communication represents a 
shift in the CEDAW Committee’s confidence in condemning multiple layers of 
discrimination.481 The CEDAW Committee considered the role that the author’s 
background had played in her struggle to claim her property rights and report the 
domestic violence. The Kell communication demonstrates that an understanding of 
anti-essentialist feminist legal theory is beneficial in interpreting women’s rights.482 
Thus, state parties would be better equipped to understand and accommodate women 
with diverse identities if resources are allocated to the sensitivity training of police 
personnel and members of the judiciary.   
The CEDAW Committee has furthermore stated that temporary special measures, 
such as the creation of task teams and supervisory bodies, may be necessary to 
eliminate multiple layers of discrimination and mitigate the negative effect they have 
on women.483 Campbell argues that integrating intersectionality into the interpretation 
of CEDAW provides a more comprehensive approach and the “transformative equality 
framework demonstrates how the CEDAW Committee can fully integrate an 
intersectional perspective and address the unique needs of racial and ethnic minority 
women who live in poverty and all women with multiple identities”.484 In the concluding 
observations on the state report of the Republic of Korea, the CEDAW Committee also 
expressed the importance of legislation which prohibits discrimination against women, 
including intersecting forms of discrimination affecting disadvantaged groups of 
women.485 
The CEDAW Committee addressed discrimination against women in detention 
facilities in the Abramova v Belarus (“Abramova”) communication.486 The author of the 
communication submitted that she faced gender-based discrimination as there were 
 
479 Para 10.2. 
480 Para 10.3. 
481 L Hodson “Women’s Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW’s Optional Protocol” (2014) 25 EJIL 561 578. 
482 See chapter three part 3 3 1 above for a discussion on anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. 
483 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 27 para 12. Article 4 of CEDAW refers to temporary 
special measures. See part 4 2 3 1 below.  
484 M Campbell “CEDAW and Women’s Intersecting Identities: A Pioneering New Approach to 
Intersectional Discrimination” (2015) 11 Revista Direito GV 479 481. 
485 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eight Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea 
(2018) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8 para 13. 
486 Communication No 23/2009, CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009 (27 September 2011).  
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only male staff in the detention facility in which she was held.487 All the female 
prisoners shared one toilet which was visible to the male staff and the staff periodically 
watched the prisoners through a peephole.488 The CEDAW Committee noted that 
women being held in a detention facility exclusively staffed by men and facing 
humiliating treatment constitutes degrading treatment and gender-based 
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of CEDAW.489 The CEDAW Committee 
recommended that the state party ensure that women detainees have access to 
gender-specific health care and are only supervised by properly trained women 
staff.490 The CEDAW Committee stated that special measures, as per article 4 of 
CEDAW, are not deemed to be discriminatory if they are enacted to ensure the specific 
needs of women prisoners are addressed.491 Cusack and Pusey argue that the 
decision in Abramova holds state parties to a high standard and provides practical 
recommendations for measures for the prohibition of discrimination.492 Such 
measures, if implemented with the appropriate resources, safeguard future female 
detainees.493 
 
4 2 2 2 Gender-based violence  
CEDAW does not contain a specific article which addresses gender-based violence. 
However, through the adoption of General Recommendation 19, and subsequently 
General Recommendation 35, the CEDAW Committee has interpreted CEDAW to 
address the issues of gender-based violence.494 The CEDAW Committee referred 
particularly to article 2 (the non-discrimination clause), explaining that non-
discrimination against women and substantive equality cannot be achieved without 
eliminating gender-based violence.495 Thus, the eradication of gender-based violence 
is central to achieving substantive equality between men and women. To respond to 
 
487 Para 2.2. 
488 Para 2.4. 
489 Para 7.2 and 7.4. 
490 Para 7.9(1)(b) and 7.9(1)(d). 
491 Para 7.5. See part 4 2 3 1 below for a discussion on temporary special measures.  
492 S Cusack & L Pusey “CEDAW and the Rights to Non-Discrimination and Equality” (2013) 14 Melb J 
Int’l L 54 75. 
493 Hodson (2014) EJIL 571. 
494 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 19 On Violence Against Women (1992) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/19; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 Gender-based Violence Against 
Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19 (2017) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
495 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 34(f) para 11.  
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and eradicate gender-based violence, state parties are required to allocate 
appropriate human and financial resources at the national, regional, and local levels 
to effectively implement legislation and policies for the protection of women.496  
The CEDAW Committee has interpreted articles 2(c), (d), (f), and 5(a) to provide 
that state parties have to adequately provide budgetary resources for the adoption and 
implementation of diverse institutional measures.497 These measures include the 
creation of focused public policies, the development and implementation of monitoring 
mechanisms, and the establishment and funding of competent tribunals.498 The 
CEDAW Committee reiterated in VK v Bulgaria (“VK”) that where a state party does 
not provide adequate shelters for women and children, it constitutes a violation under 
article 2(c) and (e) of CEDAW to provide for the immediate protection of women from 
violence.499 The CEDAW Committee thus recommended that the state party ensures 
sufficient state-funded shelters are available and adequate support is given to NGOs 
offering shelters.500 The CEDAW Committee has also expressed concern about state 
parties who have insufficient services of counselling and psychological treatment 
centres available to women who have experienced sexual violence.501  
In X and Y v Georgia (“X and Y”), the authors, a mother and daughter, described 
the domestic abuse which they endured from their husband and father, respectively.502 
The wife had married her husband after he had raped her, as she believed that no one 
would want to marry her after she had been raped.503 The continued violence which 
the wife and children endured had been reported to the police, however, the authorities 
decided not to open a case.504 The CEDAW Committee condemned Georgia for the 
lack of investigation into the matter as well as the failure to adopt appropriate 
measures to ensure the prohibition of gender-based violence.505 The CEDAW 
Committee recommended that resources be allocated to ensure the victims of 
 
496 Para 34(f).  
497 Para 26(b).  
498 Para 26(b).  
499 Communication No 20/2008, CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (27 September 2011) para 9.13. 
500 Para 9.16(b)(iii). 
501 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea 
(2018) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8 para 23(g). 
502 Communication No 24/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/61/D/24/2009 (2015).  
503 Para 2.1. 
504 Para 2.9.  
505 Para 9.7. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  81 
 
domestic violence and their children were provided with timely and adequate support, 
including shelters and psychological support.506  
The X and Y communication emphasises the dangers that women face when 
domestic violence is reported to the police and little or no action is taken.507 The 
inaction by poorly trained police often results in further violence being inflicted on the 
women. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences (“Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women”)508 reinforced that 
state parties need to actively work to eliminate the stigmatisation around domestic 
violence as many women who have experienced violence, are often forced by their 
community, in particular rural communities, or the police to remain with their 
perpetrators as they are considered tainted women.509 Women who return to their 
perpetrators are in danger of experiencing the same, or worse, violence. The Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women called for the creation of more shelters for 
women who are victims of domestic violence as well as measures which empower 
women who have to leave the shelter.510 Measures such as access to housing or 
employment would assist in women not being rendered more vulnerable to return to 
their perpetrators.511 Such measures require significant resource commitments from 
state parties.  
The Yildirim (deceased) v Austria (“Yildirim”) and Goekce (deceased) v Austria 
(“Goekce”) communications expanded on the state party’s duty of due diligence for 
the actions of non-state actors.512 In both cases, the victims were killed by their 
husbands after prolonged domestic abuse, which had been reported to the police.513 
 
506 Para 11(b)(i).  
507 EHRAC “First Ever International Decision on Domestic Violence in Georgia Highlights Serious 
Shortcomings in State Response” (2016) European Human Rights Advocacy Centre 
<http://ehrac.org.uk/news/first-ever-international-decision-on-domestic-violence-in-georgia-highlights-
serious-shortcomings-in-state-response/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
508 As created by Resolution 1994/45 (4 March 1994). 
509 OHCHR “’Break the Cycle of Silence and Acceptance of Violence Against Women’ Expert Urges 
Georgia” (2016) United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17087&LangID=E> 
(accessed 07-07-2020).  
510 1. 
511 1. 
512 Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 October 2007); Communication No 
5/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (6 August 2007). As the communications had similar facts, 
both were brought against Austria and were seen by the CEDAW Committee during a similar time, the 
CEDAW Committee provided similar recommendations to the state party.  
513 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 
October 2007) para 2.13; Goekce (deceased) v Austria Communication No 5/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (6 August 2007) para 2.11.  
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Even though the domestic abuse also included multiple threats of murder, the 
perpetrators were not detained by the police and the state party was not able to 
adequately protect the women from the violence.514 The CEDAW Committee noted in 
both communications that the state party has “established a comprehensive model to 
address domestic violence that includes legislation, criminal and civil-law remedies, 
awareness-raising, education and training, shelters, counselling for victims of violence 
and work with perpetrators”.515 Cusack and Pusey argue that these two 
communications demonstrate how often women do not benefit from the state party’s 
legal protections in practice.516 Thus, Austria was recommended to strengthen the 
implementation of protection against gender-based violence legislation and ensure 
enhanced coordination among law enforcement, judicial officers and NGOs that work 
to protect and support women who are victims of gender-based violence.517 This 
strengthening and coordination requires significant resource allocation from the state 
party. 
In VPP v Bulgaria (“VPP”), the state party was held liable for the inadequate 
protection provided to a minor who was the victim of sexual violence.518 Cusack and 
Pusey argue that the VPP communication reinforced the seriousness with which the 
CEDAW Committee views gender-based violence.519 The state party had failed in its 
obligation to protect victims of gender-based violence. The CEDAW Committee was 
critical of the state party in the VPP communication because, first, the perpetrator had 
been charged with sexual molestation, rather than the more serious offence of rape or 
attempted rape.520 Secondly, the perpetrator had only received a three year 
suspended sentence, which is considerably lower than the prescribed statutory 
maximum sentence.521 The CEDAW Committee also expressed concern that there 
 
514 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 
October 2007) para 2.10; Goekce (deceased) v Austria Communication No 5/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (6 August 2007) para 2.9. 
515 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 
October 2007) para 12.1.2; Goekce (deceased) v Austria Communication No 5/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (6 August 2007) para 12.1.2. 
516 Cusack & Pusey (2013) Melb J Int’l L 74. 
517 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 
October 2007) para 12.3(a) & (c); Goekce (deceased) v Austria Communication No 5/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (6 August 2007) para 12.3 (a) & (c). 
518 Communication No 31/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (27 November 2012) para 10(2)(d). 
519 Cusack & Pusey (2013) Melb J Int’l L 76. 
520 VPP v Bulgaria Communication No 31/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (27 November 2012) 
para 9.5. 
521 Para 9.5. 
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were no mechanisms in place to protect the victim from re-victimisation, such as 
protection or restriction orders, as the perpetrator was released back into society after 
the criminal proceedings.522 Thus, state parties are obligated to allocate resources 
towards shelters and the monitoring of restraining orders, which would ensure the 
protection of victims of gender-based violence from further abuse.  
The existence of gender stereotypes, as displayed in the Georgia communication, 
makes it increasingly difficult for women to report gender-based violence and receive 
the justice required. This was evident in RPB v The Philippines (“RPB”) where the 
author noted that she had faced gender stereotyping during her rape trial.523 The court 
made reference to how a rape victim should act when confronted with a violent act, 
such as struggling and trying to attack her assailant, and that the author had not 
displayed these traits.524 The CEDAW Committee noted, with concern, that such 
stereotypes lead to the victims of rape being placed at a legal disadvantage and 
recommended that such stereotypes be removed from all future gender-based 
violence proceedings.525  
The RPB communication referred to Vertido v the Philippines (“Vertido”) where the 
state party had made use of similar stereotypes of how a rape victim should have 
acted when being attacked.526 Some of the stereotypes that the state party employed 
during the trial of the author of Vertido was that rape victims should try and escape at 
every stage of the assault and that older men lack the necessary sexual prowess to 
commit the act of rape.527 The court also referred to myths about rape such as the fact 
that the victim and perpetrator know each other well makes the interaction 
consensual.528 The CEDAW Committee stated that the use of such harmful gender 
stereotypes during gender-based violence cases results in the victims being re-
victimised during their trial.529 Cusack and Timmer argue that state parties have an 
obligation to address the systematic judicial stereotyping that occurs during gender-
based violence cases.530 The eradication of violence against women can only take 
 
522 Para 9.7. 
523 Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (21 February 2014).  
524 Para 3.3. 
525 Para 3.7, 9(b)(i) and 9(b)(iii). The RPB communication is further discussed in part 4 2 2 6 below. 
526 Communication No 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 September 2010).  
527 Para 3.5.1 and 3.5.7. 
528 Para 3.5.4. 
529 Para 8.8. 
530 S Cusack & ASH Timmer “Gender Stereotyping in Rape Cases: The CEDAW Committee’s Decision 
in Vertido v The Philippines” (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 329 338. 
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place when gender stereotypes are eliminated from the investigations into the 
violence.531 The modification of such stereotypes and social prejudices requires a 
significant commitment from state parties, including the allocation of resources 
towards training and education programmes.532 
Similar gender stereotypes were also illustrated in the Jallow v Bulgaria (“Jallow”) 
communication where the state party was accused of failing to conduct a timely and 
suitable investigation into the author’s allegations of domestic violence.533 The state 
party in the Jallow communication investigated allegations of abuse that the author’s 
male partner had made but not the allegations made by the author. The CEDAW 
Committee argued that such actions were based on gender stereotypes that the 
husband was superior and more trustworthy than the wife.534 The CEDAW Committee 
recommended that all judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel receive 
training on CEDAW, its implications and how to handle cases in a gender-sensitive 
manner.535 Training such as this requires significant resource investments from state 
parties. The training also needs to focus on the effect of multiple levels of 
discrimination, to ensure that complaints regarding gender-based violence are 
adequately received and considered.536 Thus, an understanding of the multiple 
identities of women, which can give rise to discrimination and gender-based violence, 
assists in the review and assessment of such training programmes.537  
The CEDAW Committee has further acknowledged the varying degrees that women 
may face gender-based violence because of intersecting forms of discrimination.538 
Thus, appropriate legal and policy responses are required to ensure all groups of 
women are protected.539 The policies and programmes adopted to address 
intersecting degrees of discrimination must also aim to eliminate intersecting 
discrimination.540 In the Report of Inquiry Concerning Canada, the CEDAW Committee 
stated that intersectional discrimination can stem from complex factors.541 This 
 
531 341. 
532 Gender stereotyping is further discussed under part 4 2 2 3 below.  
533 Communication No 32/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (28 August 2012) para 8.4. 
534 Para 8.6.  
535 Para 8.8(2)(c). 
536 Para 8.8(2)(c). 
537 See chapter three part 3 3 2 above for a discussion on anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. 
538 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 12. 
539 Para 12.  
540 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 18. 
541 CEDAW Committee Report of the Inquiry Concerning Canada of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
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particular report considered the compounding discrimination that aboriginal women 
face in Canada due to their sex, gender, geographical isolation, rural environments 
and aboriginal identity.542 State parties must, therefore, take appropriate steps to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, including intersecting forms of 
discrimination.543 Thus, state parties need to consider the role that the multiple 
identities of women can give rise to compounding violence when allocating resources 
to prevent gender-based violence.544 
The CEDAW Committee also noted in the concluding observations on the state 
report of Costa Rica that the there is a concerning amount of gender-based violence 
recorded against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, and intersex persons.545 
In response to this, the CEDAW Committee stated that the state party needs to “adopt 
measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute and adequately punish hate crimes 
against them and provide reparation, including compensation, to victims”.546 Measures 
such as this require substantial resources from the state party to ensure women from 
all backgrounds are protected. An understanding of anti-essentialist feminist legal 
theory can guide the evaluation of such measures as there needs to be sufficient 
protection provided to women from vulnerable groups.  
In the concluding observations on the state report of the Bahamas, the CEDAW 
Committee expressed concern on the level of capacity training which the police 
receive to address complaints about gender-based violence from women who belong 
to disadvantaged groups.547 The CEDAW Committee recommended that the state 
party allocate resources which ensure that the police and courts receive the necessary 




Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (2015) Un Doc CEDAW/C/OP.8/CAN/1 para 
204. 
542 Para 204.  
543 Para 205.  
544 See chapter three part 3 3 2 above for a discussion on anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. 
545 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Costa Rica (2017) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/7 para 16(f). 
546 Para 17(f).  
547 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the Bahamas (2018) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/BHS/CO/6 para 13. 
548 Para 14(b). 
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4 2 2 3 Prohibition of harmful stereotyping 
Article 5(a) of CEDAW provides that state parties shall take all appropriate measure 
to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the ideas of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women”. Article 5(a) should also be considered 
alongside article 2(f).549 Eradicating harmful stereotyping is resource intensive for 
state parties and, thus, the CEDAW Committee provides clear recommendations 
about the educational measures which would be most effective to realise article 5(a) 
and 2(f) of CEDAW.  
State parties thus should adopt educational and public information programmes, 
which are aimed at the elimination of prejudices and harmful stereotypes.550 The 
CEDAW Committee has elaborated, in General Recommendation 35, that state 
parties are obligated to adopt and implement measures which eradicate harmful 
gender prejudices, stereotypes and practices.551 The CEDAW Committee has also 
acknowledged that the way women are viewed in certain cultures and traditions 
perpetuates harmful practices, such as female circumcision.552 Such harmful practices 
are deeply rooted in social attitudes which view women and girls as inferior.553 The 
CEDAW Committee remains firm in its stance that state parties need to intervene 
when women’s rights are being violated based on culture, religious practices or 
beliefs.554 To address these harmful practices, the CEDAW Committee has stated that 
far-reaching educational initiatives are necessary, which include temporary special 
measures to modify the social and cultural patterns which are based on the idea of the 
 
549 Article 2(f) of CEDAW reads that, “state parties condemn discrimination against women in all its 
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake: (…) [t]o take all appropriate measures, including legislation, 
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women”.  
550 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 3 Education and Public Information Campaigns UN 
Doc A/42/38 (1987).  
551 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 26.  
552 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 14 Female Circumcision UN Doc A/45/38 (1990). 
553 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 31 Joint General Recommendation No. 31 of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women / General Comment No.18 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 
(2014) para 6.  
554 Freeman, Chinkin & Rudolf (eds) The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 156. 
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inferiority of men and women.555 These educational initiatives, such as workshops, the 
establishment of task teams and the amendment of legislation, require a significant 
resource commitment from state parties. The African Court also applied article 5(a) of 
CEDAW in the APDF case.556 The African Court reiterated the importance of 
measures which would sensitise, enlighten and educate citizens on the dangers of 
harmful stereotyping.557 
The CEDAW Committee has also identified these harmful practices and 
stereotypes as some of the root causes of gender-based violence.558 In the Yildirim 
and Goekce communications, the CEDAW Committee did not directly apply article 
5(a), however, it stated that there is a direct link between traditional attitudes, where 
women are considered subordinate to men, and domestic violence.559 In the Vertido 
communication, the CEDAW Committee referred directly to article 5(a) of CEDAW, 
stating that the gender stereotypes and rape myths that were utilised during the 
author’s trial were harmful to the victim and the battle against gender-based 
violence.560 The RPB communication also discussed harmful stereotyping that took 
place during the victim’s rape trial, however, it was concerning that the CEDAW 
Committee made no direct reference to article 5(a) of CEDAW.561 In the concluding 
observations on the state report of the Philippines, the CEDAW Committee reiterated 
how discriminatory gender stereotyping and stigmatisation pose barriers to justice and 
effective remedies, particularly for women facing multiple levels of discrimination.562  
As part of the recommendations to the state party in Vertido, the CEDAW 
Committee moreover stated that training and education targeted at changing 
discriminatory attitudes towards women within the legal system are needed.563 Such 
 
555 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 31 Para 31.  
556 See chapter two part 2 2 2 above for a discussion of the APDF case. 
557 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 paras 125 and 126.  
558 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 26. A more detailed discussion of gender-
based violence can be found in part 4 2 2 2 above.  
559 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (1 
October 2007) para 12.2; Goekce para 12.2. See part 4 2 2 2 above for a further discussion on the 
Yildirim and Goekce communications. 
560 Vertido v the Philippines Communication No 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 
September 2010) para 3.4. See part 4 2 2 2 above for a further discussion on the Vertido 
communication. 
561 See part 4 2 2 2 above for a further discussion on the RPB communication.  
562 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic 
Reports of the Philippines (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/PHL/CO/7-8 para 14(b).  
563 Vertido v the Philippines Communication No 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 
September 2010) para 8.9(b). 
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education should include training for judges, lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and 
medical personnel on CEDAW and understanding gender-based violence and sexual 
crimes in a gender-sensitive manner.564 This training will require significant budgetary 
allocations in order to acquire effective trainers, workshops, course material, task 
teams and monitoring bodies. Cusack and Timmer argue that the CEDAW Committee 
could have achieved more in Vertido by examining the systematic gender stereotyping 
in the judicial system, and thus further clarifying state parties’ obligations under article 
5(a) of CEDAW.565 There was also a missed opportunity in Vertido to clarify the 
differences between the state party obligations in article 2(f) and 5(a).566  
However, the CEDAW Committee later provided more clarification on article 5(a) of 
CEDAW through General Recommendation 35. It recommended that state parties 
develop and implement measures that eradicate gender stereotypes, prejudices, 
customs and practices which underpin the structural inequality between men and 
women.567 These measures should be developed with the active participation of 
relevant women’s NGOs as well as organisations which represent marginalised 
groups of women.568 The implementation of these measures also includes the 
integration of gender equality into curricula at all levels of education, which a focus on 
stereotyped gender roles and non-discrimination, and awareness campaigns around 
the understanding of gender-based violence and the legal recourse available to 
victims.569 Thus, the implementation of these measures by state parties requires 
significant resources in the form of task teams, textbooks, and salaries of teachers 
and trainers.  
In the RKB v Turkey (“RKB”) communication, the CEDAW Committee reiterated 
that it would require more than the enactment of legislation to protect women against 
harmful stereotyping; these laws need to be implemented.570 The author, in the RKB 
communication, was accused of having an affair with a male colleague and, as a 
result, was dismissed by her employer.571 However, her male colleague was not 
 
564 Para 8.9(b)(iv).  
565 Cusack & Timmer Human Rights Law Review 338. 
566 340.  
567 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 30(b).  
568 Para 30(b). The active involvement of NGOs and civil society who represent women’s interests is a 
key part of gender responsive budgeting. See chapter three part 3 4 4 above.  
569 Para 30(b)(i) & (ii). 
570 Communication No 28/2010, UN Doc CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010 (13 April 2020).  
571 Para 2.1.  
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dismissed. The author referred the case to the Labour Court in Turkey, where her 
moral integrity was scrutinised. The Labour Court did not grant any legal recourse 
against her employer.572 The CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the 
gender bias that extramarital affairs were condoned for men, but that women were 
subject to penalties for such affairs.573 Thus, the CEDAW Committee recommended 
that measures be taken to ensure that the prohibition against gender stereotyping is 
practically implemented. Such implementation requires regular and appropriate 
training on CEDAW for judges, lawyers and law enforcement personnel.574 Thus, to 
ensure state parties meet their obligations in terms of article 5(a) and article 2(f) of 
CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee has made progressive recommendations in terms 
of the budgetary commitment that state parties need to make. This includes that 
appropriate legislation which prohibits direct and indirect discrimination must be 
enacted alongside training and education on gender stereotyping in society.  
 
4 2 2 4 Health care 
Article 12 of CEDAW refers to all appropriate measures being taken to eliminate 
discrimination against women in health care.575 The CEDAW Committee has 
supplemented this provision by stating that state parties need to take appropriate 
budgetary and economic measures to the maximum extent of their available resources 
to ensure that women realise their right to health care.576 The percentage of the overall 
budget allocated to women’s health should be comparable to that of men’s health, 
while still taking into account the different health needs of men and women.577 Thus, 
state parties should ensure the removal of all barriers to women’s access to health 
care, particularly sexual and reproductive health services, and should allocate 
resources for programmes aimed at the prevention and treatment of sexually 
 
572 Para 8.7. 
573 Para 8.7.  
574 Para 8.10(b)(i) and (ii).  
575 Article 12 of CEDAW provides that:  
“[1] State parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health 
care services, including those related to family planning. [2] Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of this article, state parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection 
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as 
well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation”.  
576 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24 Women and Health UN Doc A/54/38/Rev.1, 
chap1 (1999) para 17 (“General Recommendation 24”).  
577 Para 30.  
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transmitted diseases.578 Budoo argues that the CEDAW Committee recognises that 
women face more vulnerabilities in terms of health and, thus, the resource allocation 
for health care needs to reflect that.579 State parties are also not permitted to relinquish 
their obligations in terms of health care by transferring these powers to private 
entities.580 State parties are, thus, required to report to the CEDAW Committee on the 
measures that have been taken to organise public structures to promote and protect 
women’s health. 
In the VPP communication, the CEDAW Committee reiterated the importance of 
specialised health care services for victims of gender-based violence and sexual 
assault.581 The author in the VPP communication argued that the state party had failed 
to provide appropriate health care services, including psychologists and trained health 
workers, to her minor daughter who was the victim of sexual violence.582 The CEDAW 
Committee stated that it is the responsibility of the state party to ensure the provision 
of appropriate health services to victims of gender-based violence as well as the 
provision of gender-sensitive training to all health care workers.583 Such services and 
training require significant resources, however, it assists in the adequate protection of 
victims of gender-based violence. 
In Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil (“Pimentel”), the CEDAW Committee made 
recommendations on resource allocation for women’s health rights.584 The petitioner 
claimed that her deceased daughter was the victim of a violation by the state party, 
Brazil, of her right to life and health under articles 2 and 12 of CEDAW.585 The daughter 
passed away from complications that arose from having to deliver a stillborn baby.586 
The claim was that Brazil had failed to ensure access to quality medical treatment 
during the delivery, which resulted in the death of the mother-to-be.587 The CEDAW 
Committee considered whether the state party had allocated maximum available 
resources to women’s health care as whether the state party had ensured that the 
 
578 Para 31(b).  
579 A Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 57. 
580 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24 para 17.  
581 VPP v Bulgaria Communication No 31/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (27 November 2012) 
para 9.10. See part 4 2 2 2 above for a further discussion on the VPP communication. 
582 Para 3.6. 
583 Para 9.10. 
584 Communication No 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 (27 September 2011).  
585 Para 1.  
586 Para 3.4.  
587 Para 3.4.  
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health policies and practices of private health care institutions were appropriate.588 
The lack of appropriate maternal health services has a severe impact on women’s 
specific health needs and their right to life.589  
In the CEDAW Committee’s views, General Recommendation 24, which addresses 
article 12 of CEDAW, was cited.590 The CEDAW Committee reiterated that state 
parties have to safeguard “women’s right to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric 
services” and allocate the maximum available resources to these services.591 To 
achieve this, health care systems must be able to provide services which prevent, 
detect and treat illnesses specific to women.592 Consequently, states parties must 
make provision for “adequate professional training for health workers, especially on 
women’s reproductive health rights”.593 Budoo argues that such recommendations are 
resource intensive and adequate provision should be made in national budgets for 
their implementation.594  
The CEDAW Committee has also reiterated the importance of sufficient resource 
allocation to ensure the establishment of duly equipped hospitals, especially in rural 
and remote areas.595 Budgetary allocations for sufficient medical care should be 
viewed through an anti-essentialist feminist legal theory lens as it acknowledges that 
women in poorer or remote areas are more vulnerable without adequate medical care. 
Campbell further argues that the Pimentel communication must be understood by 
considering the deceased’s socio-economic status. This is due to the maternal 
mortality rate being much higher among women living in poverty.596 It was not solely 
her gender, but also her race, poverty and the fact that she lived in rural Brazil which 
resulted in the deceased’s access to health care being undermined.597 Thus, in terms 
of the provision of medical services and the realisation of article 12 of CEDAW, state 
parties must provide resources to ensure all women’s specific health care needs are 
met.  
 
588 Paras 7.3 and 7.5. 
589 Para 7.6. 
590 Para 7.3. 
591 Para 7.3 referring to para 27 of General Recommendation 24.  
592 Para 7.3 referring to para 11 of General Recommendation 24.  
593 Para 8(2)(b).  
594 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 56. 
595 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Democratic Republic 
of Congo (2019) UN Doc CEDAW/C/COD/CO/8 para 37(a). 
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4 2 2 5 Non-monetised care work 
Non-monetised care work entails long and unrecognised hours of tasks such as care 
of other family members, cooking, cleaning, and childcare.598 Non-monetised care 
work is an important issue which should be accounted for in resource allocation 
strategies. This is because, in many societies, women and girls are responsible for the 
care work due to a stereotype, prescribing this role to them.599 Thus, women are often 
unable to negotiate a fairer balance between non-monetised care work and other 
opportunities.600 Chopra argues that by not adequately addressing non-monetised 
care work in fiscal policies, state parties are denying women’s economic 
empowerment, and ultimately, the economic growth of the country.601  
Thus, resource allocation for women’s rights needs to be cognisant of non-
monetised care work to promote women’s empowerment and contribution to society 
and the economy.602 Esquivel reiterates this, by arguing that long-term development 
policies should be informed by non-monetised care work and its contribution to the 
GDP.603 The theme of non-monetised care work forms part of the Beijing Platform for 
Action604 as an area of critical concern.605 The Beijing Platform for Action notes how 
the reduction of public services has a disproportionate effect on women needing to 
take on more non-monetised care work.606 Thus, women involved in the non-
monetised care economy need access to appropriate technologies, transportation, 
clean water and sanitation which would alleviate the further burden. Non-monetised 
care work advocacy also incorporates anti-essentialist feminist legal theory, as non-
monetised care work largely affects women in poorer communities as well as rural 
areas. Rubin suggests that women who participate in non-monetised care work do 
 
598 A Marphatia & R Moussié “A Question of Gender Justice: Exploring the Linkages Between Women’s 
Unpaid Care Work, Education, and Gender Equality” (2013) 33 International Journal of Educational 
Development 85 85. 
599 85. 
600 85. 
601 D Chopra “Balancing Paid Work and Unpaid Care Work to Achieve Women’s Economic 
Empowerment” (2015) 83 Institute of Development Studies Policy Briefing 1. 
602 4. 
603 V Esquivel “Sixteen Years after Beijing: What are the New Policy Agendas for Time-Use Data 
Collection” (2011) 17 Feminist Economics 215 219.  
604 UN Doc A/CONF.177/20 (1995). See part 4 2 1 above for a more detailed discussion of the Beijing 
Platform for Action.  
605 Critical Area F refers to women and the economy.  
606 Para 160. 
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not, generally, contribute to retirements funds.607 Consequently, these women are 
discriminated against if they receive social security payments upon retirement. Thus, 
non-monetised care work affects state parties’ overall expenditure strategies, 
particularly for social security budgetary considerations.608 
Article 14 of CEDAW states that the “particular problems faced by rural women and 
the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families” 
should be considered by state parties when realising women’s rights. Article 14(1) 
specifically mentions the non-monetised care work sector of the economy. Thus, 
article 14 calls on state parties to consider the particular obstacles that rural women 
face and their significant contributions to the social and economic wellbeing of their 
families and communities.609 The CEDAW Committee recognises that rural women, 
who do the majority of non-monetised care work, are often insufficiently addressed or 
ignored in national legislation, policies and budgets.610 However, non-monetised care 
work is also carried out by women in locations other than rural areas. Therefore, 
policies that are developed by state parties protecting women performing non-
monetised care work need to be sensitive to women positioned differently in different 
locations and contexts.    
In 1991, the CEDAW Committee released General Recommendation 17 which 
addressed non-monetised care work done by women.611 It recommended that state 
parties support studies which measure the non-monetised care work done by 
women.612 The quantification of such work is supported by article 11 of CEDAW.613 
Termine and Percic argue that article 11 of CEDAW is relevant for the protection of 
rural women who are involved in low productivity employment and non-monetised care 
work, as it calls for the elimination of discrimination in all forms of work.614 This 
information allows state parties to adequately protect the rights of women who are 
 
607 M Rubin & JR Bartle “Integrating Gender into Government Budgets: A New Perspective” (2005) 65 
Public Administration Review 259 260. 
608 260.  
609 P Termine & M Percic “Rural Women’s Empowerment through Employment from the Beijing Platform 
for Action Onwards” (2015) 46 IDS Bulletin 33 34. 
610 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 34 para 4. 
611 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 17 Measurement and Quantification of the 
Unremunerated Domestic Activities of Women and their Recognition in the Gross Domestic Product 
UN D Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 242 (2003).  
612 Para a.  
613 Article 11 relates to the elimination of discrimination against women in all fields of employment or 
work of choice.  
614 Termine & Percic IDS Bulletin 34.  
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involved in non-monetised care work. The information on non-monetised care work 
also assists in guiding government expenditure to rural development. Elson argues 
that cuts in government expenditure should not be designed in ways that increase the 
burden of non-monetised care work performed by women.615  
The CEDAW Committee also recommends that states parties quantify and include 
the value of non-monetised care work performed by women in their GDP.616 By doing 
so, the economic value of the care work performed by women is recognised and 
validated in national accounts. State parties would also be promoting inclusive and 
sustainable economic development for women participating in non-monetised care 
work through the acknowledgement of their contributions to local and national 
economies.617 State parties are required to report on the measures taken to value non-
monetised care work as well as any progress made to include non-monetised care 
work in national accounts and government budgets.618 This reporting is done to the 
CEDAW Committee in terms of article 18 of CEDAW.619 
In General Comment 34, the CEDAW Committee stated that rural women carry out 
most of the non-monetised care work because of gender stereotypes and inequality 
within the household.620 When women, who perform non-monetised care work do not 
receive support and assistance by government, the cycle of poverty is perpetuated.621 
Chopra argues that young girls in poorer communities often have to drop out of school 
to fulfil non-monetised care work obligations at home, which results in them not having 
enough skills to eventually enter the workforce.622 Thus, non-monetised care work, a 
lack of education and poverty create a cycle which, without adequate government 
protection and resources, leave women disempowered. The cycle of poverty which 
results from non-monetised care work further demonstrates how anti-essentialist 
feminist legal theory assists in understanding the different layers of non-monetised 
care work.  
The lack of protection provided to women carrying out non-monetised care work is 
often as a result of gender-neutral policies which fail to challenge pre-existing gender 
 
615 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 33. 
616 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 17 para b. 
617 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 34 para 17(a). 
618 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 17 Para c.  
619 Further information on state reporting can be found in part 4 2 1 above.  
620 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 34 para 5.  
621 Para 5.  
622 Chopra Institute of Development Studies Policy Briefing 3. 
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stereotypes.623 Thus, the CEDAW Committee requires state parties to provide for non-
monetised care work in their rural development through policies which are gender-
responsive and backed-up by adequate budgets.624 State parties who allocate 
resources to initiatives such as providing childcare facilities and other community-
based care services in rural areas, alleviate the burden of non-monetised care work 
on women.625 Technology investments in agriculture, irrigation, labour-saving and 
water-saving initiatives, also reduces the burden of non-monetised care work on 
women.626 Moreover, the CEDAW Committee has required that rural women, their 
representatives and NGOs be directly involved in the “assessment, analysis, planning, 
design, budgeting, financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation” of all rural 
development strategies.627 Initiatives such as access to clean water and childcare 
facilities are crucial to women living in informal settlements.  
Elson suggests that the only way to close the gender gap is to recognise, reduce 
and redistribute non-monetised care work.628 Recognising non-monetised care work 
means ensuring that the value it adds to economies is adequately understood.629 This 
includes putting a monetary value on this work by calculating how much it costs to hire 
care work as well as calculating how much time is put into non-monetised care work. 
Chopra argues that without due recognition, women face discrimination in the labour 
market and the domestic responsibilities impact on the health and wellbeing of women, 
further affecting their ability to participate in economic and social spheres.630 Reducing 
non-monetised care work relates to eradicating the systemic institutions which result 
in women not being able to leave the ambits of non-monetised care work.631 This is 
resource intensive for state parties as they need to invest in clean water and sanitation, 
clean energy, public transport; as well as social infrastructures such as care services, 
health services and social security.632 By doing so, the burden on women to walk great 
distances to fetch clean water as well as caring for children, the sick and the elderly is 
 
623 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 34 para 10.  
624 Para 36(a).  
625 Para 52(h).  
626 Para 74.  
627 Para 54(d).  
628 D Elson “Recognise, Reduce, and Redistribute Unpaid Care Work: How to Close the Gender Gap” 
(2017) 26 New Labor Forum 52.  
629 54.  
630 Chopra Institute of Development Studies Policy Briefing 1. 
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alleviated. Thus, women’s time is better distributed among other activities such as 
generating income and personal growth.   
The redistribution of non-monetised care work is more difficult for state parties to 
implement. Few strategies are currently proven to reduce the non-monetised care 
work burden on women.633 Elson argues that strategies include the provision of tax-
funded paid parental leave for fathers as well as mothers.634 Through providing 
parental leave for fathers, the burden of childcare is more evenly distributed between 
mothers and fathers. Women thus have the opportunity to return to work and pursue 
further employment after having children. Men need to take responsibility for some of 
the non-monetised care work that women do. However, the majority of the work lies 
in changing social norms and addressing stereotypical gender roles.635 Elson’s 
strategies of recognising, reducing and redistributing non-monetised care work should 
arguably be included in gender responsive budgeting initiatives to ensure women in 
the care economy are adequately protected. 
 
4 2 2 6 Access to justice 
In terms of article 15(1) of CEDAW, state parties shall ensure that women are equal 
with men before the law. The CEDAW Committee has acknowledged that women’s 
right of access to justice is a fundamental component of CEDAW as it encompasses 
elements of the rule of law and good governance.636 Access to justice is essential to 
the provision of remedies for victims and the accountability of justice systems.637 
Article 15 of CEDAW is complemented by article 2 which stipulates that state parties 
must take all appropriate measures to guarantee the substantive equality of men and 
women in all areas of life, which include the establishment of competent national 
tribunals and effective justice systems.638 Article 3 of CEDAW reiterates the need for 
state parties to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure women 
can exercise and enjoy fundamental human rights and freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men.  
 
633 57.  
634 57.  
635 58.  
636 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 1. 
637 Para 1.  
638 Para 6. 
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An understanding of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory is equally relevant to the 
analysis of women’s access to justice.639 Factors such as illiteracy, armed conflict, 
migration, widowhood, poverty, criminalisation of sex work, and geographical 
remoteness make it more difficult for women to gain access to justice.640 Thus state 
parties need to be cognisant of how these factors result in women being prevented 
from seeking justice or how “authorities frequently fail to act with due diligence to 
investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators and/or provide remedies”.641 The 
CEDAW Committee reiterates that women may face discrimination based on their sex 
and gender.642 Gender refers to the socially constructed identities, attributes and roles 
for women and men.643 Women are often discriminated against when seeking justice 
because of the perceived role that women must remain silent and obedient to men. 
Thus, as required by article 5(a) of CEDAW, state parties have an obligation to 
eliminate the underlying barriers which prevent women from exercising their rights and 
impede their access to effective remedies within the justice system.644  
In the RPB communication, the CEDAW Committee noted how stereotyping could 
affect women’s right to a fair and just trial.645 The court system had discriminated 
against the author, who was a rape victim, based on preconceived stereotypes of how 
rape victims should act when confronted with violence.646 The CEDAW Committee 
reiterated in Angela González Carreño v Spain that women who are victims of 
domestic violence also face discrimination in the judicial system.647 Stereotypes based 
on what domestic violence ‘should look like’ negatively affect women’s right to a fair 
trial.648 The author in RPB also drew attention to the lack of assistance which victims 
with disabilities received during legal proceedings as she was deaf and mute.649 The 
lack of translation services and focus on the intersectionality of gender and disability 
 
639 See chapter three part 3 3 above. 
640 Para 9.  
641 Para 10. 
642 Para 7.  
643 See chapter three part 3 4 2 and part 4 2 2 3 above for a further discussion on gender and the 
prohibition of harmful practices respectively. 
644 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 7. 
645 Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (21 February 2014) para 8.8. See 
part 4 2 2 2 above.  
646 Para 8.8. 
647 Communication No 47/2012, UN Doc CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 (15 August 2014) para 9.7. 
648 Para 9.7.  
649 RPB v The Philippines Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (21 February 
2014) para 3.17. 
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resulted in a lack of understanding, from the perspective of the victim, of the 
proceedings.650 The CEDAW Committee recommended that the appropriate 
legislation should be reviewed to ensure that free and adequate interpreters were 
available if necessary during legal proceedings.651 In the concluding observations on 
the state report of the Philippines, the CEDAW Committee reiterated that the justice 
systems need to undergo capacity-building programmes to strengthen gender 
responsiveness and gender sensitivity, especially focused on women who face 
intersecting forms of discrimination.652 
In the concluding observations on the state report of the Bahamas, the CEDAW 
Committee expressed concern regarding women, especially those belonging to 
disadvantaged groups, not being aware of their rights under CEDAW and, thus, not 
being able to pursue the necessary justice.653 The CEDAW Committee recommended 
that the state party, in cooperation with civil society groups, enhance awareness of 
CEDAW and the remedies that are available to women.654 Concerning specific 
strategies, the CEDAW Committee, in the concluding observations on the state report 
of Costa Rica’s state report, stated that access to justice should be guaranteed for 
indigenous women, women of African descent, refugee and asylum-seeking women, 
and women with disabilities by addressing language barriers and disseminating 
information about legal remedies available to women.655  
In General Recommendation 33, the CEDAW Committee recommends that state 
parties provide adequate budgetary and technical assistance to all parts of the justice 
system which include specialised “judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, national human rights institutions and 
ombudsperson offices”.656 The provision of low-cost or free legal aid, advice and 
representation have been identified as a means for state parties to ensure that the 
justice systems are economically accessible to all women.657 The CEDAW Committee 
 
650 Para 3.17. 
651 Para 9(b)(ii). 
652 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic 
Reports of the Philippines (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/PHL/CO/7-8 para 16(a) & (b). 
653 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the Bahamas (2018) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/BHS/CO/6 para 13. 
654 Para 14(c). 
655 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Costa Rica (2017) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/7 para 9(d). 
656 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 39(a). 
657 Para 36. 
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reiterated the need for the institutionalisation of legal aid clinics which are sensitive to 
the needs of diverse women.658 In the X and Y communication, the CEDAW 
Committee recommended that the state party ensure that judges, lawyers and law 
enforcement personnel receive mandatory training on zero-tolerance policies in 
respect of violence against women as well as the definition of domestic violence and 
gender stereotypes.659 This ensures that when women report violent crimes, they 
receive appropriate protection and access to justice. In terms of resource constraints 
in realising women’s access to justice, the CEDAW Committee has specified that state 
parties must seek support from external sources, such as United Nations (“UN”) 
specialised agencies, the international community and civil society to ensure that 
adequate resources are allocated to the justice systems.660  
 
4 2 3 Implementation mechanisms 
4 2 3 1 Special measures 
Article 24 of CEDAW states that “state parties undertake to adopt all necessary 
measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization in the present 
convention”. This provision does not directly mention resources or budgeting, 
however, the instruction for all necessary measures to be adopted is arguably 
resource intensive for state parties. Most provisions in CEDAW also require state 
parties to take “all appropriate measures” to realise the right contained in that 
provision.661 The CEDAW Committee has defined “measures” to include a “wide 
variety of legislative, executive, administrative and other regulatory instruments, 
policies and practices, such as outreach or support programmes; allocation and/or 
reallocation of resources; preferential treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and 
promotion; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems”.662 The 
exact measures may change based on the context of the substantive equality goal, 
however, they will all have financial implications to a greater or lesser extent.  
 
658 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Costa Rica (2017) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/7 para 9(a).  
659 Communication No 24/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/61/D/24/2009 (2015) para 11(b)(iv). See part 4 2 2 
2 above for a further discussion on the X and Y communication.  
660 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 39(b).  
661 The articles that require state parties to take “all appropriate measures” are articles 2-8, 10-14 and 
16.  
662 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25 para 22.  
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Article 4 of CEDAW relates to “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating 
de facto equality between men and women”. The CEDAW Committee has described 
these temporary special measures as being necessary to accelerate equal 
opportunities and to accelerate redistribution of power and resources.663 Article 4(1) 
states that these temporary special measures shall be ceased when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. In this regard, the CEDAW 
Committee has reiterated the importance of having a clear timeframe for any 
temporary special measures being implemented.664 
General Recommendation 23 refers to temporary special measures such as 
financially assisting and training female candidates as necessary for women’s 
appointments to public positions within their government.665 The CEDAW Committee 
has recommended that temporary special measures, such as quotas and affirmative 
action, be utilised in areas where women are underrepresented or disadvantaged, 
such as in the labour market and political sphere.666 Along with implementing such 
measures, the CEDAW Committee has also emphasised that state parties must raise 
public awareness about the non-discriminatory nature and importance of such 
temporary special measures for promoting substantive equality.667 
Elson argues that these temporary special measures provide opportunities and 
ensure the participation of women within the budgetary process.668 Women should be 
included to assist with budget formation, content and implementation. This is 
strengthened by article 7 of CEDAW, which refers to women having equal opportunity 
to participate in the political and public life of the country. General Recommendation 
23 elaborates on this by stating that it refers to the exercise of legislative, judicial, 
executive and administrative powers which includes the “formulation and 
implementation of policy at international, regional, national and local levels”.669  
 
 
663 Para 39.  
664 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eight Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea 
(2018) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8 para 21. 
665 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 23 Political and Public Life UN Doc A/52/38 (1997) 
para 15. 
666 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Fiji (2018) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/FJI/CO/5 para 24.  
667 Para 24. 
668 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 33. See chapter three part 3 4 4 above for a further discussion 
on women’s involvement in the budgeting process.  
669 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 23 para 5. 
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4 2 3 2 Budgeting in terms of CEDAW 
Gender responsive budgeting has been established as an effective way for state 
parties to meet their obligations in terms of CEDAW.670 Most state parties to CEDAW 
have implemented a form of gender responsive budgeting. However, when assessing 
state reports to the CEDAW Committee and concluding observations on those state 
reports, there are still discrepancies in how state parties budget to realise the rights in 
CEDAW and how the CEDAW Committee responds to these budgeting strategies. 
There is no particular gender responsive budgeting strategy which has been 
specifically developed by the CEDAW Committee for state parties to meet their 
obligations in terms of CEDAW.671 However, the concluding observations on state 
reports give insight into what the CEDAW Committee expects from state parties when 
fulfilling their obligations towards women’s rights. Byrnes argues that the CEDAW 
Committee’s goal when considering state reports is to assess the actual situation in 
the country as well as identifying the progress that has been made and the obstacles 
that still need to be overcome.672  
The CEDAW Committee acknowledges the significance of anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory in state party budget formulation. This is, for example, evident in the 
concluding observations on the state report of Mali where the CEDAW Committee 
recommended that “women who are more vulnerable, such as women with disabilities 
and internally displaced women”, need to be considered when formulating national 
budgets.673 The CEDAW Committee has also emphasised the imperative role that civil 
society plays in establishing gender responsive budgeting.674 In the concluding 
observations on the state report of Austria, the CEDAW Committee commended the 
establishment of gender responsive budgeting in all government sectors.675 The 
CEDAW Committee also recommended that Austria continue to allocate resources to 
the various bodies responsible for ensuring the execution of these budgets.676  
 
670 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 32. 
671 39. 
672 Byrnes “The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women” in Women’s Human 
Rights 32.  
673 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report 
of Mali (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/MLI/CO/6-7 para 18(c). 
674 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Côte d’Ivoire (2019) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/CIV/CO/4 para 22(c). 
675 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of Austria (2019) UN 
Doc CEDAW/C/AUT/CO/9 para 14. 
676 Para 15. 
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While the CEDAW Committee has praised some state parties on their gender 
responsive budgeting initiatives, concerns have been raised about the implementation 
of other strategies. The concluding observation for Guyana emphasised the lack of 
training and expertise among staff who were expected to implement gender 
responsive budgeting initiatives.677 The CEDAW Committee recommended that 
human, technical and financial resources should be increased to ensure substantive 
gender equality was being achieved through gender responsive budgeting.678  
Elson suggests that when assessing gender responsive budgeting strategies, it is 
imperative to identify the different measures that state parties have utilised to fulfil their 
obligations in terms of CEDAW.679 In this regard, CEDAW provides for three different 
types of measures which should be implemented in the expenditure part of gender 
responsive budgeting. The first of these is general measures which improve the 
position of women and guarantee their full enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights.680 The second type of measure is temporary special measures which 
accelerate the achievement of substantive equality between men and women.681 The 
temporary special measures, as provided for in article 4(1) of CEDAW, do not 
constitute discrimination and they are to be discontinued when the desired goal of 
substantive equality has been reached.682 The third type of measure is permanent 
gender-specific special measures necessitated by biological differences.683  
These different kinds of measures can be utilised to realise any provision in 
CEDAW, including in the provisions as discussed above.684 The extensive work that 
has been carried out by scholars alongside the CEDAW Committee on resource 
allocation for the realisation of women’s rights, can provide valuable insights into the 
interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Chapter 5 draws on these 




677 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of Guyana (2019) UN 
Doc CEDAW/C/GUY/CO/9 para 17(a). 
678 Para 18(a). 
679 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 50. 
680 50.  
681 50.  
682 See part 4 2 3 1 above.  
683 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 50. 
684 See part 4 2 2 above. 
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4 3 Resource allocation under ICESCR                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
4 3 1 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR  
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states that “each party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, to 
achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures”. It describes the nature of the general legal obligations of state parties to 
the ICESCR.685 Before analysing how state parties must meet their obligations in 
terms of article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the different norms mentioned in article 2(1) are 
defined and analysed below. The CESCR has sought to clarify states parties’ 
obligations in terms of defining maximum available resources, progressive realisation, 
retrogressive measures, minimum core obligations, extraterritorial obligations and 
non-discrimination. Similarly, to the CEDAW Committee,686 it has done so through 
statements, general comments and concluding observations on state party reports. 
While these documents are not legally binding in nature, they too hold persuasive 
value.687  
 
4 3 1 1 Maximum available resources 
General Comment 3, issued by the CESCR, elaborates on the obligations created by 
article 2(1). State parties can determine which measures are most appropriate to 
realise the rights in the ICESCR within the context of their country. The CESCR has 
stated that the mere adoption of legislative measures does not exhaust the obligations 
of state parties.688 The CESCR has also identified policy, judicial, administrative, 
financial, educational and social measures.689 O’Connell et al argue that no legislative 
or administrative measure carries as much significance as budgetary allocations, 
 
685 CESCR General Comment 3 The nature of states parties’ obligations (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 
para 1 (“CESCR General Comment 3”). 
686 See part 4 2 above. 
687 B Saul, D Kinley & J Mowbray The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2014) 5. See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 107. 
688 Para 4.  
689 Paras 5, 6 and 7.  
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specifically in the realisation of socio-economic rights.690 To mobilise maximum 
available resources, state parties need to have progressive fiscal policies which 
consider the impact that implementation has on inequality and all groups of people.691   
State parties cannot escape their obligations in terms of the ICESCR solely on the 
grounds of a shortage of available resources.692 In this regard, the CESCR has 
importantly stated that “budgetary constraints should not be invoked as the only 
justification for the lack of progress” when considering the rights in the ICESCR.693 
The available resources include those within the state party as well as those available 
from the international community.694 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Limburg 
Principles”)695 state that when determining whether state parties have taken adequate 
measures and allocated effective resources for the realisation of the rights in the 
ICESCR, attention should be paid to the equitable distribution of these resources.696 
The purpose of the Limburg Principles is to clarify the nature and scope of state 
parties’ obligations under the ICESCR.697 While the Limburg Principles are non-
binding on state parties, they ensure that state parties better understand their 
obligation to prioritise economic, social and cultural rights.698 De Schutter argues that 
the Limburg Principles marked a crucial advancement in the understanding of 
economic, social and cultural rights due to the clarification of rights that were still 
largely unclear to state parties.699 
 
690 R O’Connell, A Nolan, C Harvey, M Dutschke & E Rooney Applying an International Human Rights 
Framework to State Budget Allocations (2014) 66.  
691 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South Africa (2018) UN Doc 
E/C.12/ZAF/CO/1 para 16. See part 4 3 2 1 below for a further analysis of taxation policies and its effect 
on different groups of people. 
692 CESCR General Comment 11 Plans of Action for Primary Education (Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (1999) para 9 (“General Comment 11”).  
693 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4 para 24.  
694 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 (1986) para 26. See part 4 3 1 5 below for a discussion on 
extra-territorial obligations.  
695 UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 (1986). 
696 Para 27.  




699 O De Schutter “The Rights-Based Welfare State: Public Budgets and Economic and Social Rights” 
(2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 9.  
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In terms of article 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, state parties are obliged to report to 
the CESCR on the measures they have taken to realise the rights in the ICESCR. By 
doing this, the CESCR can assess current initiatives and make recommendations to 
state parties in the concluding observations on state reports. The CESCR has 
described the objectives of state reporting as creating a platform to facilitate the 
exchange of information among state parties and a way for state parties to evaluate 
the extent to which progress has been made towards the progressive realisation of 
the rights in the ICESCR.700 The CESCR is also able to request budgetary alterations 
and express concern over insufficient resource allocations.701 In the concluding 
observation on the combined initial, second and third periodic reports of Chad, the 
CESCR expressed concern over the lack of funding for social services, despite the 
available resources for it.702  
The CESCR has drawn attention to where budget increases have not had the 
desired effect on the realisation of rights. This occurred when Paraguay increased 
their national health budget, yet the majority of people in the country did not have 
access to adequate health care.703 Such observations demonstrate that the CESCR 
is greatly concerned with the effect and implementation of resource allocation.  
The CESCR has also raised concern over the non-consideration of state parties of 
the sufficiency of certain budgetary allocation to meet the number of beneficiaries 
requiring access to the rights. This is evident in the concluding observations on the 
state report of Angola where the CESCR noted that the budget allocation for education 
had decreased, despite the number of school-going children having increased.704 The 
CESCR expressed similar concern over insufficient work opportunities for men and 
women despite Angola’s economic growth.705 In the concluding observations on 
Mauritius’ state report, the CESCR stated that effective measures needed to be 
adopted to close the gender pay gap and eliminate gender stereotypes in the family 
 
700 CESCR General Comment 1 Reporting by State Parties (1989) para 9 and 6. See part 4 3 1 2 below 
for a discussion on progressive realisation. 
701 L Chenwi “Monitoring the Progressive Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights: Lessons from the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the South African 
Constitutional Court” (2010) Research Paper Written for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute 46. 
702 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second and Third Periodic Reports 
of Chad UN Doc E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (2009) para 23. 
703 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Second and Third Periodic Reports of Paraguay UN Doc 
E/C. 12/PRY/CO/3 (2008) para 12(i).  
704 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial to Third Periodic Report of Angola UN Doc 
E/C.12/AGO/CO/3 (2008) para 39. 
705 Para 39.  
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and society.706 The measures which were suggested, such as career development 
opportunities and media campaigns, require a substantial resource input from the 
state.  
In the concluding observations on the state report of Ukraine, the CESCR 
expressed concern regarding the persistent gender stereotypes which perpetuate 
gender inequality in the state party.707 These persistent gender stereotypes result in 
women, particularly those in vulnerable positions, to continue to bear the 
disproportionate burden of non-monetised care work.708 The CESCR recommended 
that the state party implement a gender responsive budgeting initiative which includes 
time-use surveys as a tool to measure the distribution of monetised and non-
monetised care work between men and women.709 
The above shows that there are extensive requirements as to how states should 
meet their obligations in terms of the ICESCR.710 The CESCR also places great 
emphasis on whether state parties have made transparent and participative 
decisions.711 Chenwi argues that the obligation to allocate maximum available 
resources is also intertwined with the concepts of progressive realisation and minimum 
core obligations.712 Therefore, these concepts are discussed in turn.   
 
4 3 1 2 Progressive realisation 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR encompasses the concept of progressive realisation. This 
means that economic, social and cultural rights are generally not capable of being 
achieved in a short period of time, however, there are some obligations that can be 
achieved immediately or over a shorter period of time, as discussed below.713 The 
CESCR has clarified that the concept of progressive realisation requires state parties 
 
706 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Mauritius UN Doc 
E/C.12/MUS/CO/5 (2019) para 24(b) & (d).  
707 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Ukraine UN Doc 
E/C.12/UKR/CO/7 (2020) para 16. 
708 Para 16 
709 Para 17(b). See chapter three part 3 4 5 above for a discussion on gender responsive budgeting 
and time-use surveys.  
710 O’Connell et al Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations 67.  
711 CESCR General Comment 3 para 11.  
712 Chenwi Paper Written for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute 10. 
713 CESCR General Comment 3 para 9.  
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to move as swiftly as possible towards the goal of full realisation of the rights in the 
ICESCR.714  
De Schutter argues that while the actual implications of progressive realisation are 
ambiguous, there are four norms which, to a certain extent, clarify the duty of 
progressive realisation.715 The first norm is adapted from General Comment 19 and 
states that any deliberately retrogressive measures requires careful consideration and 
need to be fully justified by the state party in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources.716 The second norm stipulates that when state parties are facing 
resource constraints, they should ensure the satisfaction of, at least, the minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights in the ICESCR.717 This concept is reiterated in 
the Limburg Principles, which states that economic development must not affect the 
respect that the minimum essentials levels of economic, social and cultural rights 
should receive.718  
The third norm is that the rights in the ICESCR should be realised without 
discrimination.719 This norm does not only speak to removing discriminatory legislation 
and policy, but it also requires state parties to constantly move towards the 
prioritisation and realisation of the rights of marginalised groups.720 De Schutter 
argues that the fourth norm for progressive realisation should be participation.721 
Participation is not a principle stipulated in the ICESCR, however, it is a significant 
principle within human rights law.722 De Schutter reasons that participation is a 
necessary norm of progressive realisation because extensive consultation with civil 
society is needed to assess whether current budgetary allocations will realise the 
rights in the ICESCR.723 Participation also encourages accountability and 
 
714 Para 9.  
715 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 10. 
716 CESCR, General Comment 19 The Right to Social Security (Article 9) (2008) para 41. Retrogressive 
measures are further discussed in part 4 3 1 3 below.  
717 CESCR General Comment 3 para 10. Minimum core obligations are further discussed in part 4 3 1 
4 below.  
718 Limburg Principles para 25.  
719 Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR and CESCR General Comment 20 Non-discrimination in 
economic, social and cultural rights (art.2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/2 (2009) (“General Comment 20”). See part 4 3 1 6 below for 
a discussion on non-discrimination and equality.  
720 CESCR General Comment 20 para 8.  
721 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 11. 
722 See chapter three part 3 4 4 above.  
723 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 12. 
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transparency.724 The CESCR has reiterated the importance of a transparent and 
participatory budgetary process when steps are taken to progressively realise the 
rights in the ICESCR.725 Transparency and participation are core human rights 
principles which also form part of gender responsive budgeting strategies.726 
The CESCR has stated that the obligation to “take steps” acknowledges that while 
the full realisation of the rights in the ICESCR may be achieved progressively, there 
are steps that can be taken immediately.727 These steps need to be “deliberate, 
concrete and targeted” towards the full realisation of the rights in the ICESCR.728 
Through this clarification, the CESCR ensures that state parties understand the short- 
and long-term obligations that are created under article 2(1) of the ICESCR. With 
regard to the right to education, the CESCR observed that state parties should 
prioritise the provision of free primary education and also mobilise resources to take 
concrete steps towards achieving free secondary and higher education.729 Thus, as 
Chenwi establishes, progressive realisation goes beyond resource allocation for 
achieving the minimum core levels of a right.730 Instead, progressive realisation 
encompasses a long-term approach to continuously strive for improvement of the 
enjoyment economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
4 3 1 3 Retrogressive measures 
Retrogressive measures require careful consideration and need to be fully justified “by 
reference to the totality of the rights” provided for in the ICESCR and the context of 
the full use of maximum available resources.731 When assessing the validity of 
retrogressive measures taken by state parties, the CESCR has six considerations.732 
These considerations include whether there was reasonable justification for the action, 
alternatives were duly considered, there was genuine participation of affected groups 
 
724 12. 
725 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Periodic Report of Mali (2018) UN Doc 
E/C.12/MLI/CO/1 para 13. 
726 See chapter three part 3 4 4 above for a discussion on civil society’s role in gender responsive 
budgeting. 
727 CESCR General Comment 3 para 2. 
728 Para 2.  
729 CESCR General Comment 13 The Right to Education (Article 13 of the Covenant) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) para 14.  
730 Chenwi Paper Written for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute 20. 
731 CESCR General Comment 3 para 9. 
732 CESCR General Comment 19 para 42. 
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examining the proposed measures, the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory, the measures will have a sustained impact on economic, social and 
cultural rights, and whether there was an independent review of the measures at the 
national level.733 Part of the duty to realise the rights in the ICESCR progressively 
implies a heavy burden of justification on retrogressive measures.734 Any retrogressive 
measure needs to be considered and justified.735 These measures should also ensure 
that the rights of disadvantaged and marginalised groups are not adversely 
affected.736  
Liebenberg argues that there should be heavier burdens of justification on state 
parties when retrogressive measures result in depriving marginalised and vulnerable 
groups of people of access to basic social services.737 For the adoption of 
retrogressive steps, the burden of proof rests on the state party to show that the action 
was justified and that full use was made of available resources.738 Should a state party 
use “resource constraints” as a defence for the implementation of retrogressive 
measures, then the CESCR has a set of considerations to take into account. These 
include the country’s level of development, the severity of the alleged retrogressive 
measures, the country’s economic situation, the existence of serious claims for limited 
resources, whether low-cost options had been sought, and whether the state party 
had sought aid and cooperation from the international community.739  
Accordingly, the CESCR has stated that retrogressive measures should only 
remain in place insofar as they remain necessary and proportionate, they should 
ensure that the rights of disadvantaged and marginalised people are not 
disproportionately affected, and they should not affect the minimum core content of 
 
733 Para 42.  
734 OHCHR “Report on austerity measures and economic and social rights” (2013) The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RightsCrisis/E-2013-82_en.pdf> (accessed 
07-07-2020).  
735 CESCR General Comment 3 para 9.  
736 Statement of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (fifty-eighth session, 2016) 
Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights UN Doc E/C. 12/2016/1 para 4.  
737 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 190. 
738 Statement of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (thirty-sixth session, 2007) An 
evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum available resources” under an optional 
protocol to the covenant UN Doc E/C. 12/2007/1 para 9. 
739 Para 10.  
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the rights under the ICESCR.740 The CESCR has also specified this in the concluding 
observations on the state report of Bulgaria where it was stated that retrogressive 
measures, if unavoidable, must only remain in place insofar and they are necessary 
and they must not result in discrimination.741 In the concluding observations on the 
state report of Argentina, the CESCR recommended that during periods of austerity, 
retrogressive measures should be avoided if possible and if these cannot be avoided, 
the national budget should be implemented to reflect a “human rights and gender-
sensitive approach”.742 In this way, the CESCR expresses the significance of a 
gender-responsive approach to budgeting. 
Retrogressive measures also cannot solely be justified on an existing armed conflict 
where more resources are being redirected to military spending.743 The CESCR 
reiterated this in its concluding observations on the state report of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.744 The CESCR found there to be a mismanagement of 
resources and international aid as there had been a decrease in budgetary allocations 
to social sectors while there was an increase in defence budgetary allocations.745 
However, when assessing periods of armed conflict and retrogressive measures, the 
CESCR will consider each state party’s budgetary allocations individually.746 
The CESCR addressed retrogressive measures in Djazia and Bellili v Spain 
(“Djazia”)747 where it concluded that all budgetary adjustments affecting the rights in 
the ICESCR must be “temporary, necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory.”748 
This case dealt with the right to adequate housing as well as the importance of special 
protection for vulnerable groups.749 Djazia and Bellili had been evicted, along with their 
 
740 Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights para 4.  
741 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Bulgaria (2019) UN Doc 
E/C.12/BGR/CO/6 para 9. 
742 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Argentina (2018) UN Doc 
E/C.12/ARG/CO/4 para 6(d). 
743 Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Conflict Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc E/2015/59 (2015) para 26.  
744 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4. 
745 Para 16.  
746 S Yeshanew “Combining the ‘minimum core’ and ‘reasonableness’ models of reviewing socio-
economic rights” (2008) 9 ESR Review 8 12.  
747 Djazia and Bellili v Spain (2017) “Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with regard to communication No. 
5/2015” UN Doc E/C. 12/61/D/5/2015.  
748 Para 17.6.  
749 The right to adequate housing as in art 11(1) of the ICESCR. 
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two small children, from their private rental housing in Spain.750 General Comment 7 
refers to forced evictions as a negative obligation on state parties.751 Negative 
obligations are often considered absent of resource allocations, as state parties are 
obligated to refrain from performing them.752 Thus, the state party’s obligation to 
respect the rights to adequate housing can also include non-resource intensive 
considerations. The decision in Djazia is considered significant because of the focus 
on realising the right to adequate housing during an economic crisis.753 
The family, in Djazia, had been severely affected by the economic crisis in Spain 
and had repeatedly been denied social housing.754 The CESCR stated that the 
obligation to provide adequate housing must be fulfilled through measures that are 
deliberate, specific and as straightforward as possible to ensure this right.755 General 
Comment 7 elaborates that state parties must take all appropriate measures, to the 
maximum of available resources, to ensure that those that have been affected by 
evictions have access to adequate alternative housing.756 The CESCR stated that 
despite an economic crisis, there were measures, such as the formulation of an 
emergency housing plan, which the state party could have taken to ensure that 
economically vulnerable families had access to adequate housing.757 Spain was 
furthermore not able to explain to the CESCR why it sold part of the public housing 
stock to private companies, significantly decreasing the availability of public housing 
in times of an economic downturn.758 The sale of the public housing was considered 
retrogressive measures which were not temporary or necessary as required.759 The 




750 Djazia and Bellili v Spain (2017) para 2.8. 
751 CESCR General Comment 7 The Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11.1): Forced Evictions UN Doc 
E/1998/22 (1997) para 8 (“General Comment 7”).  
752 Chenwi Paper Written for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute 16.   
753 ESCR-Net “Mohamed Ben Djazia and Naouel Bellili v. Spain, CESCR, Communication No. 5/2015, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 (20 June 2017)” (2017) ESCR-Net <https://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/2017/mohamed-ben-djazia-and-naouel-bellili-v-spain-cescr-communication-no-
52015-un-doc> (accessed 07-07-2020).  
754 Djazia and Bellili v Spain (2017) para 2.9. 
755 Para 15.3. 
756 CESCR General Comment 7 para 16. 
757 Djazia and Bellili v Spain (2017) para 17.5. 
758 Para 17.5. 
759 Para 17.6. 
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4 3 1 4 Minimum core obligations 
The CESCR has established that state parties have a minimum core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of the minimum essential levels of each of the rights in the 
ICESCR.760 The CESCR has stated that resource constraints need to be taken into 
consideration to assess whether the states have discharged their minimum core 
obligation.761 However, there is a “heavy burden of justification” on the state to show 
that it has exhausted its resources to fulfil its minimum core obligation.762 The Limburg 
Principles also state that the minimum subsistence of all rights needs to be met, 
regardless of economic development.763 In this regard, it is necessary to establish 
whether the state has taken all available steps to the maximum of its available 
resources as per article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The CESCR has the ultimate say as to 
whether state parties have undertaken all appropriate means to realise the rights in 
the ICESCR.764  
The CESCR has also noted that the states’ core obligation in terms of the ICESCR 
is not eliminated as a result of resource constraints.765 Should a state party attribute 
the failure to meet the minimum core obligation to resource constraints, then the state 
party must demonstrate to the CESCR that every effort has been made to use all the 
available resources in an attempt to meet its obligations.766 The only way for a state 
party to show that it has attempted to realise the rights to the maximum of its available 
resources is to show that it has made every effort to satisfy its obligations as a matter 
of priority in terms of the ICESCR.767 Therefore, the burden of proof rests on the state 
party to demonstrate why it is unable to shift its resources (such as resources used for 
military expenditure) to ensure that its minimum core obligations are met.768 
State parties must specifically ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable citizens 
are not further deprived of their most essential economic, social and cultural rights 
during times of austerity.769 The CESCR has reiterated that where a state party uses 
 
760 CESCR General Comment 3 para 10.  
761 Para 10.  
762 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 149. 
763 Limburg Principles para 25.  
764 CESCR General Comment 3 para 4.  
765 Para 11. 
766 Para 10. 
767 Para 6.  
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resource constraints or severe economic recession as a reason for not meeting their 
obligations in terms of the ICESCR, the most vulnerable members of society still need 
to be protected through the adoption of relatively low-cost programmes.770 These 
programmes need to be aimed at ensuring that individuals have access to essential 
foodstuff, essential primary health care, basic shelter and housing, and basic forms of 
education.771 In the concluding observations on the state report of Jamaica, the 
CESCR argued that it is precisely during periods of resource constraints that the 
ICESCR “should assume its most important function – that of a last-ditch defence for 
the most vulnerable”.772 
Campbell argues that the minimum core obligation is currently loosely defined in 
practice.773 Thus, state parties are left uncertain as to where to allocate their resources 
to meet their minimum core obligations in terms of the ICESCR. Young suggests that 
the lack of firm definitions have led to core obligations being identified under specific 
rights in the ICESCR.774 In terms of just and fair working conditions, the core 
obligations include minimum wages, health and safety policies, and working 
standards.775 In terms of sexual and reproductive rights, the core obligations include 
the equal provision of health services and medicines.776 Campbell states further that 
the lack of unifying principles between these core obligations make it difficult for state 
parties to ascertain their exact minimum core obligations.777 However, as reiterated by 
the CESCR, the main focus of minimum core obligations should always be to ensure 
that the most vulnerable members of society have access to the most essential rights 
in the ICESCR.  
 
 
770 CESCR General Comment 3 paras 12. 
771 Para 10.  
772 CESCR Consideration of Report Submitted by State Party: Jamaica UN Doc E/C.12/1990/SR.15 
(1990) para 7.  
773 M Campbell Women, Poverty, Equality: The Role of CEDAW (2018) 121. 
774 KG Young “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content” 
(2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113 152. 
775 CESCR General Comment 23 on the Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Article 7 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/23 
para 65. 
776 CESCR General Comment 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Rights (Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/22 para 
49. 
777 Campbell Women, Poverty, Equality 122. 
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4 3 1 5 Extraterritorial obligations 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that state parties are obligated to take states, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to realise the rights 
in the ICESCR. The CESCR has interpreted maximum available resources as the 
resources both existing within the state as well as those that could be received through 
international assistance.778 Thus, international assistance and cooperation for “the 
development and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an 
obligation of all States”.779 Article 23 of the ICESCR states that international 
cooperation includes the adoption of recommendations, conclusion of conventions as 
well as technical assistance. General Comment 11 reiterates that when “a state party 
is lacking financial resources or expertise to fully realise the rights” in the ICESCR, the 
“international community has a clear obligation to assist”.780  
The CESCR has reiterated that where a state party relies on resource constraints 
as a reason for not being able to realise economic, social and cultural rights to the 
maximum of its available resources, the CESCR will consider whether that state party 
has sought international aid.781 The CESCR will look particularly at where international 
aid was requested and whether any assistance or offers of resources were rejected 
by state parties.782 The CESCR has stated that when international cooperation is 
undertaken, a sustainable framework on the use of aid must be developed.783 If a state 
party does not develop such a framework, it is in breach of its obligation to allocate 
maximum available resources to the realisation of the rights in the ICESCR.784 
The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Maastricht Principles”) elaborate on state 
parties’ extraterritorial obligations in terms of the ICESCR.785 As stated in the 
 
778 Statement of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (thirty-sixth session, 2007) An 
evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum available resources” under an optional 
protocol to the covenant UN Doc E/C. 12/2007/1 para 5. 
779 CESCR General Comment 3 para 14.  
780 CESCR General Comment 11 para 9.  
781 An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum available resources” under an optional 
protocol to the covenant para 10(f). 
782 Para 10(f). 
783 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo UN Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (2009) para 16. 
784 Para 16.  
785 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
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introduction of the Maastricht Principles, they are designed to clarify the extraterritorial 
obligations of state parties in terms of existing international law. In terms of the 
Maastricht Principles, state parties are obligated to take action individually, and 
through international cooperation, to create enabling environments where economic, 
social and cultural rights can be fulfilled.786 They need to realise these rights 
separately, to the maximum to their ability and then, where necessary, contribute to 
the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.787 Principle 31 
clarifies that the extraterritorial obligation should be proportionate to the state parties’ 
economic, technical and technological capacities, available resources, and influence 
in international decision-making processes. The extraterritorial fulfilment of economic, 
social and cultural rights should also prioritise the rights of disadvantaged, 
marginalised and vulnerable groups.788  
Principle 31 recognises that the obligation to cooperate internationally and fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights is not something that one state party can do in 
isolation.789 State parties need to enter into international agreements which can hold 
all participants accountable. Principle 31 also links with Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, 
which reiterates that the state parties which have particular extraterritorial obligations 
are those which have the economic and technical capacity.790 Thus, those state parties 
which have abundant available resources have particular extraterritorial obligations to 
assist those who do not have the same capacity.791 De Schutter et al argue that since 
Principle 31 of the Maastricht Principles clarifies that, “states must cooperate to 
mobilise the maximum of available resources for the universal fulfilment of economic, 
social and cultural rights”, a state party is not relieved of its obligation to realise 
economic, social and cultural rights simply due to a lack of resources.792 




786 Principle 29. 
787 Principle 31. 
788 Principle 32(a).  
789 O de Schutter, A Eide, A Khalfan, M Orellana, M Salomon & I Seiderman “Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
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4 3 1 6 Non-discrimination and equality  
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR states that “state parties to the present Covenant undertake 
to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. State parties 
are thus obligated to ensure that all rights in the ICESCR are exercised in a way that 
prohibits any discrimination, whether in law or fact, whether direct or indirect on the 
prohibited grounds listed in article 2(2).793 The CESCR reiterated that article 2(2) is an 
obligation that state parties have to exercise immediately.794 
The ICESCR contains the right to non-discrimination based on various grounds, 
inter alia non-discrimination based on sex.795 Furthermore, the non-discriminative 
clause is complemented by the right of every woman to the equal enjoyment of all the 
rights contained in the ICESCR.796 The basis for a gender responsive budgeting and 
feminist legal theory analysis can be found in General Comment 16 where measures 
such as “gender-specific allocation of resources” and “equality in the allocation of 
resources” are addressed.797 General Comment 16 deals specifically with the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.798  
General Comment 20 also elaborates on the duty of state parties to apply the 
ICESCR based on the principle of non-discrimination.799 General Comment 22, on the 
rights to health care as per article 12 of the ICESCR, reiterates that state parties have 
a duty to ensure all women have equal access to sexual and reproductive health care. 
This is particularly important for women with disabilities, migrant workers, women 
facing sexual harassment in the workplaces, or women being discriminated against 
based on pregnancy, childbirth, parenthood, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
intersex status.800  
 
793 CESCR General Comment 19 para 29.  
794 Para 40.  
795 Article 2(2) of the ICESCR.  
796 Article 3.  
797 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 16 (thirty fourth session, 
2005) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights 
(Art. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 
para 21 & 22. 
798 CESCR General Comment 16. 
799 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20 (forty second 
session, 2009) Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para 2, of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20.  
800 CESCR, General Comment 22 para 6.  
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State parties have a greater obligation to take measures which ensure that 
vulnerable or marginalised groups have access to their rights in terms of the 
ICESCR.801 State parties need to take positive action which includes special measures 
and additional resource allocation to ensure the empowerment of vulnerable 
groups.802 The CESCR has stated, in concluding observations on state reports, that 
marginalised groups of people require a state party’s full commitment to ensuring that 
legislation and policy are non-discriminative and inclusive. By doing so, the CESCR 
has guided them to ensure that their resources are focused on the rights of the most 
vulnerable. The CESCR has, for example, identified budgetary allocations for the 
implementation of comprehensive housing plans for low-income families803 as well as 
the protection of the socio-economic rights of marginalised groups of people.804  
In the Marcia Cecilia Trujillo Calero v Ecuador (“Calero”)805 case, the CESCR 
elaborated on state parties’ obligation to ensure that women, especially women who 
are part of the non-monetised care work economy, are not discriminated against when 
receiving social security.806 The author of the communication was a voluntary affiliate 
of the social security system in Ecuador. She contributed to this fund because she 
worked as an “unpaid domestic worker” responsible for the care of her home and her 
three minor children.807 The Ecuadorian Social Security Institute rejected the author’s 
application for a retirement pension on the grounds that she had not made enough 
monthly contributions to the fund.808 The author learned in 2007 that the payments she 
had made between 1989 and 1995 had been invalid, though this information had never 
been communicated to her when she was making the payments.809 
The author, in Calero, who was left unemployed, impoverished and facing serious 
health problems due to no retirement money, had also unsuccessfully sought relief 
 
801 Chenwi Paper Written for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute 20. 
802 CESCR General Comment 5 Persons with Disabilities UN Doc E/1995/22 (1994) para 9.  
803 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second and Third Periodic Reports 
of Chad UN Doc E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (2009) para 27. 
804 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second to Fourth Periodic Reports 
of Cambodia UN Doc E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (2009) para 38.  
805 Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant concerning 
communication No. E/C.12/63/D/10/2015 (2018).  
806 See part 4 2 2 5 above on what non-monetised care work is as well as how it has been addressed 
under CEDAW. 
807 Para 2.1. 
808 Para 2.4. 
809 Para 2.3. 
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from the National Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court.810 She claimed that 
the state party violated her right to social security as protected under article 9 of the 
ICESCR.811 The author also referred to article 2(2) of the ICESCR and stated that she 
was “part of a generation of women who dedicated the majority of their lives to non-
monetised care work and who faced greater obstacles than men in accessing their 
right to social security”.812 Women who partake in non-monetised care work do not 
have an employment relationship, which provides them direct access to these social 
security schemes, and thus often make use of voluntary affiliations regimes. Non-
monetised care workers need to make contributions to these funds to access the 
benefits, despite not having a fixed income.813 Thus, Calero addresses the indirect 
discrimination against women that can occur in social security schemes. This 
discrimination is also aggravated in the case of older women who wish to access social 
security and retirement funds.814 
The CESCR stated that the right to social security, under article 9 of the ICESCR 
carries significant financial implications for state parties. The CESCR reiterated that 
state parties are obligated to ensure the satisfaction of, at least, the minimum core 
levels of this rights, without discrimination of any kind.815 State parties need to take 
effective measures, to the maximum of available resources, to fully realise the right of 
all persons without discrimination to social security. This entails ensuring that public 
policies and legislation pertaining to social security take account of the unique 
circumstances and inequalities faced by women who do non-monetised care work.816 
This is particularly significant because of the persistence of gender stereotypes which 
result in women spending more time than men doing non-monetised work and, 
subsequently, cannot make equal contributions to social security schemes.817 
Measures, such as non-contributory schemes, ensure that women in non-monetised 
care work are not forced into poverty during retirement.818  
 
810 Paras 3.6 and 2.9. 
811 Para 3.1. 
812 Para 3.4. 
813 Para 3.5. 
814 Para 7.2. 
815 Para 11.2. 
816 Para 13.3. 
817 Para 13.4. 
818 CESCR General Comment 19 para 32. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  119 
 
The CESCR concluded that the denial of special retirement for the author of Calero 
constituted a violation of the right to social security in article 9 of the ICESCR. The 
conditions of the voluntary retirement scheme, which resulted in a non-monetised care 
worker’s affiliation and contributions being invalid, constituted discriminatory treatment 
in violation of articles 2(2), 3 and 9.819 The CESCR recommended that the state party 
adopt appropriate legislation to ensure the right of all affiliates to request, seek and 
receive information on their right to social security.820 Affiliates of social security 
schemes are also entitled to timely and appropriate information on their affiliation 
status and validity of contributions.821 The CESCR also recommended the state party 
take relevant special measures to ensure that men and women enjoy an equal right to 
social security and a comprehensive non-contributory benefits plan is formulated to 
the maximum available resources.822 Thus, this communication demonstrated that 
special measures and resources need to be allocated to ensure that women do not 
face indirect discrimination because they participate in non-monetised care work. This 
conclusion by the CESCR is also reiterated in General Comment 19 where it declares 
that state parties must take steps to the maximum of their available resources to 
ensure that social security schemes adequately cover non-monetised care workers.823 
 
4 3 2 Allocating resources for the realisation of the rights in the ICESCR 
State parties must generate and spend maximum available resources to realise the 
rights in the ICESCR. The generating and spending of resources forms part of the 
allocation of maximum available resources. Sub-section 4 3 1 above clarified the 
various norms stipulated in article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which provide the background 
to how state parties must interpret their obligations under the ICESCR. Sub-section 4 
3 2 below, considers the best strategies to generate and spend maximum available 
resources to progressively realise the rights in the ICESCR. De Schutter’s work is 
focused on in this regard as he provides the most recent and comprehensive analysis 
on mobilising resources for state parties to realise their obligations in terms of article 
2(1) of the ICESCR. Other relevant sources such as the work of the Special 
 
819 Marcia Cecilia Trujillo Calero v Ecuador  CESCR, Communication 10/2015, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/63/D/10/2015 (26 March 2018) para 21. 
820 Para 23(a). 
821 Para 23(b).  
822 Para 23(e) and (f).  
823 CESCR General Comment 19 para 33.  
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Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (“Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty”),824 the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“Maastricht Guidelines”),825 the OPERA framework as developed by the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights in New York (“CESR”),826 and concluding 
observations on state reports made by the CESCR are also consulted to ensure a 
thorough evaluation of mobilising resources for the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
 
4 3 2 1 Generating resources to realise economic, social and cultural rights 
This sub-section focuses on the work of De Schutter, in providing state parties with 
practical resource generation strategies.827 He argues that when considering the 
realisation of the rights in the ICESCR, the generation of resources and spending 
strategies need to complement one another, in order to produce the most effective 
outcomes.828 In describing the significance of this complementarity, De Schutter 
states: 
 
“It may be tempting to think that a State making a smart use of its resources could be 
excused for maintaining a regressive tax structure or, conversely, that a State efficiently 
mobilising resources could be allowed to squander (within reasonable limits) some of these 
resources in unwise spending choices. Such an approach, however, would not do justice 
to the norm of progressive realization embodied in Article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant, which 
requires that States do everything they can to realise the Covenant rights, both at the 
collecting and at the spending sides of the equation.”829 
 
Consequently, resource generation, public spending, and outcomes are 
interdependent and comprehensive strategies are needed to ensure all three areas 
are managed efficiently. De Schutter warns that even where one area is supposedly 
 
824 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights includes identifying 
approaches for removing obstacles to the full enjoyment of human rights for people living in extreme 
poverty and studying the impact discrimination and extreme poverty have on vulnerable groups. See 
full objectives and mandate: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/poverty/pages/srextremepovertyindex.aspx>. 
825 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) IPASA 
<http://ipasa.co.za/Downloads/Patient%20Rights/Maastricht%20Guidelines%20on%20Socio-
Economic%20Rights.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
826 OPERA stands for “outcomes, policy efforts, resources and assessment”.  
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not needed, then the results would be fragile and unsustainable.830 An example would 
be where outcomes have been achieved in education without effective public 
resources being invested 
As discussed in chapter 3, taxation and international support are two of the main 
ways in which state parties mobilise public revenue.831 As argued above, taxation and 
international support form an integral part of most gender responsive budgeting 
strategies.832 Considering taxation, De Schutter argues that there are three 
considerations which could guide the CESCR’s assessment of the taxation structure 
adopted by state parties to realise the rights in the ICESCR. These three 
considerations include the expansion of the tax base, a progressive tax structure, and 
the combatting of tax evasion.833  
The broadening of the tax base is necessary to ensure adequate funding for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.834 De Schutter states that it is a 
misconception that poorer countries cannot rely on an increase in taxation to increase 
public revenue.835 The tax base in poorer countries is generally so low that adequate 
resources and the redistribution of wealth cannot be generated and achieved. 
Therefore, the tax base needs to be proportionately raised among the higher income 
brackets in order to encourage economic growth.836 De Schutter argues that the most 
effective way to raise the tax base is to eliminate favourable tax treatment to foreign 
investors to attract capital.837 Favourable tax treatment has been shown to have little 
to no impact on the amount of foreign investment, instead, foreign investment is 
encouraged by market size, fairer trade policies and skilled labour.838 Moreover, the 
CESCR has reiterated the significant role which corporate income tax can play in 
generating public revenue. In the concluding observations on the state report of 
Mauritius, it recommended that the role of corporate tax be re-examined, as a low rate 
 
830 23.  
831 See chapter three part 3 4 5 for a discussion on public revenue strategies within gender responsive 
budgeting.  
832 See chapter three part 3 4 5. 





838 O De Schutter, JF Swinnen and J Wouters “Introduction” in O De Schutter et al (eds) Foreign Direct 
Investment and Human Development (2012) 1 2.  
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ultimately makes it difficult for the state party to fulfil its obligations in terms of the 
ICESCR.839 
In respect of progressive tax structures, a former Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty has stated that tax systems need to have real redistributive power that 
preserves, as well as progressively increases the household income of poorer 
groups.840 A flat tax system where all people are required to pay an equal proportion 
of their income discourages substantive equality and limits the redistributive function 
which taxation could have.841 Another former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty 
reiterated this point and added that a country’s tax policy is, in many respects, a human 
rights policy.842 This is due to a tax policy shaping the allocation of income and assets 
and, ultimately, affecting the levels of inequality and human rights enjoyment.843  
The CESCR, in the concluding observations on state reports to Cameroon and 
Pakistan, reiterated that indirect taxation limits a state party’s ability to reduce high 
levels of inequality and recommended that progressive taxation strategies are 
needed.844 In the concluding observations on the state report of the Russian 
Federation, the CESCR expressed concern over a flat-rate tax system, which was 
applied to both personal and corporate income, contributing to increasing social 
inequalities.845 Thus, state parties should re-examine their taxation systems to ensure 
their policies reflect human rights principles. De Schutter argues that this can be 
achieved through considering the impact that indirect tax (such as valued added tax) 
have on poorer households and eliminating the idea that higher corporation tax 
discourages foreign investment.846 In the concluding observations on the state report 
of South Africa, the CESCR emphasised the redistributive capacity that progressive 
 
839 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Mauritius UN Doc 
E/C.12/MUS/CO/5 (2019) para 13.   
840 MS Carmona Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2014) UN 
Doc A/HRC/26/28 para 16.  
841 Para 16.  
842 P Alston Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/31 para 53. 
843 Para 53.  
844 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Cameroon (2019) UN Doc 
E/C.12/CMR/CO/4 paras 14-15; CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Pakistan 
(2017) UN Doc E/C.12/PAK/CO/1 paras 15-16. 
845 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation (2017) UN 
Doc E/C.12/RUS/CO/6 para 16. 
846 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 32. 
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taxation can have.847 South Africa is among the most unequal countries in the world, 
consequently, the CESCR recommended that a serious review of the impact of an 
increase in value-added tax on low-income households is done.848 The current 
taxation policy in South Africa also needs to be assessed with the view to improve its 
capacity to mobilise domestic resources to increase its redistributive effect.849 
De Schutter states that tax evasion represents a huge financial loss to countries 
and has a major effect on poorer countries.850 A former Special Rapporteur on 
Extreme Poverty mentioned that any state party that does not take strong measures 
to address tax evasion is not abiding by their obligation to mobilise resources to the 
maximum of their available resources to realise economic, social and cultural rights.851 
Tax abuse also undermines the principles of equality and non-discrimination as tax 
evaders end up paying less than individuals with the same or less capacity to pay.852 
Tax abuse by wealthy individuals and corporations also force state parties to increase 
other modes of taxation, such as indirect tax, which results in the countries’ taxation 
burden falling hardest on the poor.853 In this way, policies against tax evasion need to 
be cognisant of multiple layers of discrimination because the consequences thereof 
have detrimental effects on women, who buy most of the household items for poorer 
families, as well as poorer communities in general.854  
Referring to Africa in particular, De Schutter suggests that tax evasion has resulted 
in an estimated loss of between USD 859 billion and USD 1.06 trillion between 1970 
and 2008.855 Thus, tax evasion affects African states’ ability to realise the economic, 
social and cultural rights of its people, and as the African Commission has argued, it 
undermines their capacity to implement the ACHPR and the Maputo Protocol.856 
Therefore, state parties need to examine their national tax legislation and policies to 
 
847 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South Africa (2018) UN Doc 
E/C.12/ZAF/CO/1 para 16. 
848 Para 16 and 17(c).  
849 Para 17(a).  
850 33.  
851 Carmona Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights para 60. 
852 Para 60. 
853 Para 60. 
854 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above for a discussion on the burden which women and the poor face 
as a result of indirect taxation. See also chapter three part 3 3 above for a discussion on anti-essentialist 
feminist legal theory and the benefit that an understanding of multiple identities can have on government 
policies. 
855 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 33.  
856 African Commission “236 Resolution on Illicit Capital Flight from Africa” Adopted at the 53rd ordinary 
session (2013) ACHPR/Res.236(LIII)2013.  
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fight against tax evasion. Initiatives, such as establishing and funding institutions 
which can hold multinational organisations accountable for fraudulent tax behaviour, 
should be undertaken by state parties.857 The CESCR has also recommended in its 
concluding observations on states parties reports that state parties strengthen their 
measures to combat tax evasion by ensuring that private corporations are subject to 
necessary regulations.858 Therefore, when considering optimal strategies for the 
interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol in chapter 5, the high level of tax 
evasion in Africa is taken into consideration.  
De Schutter also argues that international cooperation is paramount to eliminating 
tax evasion.859 Countries which offer an unregulated tax haven to big corporations and 
wealthy individuals, should be held responsible for its contribution for tax evasion.860 
The CESCR has addressed this issue in particular during concluding observations on 
state reports. The CESCR stated the United Kingdom has allowed its overseas 
territories to enable financial secrecy legislation which is “affecting the ability of the 
state party, as well other states, to meet their obligation to mobilise the maximum 
available resources for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights”.861 
The CESCR reiterated this point in the recent concluding observations on the state 
report of Switzerland.862 The CESCR recommended that the state party take stricter 
measures to combat tax evasion, including by ensuring that public and private 
institutions are subject to appropriate regulation.863  
As discussed above, international cooperation forms part of a state parties’ 
obligation to realise economic, social and cultural rights to the maximum of available 
resources.864 De Schutter considers three obligations created by the duty of 
international support and cooperation on state parties. These obligations are that the 
burden of foreign debt on poor countries should be alleviated, foreign aid should be 
 
857 High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa “Illicit Financial Flows” (2014) 66. 
858 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of 
Liechtenstein (2017) UN Doc E/C.12/LIE/CO/2-3 para 10. 
859 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 34.  
860 34. 
861 CESCR Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/6 paras 16-17.  
862 CESCR Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Switzerland (2019) UN Doc 
E/C.12/CHE/CO/4.  
863 Para 13.  
864 See part 4 3 1 5 above. 
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provided in ways which support debt relief efforts, and loans may need to be granted 
to state parties under conditions which facilitate, and not impede debt relief.865 
By alleviating the burden of foreign debt on poorer countries, those countries can 
focus their resources on the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, instead 
of redirecting budgets to reimburse the debt.866 De Schutter thus argues that the focus 
of international assistance should be to ensure that foreign debt is alleviated and not 
aggravated.867 However, the main issue that is apparent in international aid is that a 
state party to the ICESCR cannot be held responsible for not providing foreign aid. De 
Schutter reiterates this by stating that it is politically difficult to justify that a state party 
should have done more to support the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights in another state by increasing aid.868 This is also since the liability for taking 
certain actions is easier to justify than the liability for an omission.869 The benchmark 
which the CESCR utilise when assessing state parties’ international assistance in 
state reports is 0,7% ODA/GNI.870 This target requires that state parties commit to 
contribute international aid, or official development assistance (“ODA”), by a margin of 
0,7% of their gross national income (“GNI”).  
Seeking loans from international institutions and other state parties to realise 
economic, social and cultural rights is considered a “double-edged sword”.871 This is 
because foreign loans can assist in stimulating the economy and funding local effort 
to realise economic, social and cultural rights. However, this can also lead to high 
levels of debt and creditors imposing conditions on how macroeconomic policies have 
to be carried out.872  
In this regard, De Schutter refers to Greece, which had received three separate 
financial rescue packages in 2010, 2012 and 2015.873 The European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (as the creditors) 
imposed amendments to Greece’s labour legislation in an attempt to provide 
 





870 The 0,7% ODA/GNI benchmark was first agreed upon and introduced in 1970 as a means for 
developed countries to assist developing countries achieve desirable growth rates. The Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced the 
benchmark. See further <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm>. 
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“flexibility” to the economy.874 However, this violated various provisions of the 
European Social Charter, as some of the amendments included that labour contracts 
could be terminated without notice or severance pay.875 The CESCR stated that 
Greece needed to ensure that all policies and programmes which are enabled as a 
result of international relief, are reviewed to assess their impact on the most 
marginalised groups.876 With regard to further international aid, the CESCR reiterated 
that the ICESCR should always be taken into account when negotiating foreign 
loans.877 In 2016, the CESCR echoed this requirement by stating that, “the state party 
seeking financial assistance should be aware that any conditions attached to a loan 
that would imply an obligation on that state to adopt retrogressive measures in the 
area of economic, social and cultural rights that are unjustifiable would be in violation 
of the Covenant”.878  
State parties to the ICESCR will only be able to allocate maximum available 
resources, in terms of article 2(1) of the ICESCR, to the realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, if they are able to effectively generate these resources in a way 
that abides by human rights principles. Thus, all state parties need to reconsider their 
taxation systems and international agreements. Such policies could have an extensive 
application to the Maputo Protocol because the policies need to consider the effect 
that generating resources has on marginalised groups of people, which include 
diverse women.  
 
4 3 2 2 Spending resources to realise economic, social and cultural rights 
De Schutter argues that spending priorities is the area where state parties to the 
ICESCR need the most guidance.879 As discussed in chapter 3, gender responsive 
budgeting has become a popular choice for state parties to meet their obligations in 
terms of the Maputo Protocol. However, many gender responsive budgeting initiatives 
 
874 General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and 
Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece ECSR, Decision on the merits 
(23 May 2012) Complaint No 65/2011; General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power 
Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v 
Greece ECSR, Decision on the merits, 23 May 2012, Complaint No 66/2011. 
875 Complaint No 65/2011 para 21.  
876 CESCR Concluding Observations: Greece UN Doc. E/C.12/GRC/CO/2 (2015) para 7. 
877 Para 8. 
878 Public debt, austerity measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights para 4. 
879 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 47. 
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lack elements of anti-essentialism which ensure that the initiatives respond to the 
needs of diverse women.880 Thus, the need arises to assess how spending strategies 
are assessed under different international human rights treaties.  
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR does not make any reference to the outcomes which 
state parties need to achieve to have fulfilled their obligations, instead, the provision 
requires state parties to allocate a sufficient share of their resources to the constant 
improvement and full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.881 Thus, there 
needs to be clear guidance as to how these resources need to be spent. One way to 
guide resource allocation is the “human expenditure ratio” which represents the share 
of total GDP that goes towards human priority concerns.882 The United Nations 
Development Programme (“UNDP”) estimates that the human expenditure ratio needs 
to be around 5% of GDP should a country wish to progress human development.883 
De Schutter argues that this index cannot be applied absolutely to every country, as it 
does not take into account the current development of the country or which sectors 
relevant to various economic, social and cultural rights the country needs to focus 
on.884 The CESCR is also reluctant to recommend an exact percentage which a state 
party should allocate to social spending. The CESCR expressed concern in the recent 
concluding observations on the state reports of Kazakhstan and Estonia over their 
overall low level of public expenditure on social services as a ratio of their GDP and 
recommended to both state parties that this level be increased.885 The CESCR has 
also recommended that state parties increase their social spending as a percentage 
of GDP where there has been a long-term increase in GDP.886 
The main problem that also arises out of the human expenditure ratio is that state 
parties can argue that they simply cannot allocate more resources to human 
development programmes. It then becomes difficult to assess whether a state party 
has done enough in terms of allocating resources to realise economic, social and 
 
880 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above for a discussion on different gender responsive budgeting 
initiatives.  
881 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 49. 
882 48. 
883 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 1991: Financing Human 
Development (1991) 39.  
884 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 51. 
885 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Kazakhstan (2019) UN Doc 
E/C.12/KAZ/CO/2 paras 19-20; CESCR Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of 
Estonia (2019) UN Doc E/C.12/EST/CO/3 paras 8-9. 
886 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea (2017) UN 
Doc E/C.12/KOR/CO/4 para 11. 
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cultural rights, even though it appears their efforts were insufficient to meet their 
obligations in terms of the ICESCR.887 Therefore, De Schutter refers to the human 
expenditure ratio as being useful for setting a target which state parties can reach, but 
not in assessing whether state parties can do more.888  
According to the introduction of the document, the Maastricht Guidelines were 
designed to elaborate on the Limburg Principles, with specific reference to the 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.889 Guideline 13 states that “in 
determining which actions or omissions amount to a violation of an economic, social 
and cultural right, it is important to distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of a 
state to comply with its treaty obligations”. However, this could also prove difficult as 
a low GDP does not necessarily result in an inability to fulfil rights.890 The burden of 
proof remains on the state party to show that there was an ability to realise the rights 
in the ICESCR.891  
In order to solve the dilemma of assessing whether there really was an inability of 
the state party to realise economic, social, and cultural rights, De Scutter suggests a 
causality analysis.892 A causality analysis determines whether state parties reached 
their desired outcomes, and if not, whether the disparity in outcomes could be 
attributed to their inability to execute appropriate policies. This analysis is derived from 
the work of Felner. He identifies five benchmarks against which human rights 
indicators can be measured, as well as a three-step approach by which to conduct the 
causality analysis.893  
One of the benchmarks consists of a commitment made by the state party.894 This 
includes legal commitments through the enactment of legislation or ratification of 
international treaties. It also includes a publicly-made commitment by the government 
of the state, such as a commitment to increase public housing by 20% in two years.895 
Another benchmark is the use of past outcome indicators.896 This requires a 
 
887 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 51. 
888 51. 
889 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) IPASA. 
890 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 54. 
891 V Dankwa, C Flinterman & S Leckie “Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705 719. 
892 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 54. 
893 E Felner “A New Frontier in Economic and Social Rights Advocacy? Turning Quantitative Data into 
a Tool for Human Rights Accountability” (2008) 9 International Journal on Human Rights 109 115.  
894 115. 
895 115. 
896 115.  
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comparison to assess whether the state party has made any progress with the level 
of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. De Schutter has grouped these 
first two benchmarks as internal reference points.897 The advantage of these two 
benchmarks, as argued by De Schutter, is that they were set by the state party 
concerned and can thus not be questioned on grounds of legitimacy. However, it is 
also necessary to scrutinise the targets which the state party has set to ensure that it 
is not flawed and undermining to human rights objectives.898   
The following two benchmarks utilise an international perspective as the reference 
point. The third benchmark includes using established international human rights 
standards, such as a benchmark of 100 per cent primary education completion rate.899 
The fourth benchmark requires countries with similar levels of development to be the 
focus of comparison.900 It can reveal whether the progress made a country to realise 
economic, social and cultural rights is lower than expected for that country’s level of 
development. The fifth benchmark incorporates the thinking of anti-essentialist 
feminist legal theory. Disaggregated national data (such as gender, poverty levels and 
race) is used to compare the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights among 
different population groups.901 By analysing the disaggregated national data, it 
becomes clear where state parties have fallen short in ensuring the rights in the 
ICESCR are being enjoyed equally and measures are being implemented to strive to 
substantive equality. 
De Schutter argues that a combination of these benchmarks should be used when 
evaluating the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in different 
countries.902 However, De Schutter continues that the approach where international 
perspectives are used could prove more promising. By assessing countries in similar 
sub-regions, with similar levels of development, it ensures that state parties are being 
compared more fairly and independently, than if they were only compared to their own 
internal benchmarks.903 An approach such as this is more manageable for regional 
supervisory bodies when they assess the level of development and human rights 
 
897 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 55. 
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protection in the region. Bodies such as the African Commission can make more 
accurate assessments when comparing the development of countries in the same 
sub-region. Such a sub-regional based benchmark could assist when developing 
gender responsive budgeting strategies for African countries. Most African countries 
already form part of sub-regional groups, thus sub-regional benchmarks could be set 
and evaluated by the African Commission.904 
These five benchmarks can be utilised in the three-step approach when conducting 
a causality analysis, as developed by Felner. The first step is identifying deprivations 
and disparities in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.905 This step 
includes using outcome indicators, such as primary education completion rates, 
maternal mortality rates or child malnutrition rates, to identify whether there are major 
disparities in the enjoyment of the rights in the ICESCR. Key areas are measuring: the 
minimum levels of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights; the progressive 
realisation over time; and the inequality of rights enjoyment between different 
population groups.906 The international comparisons benchmarks are useful to 
ascertain what has been achieved in other countries with similar resources, while the 
benchmarks set by internal indicators by the state party are valuable in assessing the 
progressive realisation of certain rights over time.907 
Step two necessitates the identification of the main determinant of the deprivations 
and inequalities as identified in step one.908 While the first step assesses the 
realisation of rights from the viewpoint of the right holder, the second step considers 
the viewpoint of the state party and the policies which they have in place to realise 
economic, social and cultural rights. Step three is the most essential step in the 
causality analysis.909 This step assesses the adequacy of policy efforts to address the 
determinants as identified in step two.910 Thus, the actions and omissions of state 
parties are being scrutinised to determine if they created or perpetuated the levels of 
 
904 This also proves beneficial if more state parties to the Maputo Protocol adopt gender responsive 
budgeting, as discussed in chapter three part 3 4 5 above. The African Commission would be able to 
assess the outcomes and benchmarks as set by countries in the same sub-region, with similar 
development levels, in order to provide more comprehensive feedback in communications and 
concluding observations. This will be further discussed in chapter 5. 
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deprivations in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. De Schutter 
argues that these three steps make it possible to identify whether the deprivations of 
economic, social and cultural rights are attributable to a failure by the state party to 
comply with its obligations, or instead the result of a lack of capacity.911 
In 2012, the CESR built on the three-step approach as developed by Felner. The 
CESR developed a four-step framework called OPERA, which stands for “outcomes, 
policy efforts, resources and assessment”.912 The “outcomes” step requires that the 
level of enjoyment of rights are assessed.913 During this step, a measurement of the 
minimum core obligations, non-discrimination and progressive realisation needs to be 
done.914 Identifying outcome indicators that show the extent of how the minimum 
essential levels of rights are enjoyed in the country, assist in determining whether state 
parties have met their minimum core obligations.915 Disaggregate indicators by 
different populations groups show if there are disparities in the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights, which could result in discrimination.916 The disaggregate 
indicators are also essential in assuring that the outcomes being assessed are held to 
the values of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory.917 Assessing indicators over time, 
as well as goals set by the state party, determine if the rights in the ICESCR are bring 
realised progressively.918  
The “policy efforts” step aims to assess the state parties’ commitment and efforts 
to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights.919 During this step, an assessment of 
whether the state party fulfilled their obligation to take steps towards the full realisation 
of economic, social and cultural rights is essential.920 The policy effort’s steps also aim 
to assess the extent to which state parties have applied the PANTHER principles.921 
The PANTHER principles are also an essential component of a successful gender 
 
911 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung  55. 
912 Center for Economic and Social Rights (New York) The OPERA Framework: Assessing Compliance 
with the Obligation to Fulfil Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2012). 
913 15. 
914 See parts 4 3 1 4, 4 3 1 6, and 4 3 1 2 above for a discussion on minimum core obligation, non-
discrimination and progressive realisation respectively.  
915 Center for Economic and Social Rights The OPERA Framework 15. 
916 15. 
917 See chapter three part 3 3 2 above for a discussion on anti-essentialist feminist legal theory.  
918 Center for Economic and Social Rights The OPERA Framework 15. 
919 17. 
920 See part 4 3 1 2 above for a discussion on the obligation to take steps. 
921 See chapter three part 3 4 4 above for a discussion on the PANTHER principles and their relevance 
to gender responsive budgeting.  
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responsive budgeting initiative. In particular, for the OPERA framework, the principles 
of participation, transparency and accountability are essential to ensure that state 
parties have put sufficient work into their policy efforts.922 
The “resources” step considers whether state parties have dedicated enough 
resources to the fulfilment of the rights in the ICESCR, whether they have mobilised 
all available resources, and how decisions regarding resources mobilised are made.923 
This should be done through an analysis of minimum core obligations and how specific 
rights are being achieved.924 An analysis of non-discrimination should also be done to 
assess which population groups are benefitting most from resource allocation and 
whether substantive equality is being promoted through the generation and spending 
of resources. Progressive realisation should also be assessed to ensure the allocation 
of resources are actualising into the full realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights over time.925 The OPERA framework also states that the PANTHER principles 
are paramount at the resources step and an assessment needs to be done about how 
the public has participated in the budgetary process and whether NGOs can hold state 
parties accountable to budgetary decisions.926 This, again, relates to the gender 
responsive budgeting and the significance of the participation of civil society in the 
budgetary process.  
The “assessment” step is the final step of the OPERA framework.927 During this 
stage, the conditions which limit or prevent people from enjoying economic, social and 
cultural rights first need to be identified.928 In particular, the acts or omissions of third 
parties, which impact on the state parties’ ability to realise the rights in the ICESCR, 
need to be identified. Here, the extraterritorial obligations of the state party can be 
assessed to determine whether an attempt was made to request aid to ensure the 
fulfilment of rights.929 Finally, the state’s compliance with their obligations to realise 
rights needs to be assessed. This includes an overall examination of the previous 
 
922 Center for Economic and Social Rights The OPERA Framework 18. 
923 22. 
924 See part 4 3 1 4 above for a discussion on minimum core obligations. 




929 See part 4 3 1 5 above for a discussion on extraterritorial obligations.  
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three steps to draw a conclusion of whether the state party in question have fulfilled 
their obligations in terms of the ICESCR.930 
The strategies utilised to allocate resources, which includes generating and 
spending resources, in terms of the ICESCR will prove paramount for developing an 
interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The CESCR and various scholars 
have extensively defined and interpreted article 2(1) of the ICESCR. State parties are 
aware of various strategies they can employ to progressively realise the rights in the 
ICESCR to the maximum available resources.  
 
4 4 Conclusion  
The analysis in this chapter established that extensive standards for interpreting 
resource allocation in terms of CEDAW and the ICESCR have been developed. While 
CEDAW does not have an operating provision relating to the allocation of resources, 
the CEDAW Committee has interpreted resource allocation for provisions through the 
general recommendations and communications. These general recommendations, as 
well as concluding observations on state reports, demonstrate that there are clear 
obligations on state parties to ensure sufficient resources have been allocated to 
realise the rights in CEDAW.  
Gender responsive budgeting has been established as a strategy for state parties 
to realise their obligations in terms of CEDAW. The CEDAW Committee has discussed 
and applied elements of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory, but there is still room 
for further development in this regard. The gender responsive budgeting strategies 
developed under CEDAW have been applied by various state parties. Gender 
responsive budgeting strategies under the Maputo Protocol, as developed in chapter 
5, will be enhanced by the rights-based interpretations under CEDAW, and the various 
measures required to realise the rights under CEDAW.931  
Furthermore, the ICESCR has an operating provision which creates clear resource 
obligations on state parties. The CESCR has, through general comments, 
communications and statements, elaborated on these obligations. A specific analysis 
was conducted to assess resource allocations in terms of maximum available 
resources, progressive realisation, retrogressive measures, minimum core and 
 
930 Center for Economic and Social Rights The OPERA Framework 18. 
931 Parts 4 2 2 and 4 2 3 above respectively. 
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extraterritorial obligations.932 These doctrinal elements are applied through strategies 
which have been developed for state parties to meet their obligations in terms of article 
2(1) of the ICESCR. Particular strategies for generating resources and spending 
resources in terms of the ICESCR were analysed and shown to have broad 
application.  
The following chapter demonstrates how holistic budgeting strategies, as discussed 
under sub-section 4 3 2, enhances the gender responsive budgeting initiatives 
formulated to realise the rights in the Maputo Protocol. The discussion of CEDAW and 
the ICESCR in this chapter forms the foundation of the analysis of budgeting for 
human rights in chapter 5. Therefore, the following chapter considers possible 
interpretations of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, taking into consideration the 
theoretical framework set out in chapter 3 and the analysis of resource allocation under 








932 Part 4 3 1 above. 
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CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPING AN INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ARTICLE 
26(2) OF THE MAPUTO PROTOCOL  
5 1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an interpretative framework within which 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol can be applied. This interpretative framework can 
inform how supervisory bodies, such as the African Court, the African Commission, 
and the Special Rapporteur, should interpret article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. It 
can further guide state parties in the implementation of their obligations under article 
26(2).  
The discussion in this chapter departs from the interpretation of article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol, established in chapter 2. The proposed framework is developed by 
considering the substantive interpretation of resource allocation and gender 
responsive budgeting under CEDAW and the ICESCR, which was discussed in 
chapter 4. Moreover, anti-essentialist feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting, as discussed in chapter 3, guide the theoretical understanding of the 
interpretative framework.  
 
5 2 Interpretation by supervisory bodies  
The African Court, the African Commission and the Special Rapporteur have a 
significant role to play as the supervisory bodies of the Maputo Protocol. Through their 
diverse mandates, they can effectively interpret article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol 
and guide state parties in their gender responsive budgeting initiatives.  
To fulfil their mandates, these supervisory bodies, first, need to incorporate the 
theoretical framework of anti-essential feminist legal theory. To do so, these 
supervisory bodies need to ask the “women question”.933 It includes asking what 
impact the current legal system and policies have on women.934 By asking the relevant 
questions, the supervisory bodies will be able to evaluate how the law and state parties 
have failed women and how this can be rectified to ensure that women are empowered 
and protected.935 More specifically, supervisory bodies should interrogate who is being 
 
933 See chapter three part 3 2 above.  
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affected by the legal system and how the law can best protect the women affected.936 
By assessing who the specific women are that are being affected, supervisory bodies 
need to incorporate the goals of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. Thus, the 
“women question” is expanded by asking which specific groups of women are being 
adversely impacted. Therefore, practically, the supervisory bodies must interpret 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol by contextualising the communication or provision 
before them and interrogating which groups of women are most affected.  
An example of this would be the African Commission inquiring which women would 
be affected by a specific policy or law in their decisions on communications. Only by 
consistently asking the “women question”, as well as considering who these specific 
women were, can supervisory bodies effectively interpret article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol and achieve substantive equality. Substantive equality requires laws and 
policies to take into consideration women’s lived experiences and patriarchal customs 
that disempower women.937 Ultimately, the supervisory bodies will be able to assess 
“both the law as it is, as well as the law as it ought to be”, which is crucial in a feminist 
jurisprudential inquiry.938 
Secondly, supervisory bodies need to promote the use of gender responsive 
budgeting as a way to effectively allocate resources for the realisation of women’s 
rights. When applied effectively with the needs of diverse women at the forefront, 
gender responsive budgeting is considered a manifestation of anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory and it reflects a government’s values and priorities.939 As discussed in 
chapter 3, the main concepts of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory are not directly 
aligned to gender responsive budgeting. Thus, the supervisory bodies need to 
continually interrogate and evaluate the inclusion of the needs of diverse women within 
gender responsive budgeting initiatives.940 This can, for example, be done by the 
African Commission when assessing state reports that state parties have submitted 
under the Maputo Protocol. The supervisory bodies are required to evaluate that the 
rights and needs of diverse women are integrated into all aspects of government policy 
 
936 See chapter three part 3 3 1 above. 
937 M Sjöholm Gender-Sensitive Norm Interpretation by Regional Human Rights Law Systems (2018) 
34. See chapter three part 3 3 1 above.  
938 Bonthyus & Albertyn Gender, Law and Justice 5. 
939 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 121; A Quinn “Equality Proofing the Budget: Lessons from 
the Experiences of Gender Budgeting” in A Nolan, R O’Connell & C Harvey (eds) Human Rights and 
Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (2013) 164.  
940 See chapter three part 3 4 2 above. 
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and budgets to ensure a holistic application of gender responsive budgeting.941 The 
following sub-sections consider the specific steps which different supervisory bodies 
can take, through their various mandates, to further develop the interpretative 
framework.  
 
5 2 1 African Court 
Article 27 of the Maputo Protocol provides that the African Court shall be seized with 
matters of interpretation and implementation arising from the Maputo Protocol.942 The 
African Court should, therefore, apply article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol within the 
context of every case with resource implications for the state party involved. The 
application of article 26(2) should include an evaluation of state parties’ resource 
allocation, or lack thereof, for every right that has resource implications. Furthermore, 
the interpretation of article 26(2) should arguably also include guidance on how state 
parties should allocate or reallocate budgetary resources to effectively realise 
women’s rights. To fulfil the objectives of the Maputo Protocol, the African Court must 
also adequately apply anti-essentialist feminist legal theory, which includes starting by 
asking the “women question” and considering who these women are to ensure that 
diverse women are protected and empowered.943 Thus, the African Court should 
evaluate how diverse women have been, or could be, affected by the legislation, 
policies or actions of the state party.944 
As discussed in chapter 2, the African Court has only heard two cases based on 
the Maputo Protocol.945 It has furthermore not yet applied article 26(2) to any of its 
cases. In APDF the African Court could have made significant recommendations in 
terms of resource allocation for women’s rights.946 The African Court ordered the state 
party to amend its legislation which was in contravention of its obligation to protect 
 
941 See chapter three part 3 4 2 above. 
942 The African Court is, however, still limited in the guidance that it can provide state parties because 
of the limited Court Protocol ratifications and declarations made in terms of article 36(4) of the Court 
Protocol. Thus, individuals and NGOs are largely obstructed by reaching the African Court for guidance 
in terms of resource allocations for women’s rights. The African Court, along with the assistance of the 
African Commission and the Special Rapporteur need to encourage the ratification of the Court Protocol 
and article 34(6) declarations at every possible opportunity. See chapter two part 2 2 2 above for a 
further discussion on the Court Protocol ratifications and declarations.  
943 See chapter two part 2 2 2 and chapter three part 3 2 above.  
944 See part 5 2 above. 
945 Mariam Kouma and Another v Republic of Mali Application No 040/2016; APDF and IHRDA v 
Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016. See chapter two part 2 2 2 above.  
946 See chapter two part 2 2 2 above.  
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women’s rights in terms of the ACHPR and the Maputo Protocol.947 The state party 
was also ordered to sensitise and educate its population on the amended 
legislation.948 Descriptions of such sensitisation and education are, arguably, also 
resource intensive. Thus, the African Court had an opportunity to interpret and apply 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.  
Through this interpretation, it could have articulated that part of budgeting for 
women’s rights must be allocated to programmes of re-socialisation and education. 
Such interventions were missing from resource allocation recommendations and are 
arguably very costly for the state.949 In this way, the African Court could have provided 
context as to how state parties should be using gender responsive budgeting to ensure 
that women’s rights are not violated by harmful social practises. As discussed above, 
the African Court must contextualise its recommendations in terms of the needs of 
diverse women. In APDF the African Court particularly referred to the rights of the girl-
child as this case considered underage marriage and harmful cultural practices.950 
Resource allocation recommendations, in terms of specific provisions in the Maputo 
Protocol, can be found later in this chapter.951 
In further elaborating on the African Court’s mandate, it can also, as Yeshanew 
argues, hold state parties accountable for a misallocation of budgetary resources as 
per articles 10(3) and 4(2)(i) of the Maputo Protocol.952 Therefore, the African Court 
has a responsibility to assess whether a country has redirected resources away from 
women’s rights realisation and towards military spending, in terms of article 10(3). 
However, as Budoo states, this will be difficult to prove and the state party will, thus, 
have to provide evidence that the redirected spending was in the best interests of 
national security.953  
In addition, in cases of gender-based violence, the African Court must prescribe 
that state parties meet their obligations in terms of article 4(2)(i) read with article 26(2) 
of the Maputo Protocol.954 This includes, for example, recommending that state parties 
 
947 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 para 130. 
948 Para 131. See chapter two part 2 2 2 above.  
949 See chapter two part 2 2 2 above. 
950 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 para 130. See chapter two part 2 2 2 
above.  
951 See part 5 3 4 below. 
952 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 294. See chapter two part 2 2 
1 above. 
953 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 84. See chapter two part 2 2 1 above. 
954 See chapter two part 2 2 1 above. 
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increase police training, provide women’s shelters, provide support services for 
survivors of sexual or domestic violence and equal access to justice for all women.955 
The African Court should relate these recommendations directly to resource 
commitments under article 26(2). The CEDAW Committee has acknowledged that 
women also face gender-based violence because of intersecting forms of 
discrimination.956 The African Court must remain cognisant of the effect that multiple, 
intersecting identities have on women and the discrimination they face, particularly 
with regard to gender-based violence.  Specific recommendations to state parties to 
allocate resources to eradicate gender-based violence is discussed later in this 
chapter.957 
 
5 2 2 African Commission 
5 2 2 1 General comments and communications  
Through its various mandates, the African Commission can monitor state parties’ 
implementation of the Maputo Protocol and interpret the various provisions of the 
Maputo Protocol. However, it must be noted that the African Commission does not 
have a strong record of supporting women’s rights and enforcing the Maputo Protocol. 
The African Commission has only dealt with ten communications pertaining to 
women’s rights dating back to 1996.958 As Rudman argues, the African Commission 
has not contributed to an environment where women’s rights are prioritised, due in 
part to its lack of rigorous and thorough handling of women’s rights issues which have 
appeared before it.959 Thus, there needs to be extensive reform within the African 
Commission itself before it can effectively act as the supervisory body for women’s 
rights.  
The African Commission, along with the Special Rapporteur, have significant roles 
to play in supporting and protecting women’s rights in Africa. Therefore, they must 
ensure that they prioritise women’s rights and effectively hold state parties 
 
955 M Mutiithi “An analysis of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa” in B Kombo et al Journey to equality: 10 years of the Protocol on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (2013) 44 <http://www.soawr.org/images/JourneytoEquality.pdf> (accessed 07-07-
2020).  
956 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 para 12. See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above.  
957 See part 5 3 4 2 below. 
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accountable for their obligations in the Maputo Protocol. This includes making 
progressive decisions on communications as well as directly referring to gender 
responsive budgeting and the needs of diverse women in their general comments.  
The African Commission can furthermore provide interpretative guidance to state 
parties regarding the implementation of the Maputo Protocol through their general 
comments and communications. However, it has not yet released a general comment 
directly addressing and interpreting article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. Such a 
general comment would prove beneficial to guide state parties regarding the nature of 
gender responsive budgets. In contrast, the CESCR has released a general comment 
addressing article 2(1) of the ICESCR and what the obligations of state parties are 
with regard to mobilising resources.960 The benefit of this general comment was that 
the CESCR was able to confirm that there are some rights within the ICESCR which 
cannot be realised over a short time, but which would, instead, require the commitment 
of state parties to progressively realise these rights over a longer period of time.961 
Subsequently, these rights would require resources which are allocated accordingly 
over a longer period of time. The African Commission should make similar 
recommendations to state parties within a general comment, as discussed in further 
detail later in this chapter.962 
Within a general comment specifically addressing article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol, the African Commission should recommend that state parties adopt gender 
responsive budgets in order to meet their obligations in terms of the Maputo Protocol. 
Such gender responsive budgets should respond to the needs of diverse women 
within that country. Particularly, the African Commission should recommend that state 
parties, as part of their gender responsive budgeting initiatives, re-evaluate their 
legislation and policies to ascertain how they affect women, as well as which groups 
of women are being most adversely affected. By doing this, state parties would be 
advised to engage with the needs of diverse women, as well as the “women question”, 
and concern themselves with the law as it ought to be.963 The African Commission 
should make use of the implementation strategy for gender responsive budgets as laid 
 
960 CESCR General Comment 3 The nature of states parties’ obligations (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23. 
See chapter four part 4 3 1 1 above.  
961 CESCR General Comment 3 para 9. See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 above.  
962 See part 5 3 3 below.  
963 See chapter three part 3 2 and chapter five part 5 2 above.  
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out later in this chapter.964 It should also ensure that part of their interpretation for 
resource allocation in such general comments include the specific needs that diverse 
and marginalised groups of women have. Thus, the African Commission should 
always contextualise the needs of diverse women and ensure that the most 
marginalised groups of women are protected and empowered through resource 
allocation.  
The African Commission is also able to address resource allocation for women’s 
rights through general comments on other provisions in the Maputo Protocol. The 
African Commission should, thus, make direct reference to article 26(2) in all general 
comments on provisions in the Maputo Protocol which require extensive resources 
from state parties. In this way, the African Commission can provide an interpretation 
of the specific resources that different rights in the Maputo Protocol require. This was 
briefly alluded to in General Comment 2 where the African Commission stated that 
adequate finances were needed to strengthen public health services.965 Through 
these various general comments, the African Commission could reiterate the 
significance of article 26(2) and how the rights in the Maputo Protocol can rarely be 
realised without extensive budgetary investments. In comparison, the CEDAW 
Committee has done this through its general recommendations on various resource-
intensive provisions in CEDAW.966 For example, the CEDAW Committee reiterated 
that resource intensive measures, such as the establishment of task teams and the 
development of policies, are required to prohibit discrimination against women.967 The 
specific resources and measures which certain provisions in the Maputo Protocol 
require are addressed later in this chapter.968  
The African Commission should, furthermore, make specific mention of the need 
for state parties to establish gender responsive budgets in its general comments. The 
African Commission, moreover, has a responsibility to address the needs of 
marginalised and diverse groups of women who would require specific protection from 
state parties. This should involve interpreting the impact article 26(2) of the Maputo 
 
964 See part 5 3 below.  
965 General Comment 2 on Article 14(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14(2)(a) and (c) of the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2014) Adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session para 62. See 
chapter two part 2 2 3 above. 
966 See chapter four part 4 2 2 above.  
967 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 para 27. See chapter four part 4 2 2 1 above.  
968 See part 5 3 4 below. 
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Protocol and budgeting for women’s rights has on diverse women. For example, the 
African Commission should release a general comment on non-monetised care work 
and how state parties should account for this care economy in their gender responsive 
budgets.969 A significant part of this general comment should include budgeting for the 
needs of poorer women in rural communities who form the majority of non-monetised 
care workers. As discussed above, the African Commission should always include an 
analysis of which groups of women would require the most protection within their 
general comments.970 In this way, their interpretative work would include the 
theoretical framework of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory.  
Article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol has not yet been discussed or applied in any 
decisions or communications by the African Commission. The African Commission 
has only finalised one communication dealing with women’s rights, and the Maputo 
Protocol was not mentioned since the state party had not ratified the treaty.971 
Nevertheless, the African Commission has shown that it can make progressive 
recommendations as established in the SERAC and Purohit communications.972 The 
African Commission stated in SERAC that there is no right in the ACHPR that cannot 
be made effective, despite apparent resource constraints.973 In Purohit, the African 
Commission instructed that state parties should take concrete, immediate steps 
towards the realisation of the rights in the ACHPR.974  
When assessing future communications on women’s rights and the Maputo 
Protocol, the African Commission should make similar progressive recommendations. 
Most recommendations made by the African Commission are resource intensive. 
Thus, article 26(2) should be directly applied in decisions on communications, relating 
to the Maputo Protocol, as it establishes the significance of the provision and ensures 
that state parties give resource allocation the necessary attention. The African 
Commission could, for example, show that article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol should 
be applied when state parties need to amend legislation, establish task teams, provide 
victims with compensation and ensure that there are adequate avenues for seeking 
justice for women.  
 
969 See part 5 3 4 5 below. 
970 See part 5 2 above.  
971 Communication 323/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt (2011). See 
part 2 2 3 above. 
972 Communication 155/96 (2001); Communication 241/01 (2003). See chapter two part 2 3 1 above. 
973 Communication 155/96 (2001) para 68. See chapter two part 2 3 1 above.  
974 Communication 241/01 (2003) para 84. See chapter two part 2 3 1 above.  
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The African Commission is also able to individually assess which groups of women 
are most affected in a situation addressed in specific communication. The CEDAW 
Committee used this approach in the Pimentel communication where the specific 
health care needs of poorer women in rural areas were addressed and 
contextualised.975 Similarly, the CESCR took a progressive stance in the Calero 
communication where it stated that the unique circumstances of women partaking in 
non-monetised care work need to be taken into consideration when allocating 
resources towards the non-monetised care economy.976 Thus, in line with the 
approaches of the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR, the African Commission 
should always aim to contextualise the needs of diverse women within their decisions 
on communications. This entails engaging with the “women question” and considering 
who these women are to ensure that all women are protected and empowered.977  
 
5 2 2 2 State reporting guidelines 
As discussed in chapter 2, state parties to the Maputo Protocol are requested to 
provide information on gender responsive budgeting in their state reports.978 Thus, if 
the state parties report on their gender responsive budgeting efforts, the African 
Commission can provide effective comments and evaluation on these efforts. 
However, as established above, state parties rarely report on their budget allocations 
for the realisation of the rights in the Maputo Protocol.979 The reporting guidelines are, 
thus, not strictly followed by state parties. This results in the provision of vague 
information and disparities between state reports to the African Commission. The 
African Commission is, therefore, not able to provide adequate supervision over the 
implementation of the Maputo Protocol regarding gender responsive budgeting and 
resource allocation.   
Where state parties do mention their gender responsive budgeting efforts, the 
African Commission does not comment on it in the concluding observations on state 
reports.980 This is apparent in the concluding observations on the state report of South 
 
975 See chapter four part 4 2 2 4 above.  
976 See chapter four part 4 3 1 6 above.  
977 See part 5 2 above.  
978 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP 2. See chapter two part 2 2 4 1 above.  
979 See chapter two part 2 2 4 above. 
980 Such as the Republic of Rwanda and Republic of South Africa state reports and concluding 
observations. See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 above. 
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Africa where the African Commission had an opportunity to question the state party 
on their lack of implementation strategies in respect of their gender responsive 
budgeting.981 The African Commission has an opportunity to guide state parties, 
through the concluding observations, to develop effective gender budgeting policies 
and strategies. The African Commission can also follow up on the implementation of 
the strategies which are mentioned in state reports, through the concluding 
observations. This is particularly important in situations where state parties refer to 
some form of gender responsive budgeting but no specific implementation plan has 
been referenced.982 The African Commission can also request clarification on gender 
responsive budgeting implementation strategies or goals in terms of rule 75(3) of the 
Rules of Procedure.983  
However, the African Commission should preferably request specific information 
from state parties regarding article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. State parties are 
already expected to report on gender responsive budgeting in terms of the state 
reporting guidelines, thus, it is feasible for the African Commission to require state 
parties to report on how their gender responsive budgeting strategies directly relates 
to the realisation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.984 Therefore, the African 
Commission should supplement the state reporting guidelines with questions 
pertaining to the application and realisation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. In 
this way, the African Commission would be able to ascertain which state parties have 
not adequately understood their obligation to implement gender responsive budgeting.   
In addition, the involvement of civil society and NGOs in the drafting and preparation 
of state reports submitted to the African Commission needs to become more 
prominent. In terms of the reporting guidelines, state parties are recommended to 
involve civil society in the process of preparing state reports.985 If civil society and 
NGOs focused on gender issues are involved in the state reporting process, this 
encourages greater accountability on behalf of state parties. Civil society and NGOs 
 
981 See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 above. 
982 This can be seen in The Republic of South Africa’s state report. See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 2 
above.  
983 AU “Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2010) AU 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf> 
(accessed 07-07-2020). See chapter two part 2 2 4 above.  
984 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP  1. See chapter two part 3 4 4 above. 
985 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP  1. See chapter two part 3 4 4 above.  
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have a broader understanding of what state parties are planning and implementing to 
realise women’s rights in terms of the Maputo Protocol. Thus, they are more involved 
in the implementation and monitoring of gender responsive budgeting initiatives.  
Despite the involvement of civil society in the state reporting process being 
recommended, state parties have not yet directly mentioned their involvement.986 The 
African Commission needs to reiterate this recommendation in its concluding 
observations. Where state parties have not mentioned the involvement of civil society 
or NGOs, the African Commission should request specific institutions to submit 
information regarding particular areas of the state report.987 NGOs or civil society 
should also submit shadow reports to the African Commission which can be read 
alongside the state party’s report.988 These shadow reports can illuminate areas of 
concern to the African Commission as well as illustrate the role that civil society and 
NGOs played in the budgetary and state reporting processes. Such shadow reports 
would assist the African Commission in fulfilling their supervisory role, as well as 
ensuring that the concluding observations provided are thorough. The state party 
should, through comprehensive concluding observations on state reports, be in a 
better position to understand what their obligations are in terms of the Maputo Protocol 
and what the African Commission expects of them.  
In terms of the state reporting guidelines, state parties are obligated to report in two 
parts: Part A on the ACHPR and part B on the Maputo Protocol.989 However, as 
discussed above, many state parties still conflate these two parts into one report which 
is submitted to the African Commission.990 When the reports are conflated, state 
parties cannot rigorously discuss their gender responsive budgeting strategies and 
implementation goals to the African Commission. This is because most of the report 
is focused on the realisation of the rights in the ACHPR. Conflated reports also make 
it more difficult for the African Commission to provide effective feedback in concluding 
observations. State parties should, therefore, abide by the guidelines to ensure 
adequate engagement with the Maputo Protocol in part B of the report. The African 
 
986 See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 above.  
987 In terms of Rule 74(3) of the Rules of Procedure. See chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
988 In terms of Rule 74(2) of the Rules of Procedure. See chapter two 2 4 4 above. 
989 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP. See chapter two part 2 2 4 1 above.  
990 See chapter two part 2 2 4 1 above.  
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Commission should moreover address non-compliance with reporting guidelines in 
their concluding observations on state reports.  
The analysis in chapter 4 on CEDAW can also assist state parties in their state 
reporting in terms of the Maputo Protocol. Under the Compilation Reporting 
Guidelines, state parties to CEDAW need to address how the rights in CEDAW are 
being implemented for different groups of women, particularly those that face multiple 
forms of discrimination.991 Therefore, state parties need to be cognisant of the 
multiplicity of women’s identities in their state reports, which is at the core of anti-
essentialist feminist legal theory. State parties to the Maputo Protocol should 
incorporate this requirement into their state reports. Thus, state parties should include 
the implementation strategies for gender responsive budgeting which is sensitive to 
women who face intersecting discrimination in their state reports. This should, in 
theory, enable the African Commission to effectively monitor the strategies utilised to 
ensure all women are protected under the Maputo Protocol. 
 
5 2 3 Special Rapporteur 
The Special Rapporteur often holds side sessions at the ordinary sessions of the 
African Commission.992 These side sessions have, in the past, been utilised to address 
the guidelines for state reporting in terms of the Maputo Protocol.993 However, there is 
an opportunity for these sessions to be further utilised to highlight the significance of 
reporting on gender responsive budgeting initiatives. The mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur includes establishing guidelines which state parties can utilise when 
reporting to the African Commission.994 These guidelines can assist state parties to 
better understand their obligations under the Maputo Protocol as well as how to 
address them in their periodic reports. These side sessions could become a regular 
instalment to make state parties aware of best practices as well as keeping them 
accountable in terms of their reporting obligations under the Maputo Protocol. 
 
991 Compilation Reporting Guidelines 69. 
992 See chapter two part 2 2 5 above. 
993 See chapter two part 2 2 5 above.  
994 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 6. 
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In order to promote the ratification and enforcement of the Maputo Protocol, the 
Special Rapporteur furthermore undertakes advocacy campaigns in African states.995 
These types of missions and conferences can be instrumental in promoting the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur and in sharing best practices of resource allocation 
for women’s rights across state parties. These missions could also be used to collect 
data and best practices of state parties allocating resources for different groups of 
women. This could assist African countries that have been struggling to apply 
elements of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory to their gender responsive budgeting 
initiatives. The Special Rapporteur could also conduct promotional missions to 
countries with the sole purpose of emphasising the importance of gender responsive 
budgeting to realise state parties’ obligation in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol.  
The Special Rapporteur may also undertake comparative studies on the situation 
of women’s rights across the African continent.996 Such studies could compare and 
analyse the use of gender responsive budgeting to realise women’s rights in various 
African countries. During the analysis of state parties’ abilities or inabilities to realise 
the rights in the ICESCR, one benchmark of rights realisation was identified as a 
comparison of countries with similar development levels.997 This research argues that 
supervisory bodies such as the African Commission and Special Rapporteur could 
conduct such comparisons to make more accurate assessments of the effectiveness 
of gender responsive budgeting strategies of countries in the same region.998 The 
Special Rapporteur could conduct these studies to encourage state parties to adopt 
or improve their gender responsive strategies to ensure the protection and 
empowerment of women. These comparative studies could also assess how different 
countries in a similar region ensure different groups of women are involved and 
protected within their budgetary process. Thus, the aims of anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory can also guide comparative studies.  
 
995 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa on the Occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 6. See chapter two part 2 2 5 
above. 
996 See chapter two part 2 2 5 above.  
997 Felner (2008) International Journal on Human Rights 115. See chapter four part 4 3 2 2 above.  
998 See chapter four part 4 3 2 2 above.  
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During the intersession reports presented to the African Commission, the Special 
Rapporteur has not, yet, made any reference to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.999 
However, there has been reference made to budgetary allocations for women’s rights 
in general.1000 These platforms could be better utilised to draw attention to the 
significance of gender responsive budgeting for state parties to realise their obligation 
in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The Special Rapporteur could also 
share best practices of budgeting for different groups of women in intersession reports. 
Budoo recommends that the Special Rapporteur undertake a specific study on the 
adoption of gender responsive budgeting as a means for state parties to realise their 
obligation in terms of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.1001 Such a study would be 
enhanced by considering how different groups of women, who encounter varying 
degrees and types of discrimination are affected by gender responsive budgeting and 
how gender responsive budgeting can best be utilised to protect them.1002 The 
following section considers the potential of gender responsive budgeting as part of 
state parties’ national policies. This section will also provide an interpretative 
framework for gender responsive budgeting which supervisory bodies can refer to in 
their various mandates.  
 
5 3 Gender responsive budgeting  
5 3 1 The involvement of NGOs and civil society in the budgetary process 
The involvement of NGOs and civil society during the drafting, legislating, 
implementing and auditing stages of national budgets ensure that state parties adhere 
to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.1003 Thus, the active participation of NGOs and 
 
999 See chapter two part 2 2 5 above.  
1000 Intersession Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during 
the 59th Ordinary Session of the African Commission (2016) 
<https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=245> para 12; Intersession Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during the 58th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission (2016) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=244> para 15; Intersession 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during the 57th Ordinary 
Session of the African Commission (2015) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=189> para 
19: Intersession Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa presented during 
the 56th Ordinary Session of the African Commission (2015) 
<https://www.achpr.org/sessions/intersession?id=179> para 25. 
1001 Budoo The Role of Gender Budgeting 222. 
1002 As discussed in parts 5 2 1 and 5 2 2 above. 
1003 Krafchik “Can Civil Society Add Value to Budget Decision-Making?” in United Nations Development 
Fund for Women 75. 
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civil society is a crucial part of the budgetary process.1004 The involvement of and 
engagement with these groups adhere to the PANTHER principles.1005 NGOs and civil 
society involved should include organisations that represent the interests of diverse 
women. By including such organisations, state parties will be better positioned to 
ensure that their budgets and policies are responsive to the needs of women with 
multiple identities.  
When state parties incorporate an understanding of anti-essentialist feminist legal 
theory into every stage of their budgetary processes, it results in practices which are 
sensitive to all groups of women and involve women at every stage. In particular, 
Budlender and Hewitt suggest the active involvement of NGOs focused on education 
for girls, violence against women, and sexual and reproductive rights.1006 These 
organisations and groups can have a significant impact on the budgetary process 
because of the research that they have done on the impact of policy and national 
budgetary decisions on different groups of women. 
Due to the closed nature of some countries’ budgetary processes, it is common for 
civil society to only be able to analyse national budgets once they have been 
published.1007 While this is not the situation in all countries, if all state parties to the 
Maputo Protocol involve NGOs and civil society at every stage of the budgetary 
process, then problem areas can be identified and corrected before budgets are 
published and implemented. As argued above,1008 state parties should use temporary 
special measures under CEDAW to provide opportunities and ensure the participation 
of women in the budgetary process.1009 In terms of CEDAW, temporary special 
measures are utilised to accelerate substantive equality between men and women and 
the redistribution of power and resources.1010 When the objectives of substantive 
equality have been reached, these temporary special measures have to cease. Thus, 
a clear timeframe is imperative when implementing temporary special measures.1011  
 
1004 See chapter three part 3 4 4. 
1005 Ekwall & Rosales “A Human Right Obligations and Responsibilities PANTHER” (2009) 5 Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. See chapter three part 3 4 4 above for a further 
discussion on the PANTHER principles.  
1006 Budlender & Hewitt Engendering Budgets 54. 
1007 74.  
1008 See chapter four part 4 2 3 1 above.  
1009 Elson Budgeting for Women’s Rights 33. See chapter four part 4 2 3 1 above.  
1010 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25 para 39.  
1011 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eight Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea 
(2018) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8 para 21. 
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There is no specific provision in the Maputo Protocol which provides for temporary 
special measures. However, when considering article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, 
state parties are obligated to “adopt all necessary measures [emphasis added]” for the 
full and effective implementation of women’s rights. There are also specific provisions, 
such as the elimination of discrimination against women in article 2, which requires 
state parties to adopt appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. 
Therefore, state parties must consider developing strategies for temporary special 
measures to be invoked to ensure the involvement of NGOs and civil society in the 
budgetary process. Article 9 of the Maputo Protocol (right to participation in the political 
and decision-making process) also provides that “state parties shall take specific 
positive action to promote participative governance and the equal participation of 
women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action, enabling national 
legislation and other measures… state parties shall ensure increased and effective 
representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making”. The 
involvement of women and women’s interests NGOs in the budgetary process is 
included in national decision-making. Thus, the use of temporary special measures 
could be provided for through the affirmative action and enabling legislation which 
ensures the active and equal participation of women and women’s interests NGOs in 
the budgetary decision-making process.   
Through the adoption of temporary special measures, with clear objectives and time 
frames, state parties can ensure that their budgetary processes are transparent and 
participatory. These temporary special measures are particularly necessary should 
any of the NGOs involved require training or transportation to be purposefully included 
in the budgetary process.1012 Individuals working in women’s rights NGOs may not 
have sufficient economic experience to read and fully understand national policies and 
budgets. Thus, comprehensive budgetary training will prove beneficial to the 
budgetary process. The timeframes can also be set for the duration of a certain stage 
of the budgetary process, an example being involving women’s groups in the drafting 
process of a gender responsive budget.  
As Elson and Sharp reiterate, participatory budgeting gives local communities a 
direct say in how local funds are to be utilised to best address local issues.1013 This is 
 
1012 See chapter three part 3 4 4 above.  
1013 D Elson & R Sharp “Gender Responsive Budgeting and Women’s Poverty” in S Chant (ed) The 
International Handbook of Gender and Poverty: Concepts, Research and Policy (2010) 522 525. 
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also particularly prevalent in poorer communities where concerns such as water and 
sanitation, schools and clinics would greatly benefit from the involvement of groups of 
people who have experience in addressing these types of concerns.1014 Again, anti-
essentialist feminist legal theory unearths the crucial role that diverse women, who 
have direct knowledge and experience of their communities’ development areas, play 
in budget formulation. As argued above, Africa is a vastly diverse continent which 
requires legal solutions which are responsive to the multiplicity of African women.1015   
The active participation of NGOs and civil society will also encourage greater 
transparency in the budgetary process and state parties will be able to set joint 
objectives with the NGOs involved.1016 
The reporting guidelines for state reporting under the Maputo Protocol require state 
parties to describe the extent to which civil society, particularly individuals and 
organisations working on gender issues, were involved in the preparation of the 
report.1017 Reporting to the African Commission is a legal obligation of state parties to 
the Maputo Protocol which ensures that the African Commission can fulfil its 
monitoring responsibilities. Thus, as part of the interpretative framework for article 
26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, state parties should adhere to their obligation to report 
to the African Commission on the involvement of NGOs and civil society in the 
preparation of national budgets. In terms of the OPERA framework, supervisory 
bodies should also conduct an assessment on the involvement of the public in the 
budgetary processes and whether NGOs can hold state parties accountable for 
budgetary decisions.1018 As part of the interpretative framework for article 26(2), the 
African Commission must perform such an assessment when considering the 
involvement of NGOs in executing the provisions of the Maputo Protocol.  
State parties should also budget for the role of National Human Rights Institutions 
(“NHRIs”) in their gender responsive budgets. The NHRIs can take various forms, such 
as ombudsmen, commissions, or a combination of both.1019 The functions of NHRIs 
 
1014 525. See chapter three part 3 4 4 above.  
1015 See chapter three part 3 3 1.  
1016 See chapter three part 3 4 4 above for a discussion on the PANTHER principles.  
1017 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP 1. 
1018 OPERA refers to “outcomes, policy efforts, resources and assessment”. Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (New York) The OPERA Framework: Assessing Compliance with the Obligation to Fulfil 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2012) 22. See chapter four part 4 3 2 2 above.  
1019 R Murray The Role of National Human Rights Institutions at the International and Regional Levels: 
The Experience of Africa (2007) 2. 
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include playing a facilitative role between supervisory bodies and state parties, making 
“recommendations on compliance with human rights standards”, raising awareness 
on international treaties and furthering the involvement of civil society in national law 
and policy.1020 Carver has described the role that these bodies play as a “bridge 
between international human rights standards and their implementation at a national 
level”.1021 Thus, NHRIs could be utilised to assist state parties in the preparation of 
state reports and gender responsive budgeting, while ensuring the active and 
meaningful involvement of NGOs and civil society. The African Commission has 
recongnised the significant contribution that NHRIs could make to human rights 
realisation when they are allocated sufficient resources and effectively established.1022 
The CEDAW Committee has also noted the important function that these bodies have 
in ensuring access to justice.1023 State parties should consequently ensure that 
sufficient resources are allocated to the establishment of NHRIs, as well as the 
continued monitoring and improvement of these bodies.  
 
5 3 2 Generating resources  
For state parties to allocate sufficient resources to meet their obligations in terms of 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, they first need to generate these resources, and 
second, these resources have to be effectively spent. As discussed in chapter 3, how 
state parties raise their revenue and generate resources for the realisation of women’s 
rights, forms a crucial part of gender responsive budgeting.1024 State parties to the 
Maputo Protocol have to ensure that their revenue strategies are in line with the 
theoretical approaches of gender responsive budgeting. The gender responsive 
budgeting strategies will also be assessed based on their responsiveness to the needs 
of diverse women. As part of the interpretative framework, it is suggested that state 





1021 R Carver “A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and the 
Domestication of International Law” (2010) 10 HRLR 1 2. 
1022 Murray National Human Rights Institutions 3 & 4. 
1023 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 39(a). See chapter four part 4 2 2 6 above 
for a further discussion on access to justice under CEDAW. 
1024 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above for gender responsive budgeting implementation strategies.  
1025 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 27. 
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5 3 2 1 Systems of taxation 
With regard to taxation, state parties are required to be cognisant of how different tax 
policies affect various groups of women. Ensuring that taxation systems are applied 
equally to both men and women is required by article 13(j) of the Maputo Protocol. 
Taxation systems in most African countries are underdeveloped. Tax as a share of 
GDP has been slow to rise or is even on the decline in many poorer African 
countries.1026 However, as shown in chapter two, Rwanda is an example of how strong 
leadership and political will can implement efficient taxation systems which resulted in 
public revenues increasing by more than 50% since 2001.1027  
Through their various mandates, the African Court, African Commission and 
Special Rapporteur are also required to monitor whether state parties’ taxations 
systems promote the equality and protection of all women.1028 As state parties are 
required to report on their gender responsive budgeting strategies in their state 
reports, the African Commission would be able to provide feedback on state parties’ 
taxation strategies, as per the framework discussed in the rest of this section.1029 As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the Special Rapporteur should also conduct fact-
finding missions across Africa to establish the best taxation practices.1030 These 
practices could then be presented to state parties at side sessions at the ordinary 
sessions of the African Commission.  
As discussed above, each state party to the Maputo Protocol would first have to do 
a taxation assessment to consider the situation of diverse groups of people in respect 
of how taxation affects their lives, if at all.1031 This strategy was suggested by 
Budlender as part of revenue review in terms of gender responsive budgeting.1032 
Budlender’s strategy was originally designed for implementation in Australia and 
South Africa. However, as part of generating resources for the realisation of the 
Maputo Protocol, African countries could, in line with Budlender’s strategy, first 
undertake a taxation assessment. The assessment will be able to clarify who pays 
taxes and whether the taxation system is currently reaching all citizens. Such a 
 
1026 Ghosh “Why Taxes will be Central to Africa’s Development” (2016) World Economic Forum 1. 
1027 1. See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 1. 
1028 See part 5 2 above.  
1029 UP “Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2010) UP 2. See part 5 2 2 2 above. 
1030 See part 5 2 3 above. 
1031 See chapter three part 3 4 5. 
1032 Budlender & Hewitt Engendering Budgets 103. 
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taxation assessment needs to consider the employment status, consumption patterns, 
income levels, poverty levels, and amount of non-monetised care work.1033 Only once 
such an assessment has been carried out and the results analysed against 
disaggregated data (such as gender, poverty levels, and race), should the state parties 
to the Maputo Protocol progress to reform their taxation policies. In terms of taxation 
policies to realise the rights in the ICESCR, De Schutter suggests reconsidering the 
tax base, a progressive tax structure and the combatting of tax evasion, which as 
discussed below, are all prominent issues in the African context.1034  
As established in chapter 4, the tax base in poorer countries is generally so low that 
state parties are unable to mobilise adequate resources for the realisation of human 
rights and encourage economic growth.1035 One way in which state parties to the 
Maputo Protocol can raise the tax base is by eliminating favourable treatment to 
foreign investors.1036 Favourable tax treatment has been shown to have little to no 
impact on the amount of foreign investment attracted to various countries.1037 
Increasing the tax base in this way would also have a significant impact on African 
countries who are currently attracting significant foreign investment because of their 
role as emerging markets.  
Africa has also seen an increase in foreign direct investment in recent years while 
there has been an overall decrease globally.1038 While foreign direct investment can 
assist to increase the tax base, it should not be used as a means for large corporations 
to have influence over the human rights and human dignity of the population. Thus, 
investment treaties need to be drafted with human rights and human dignity at the 
forefront. With regard to foreign direct investment, the state party has a right to 
regulate and the duty to protect the rights of their populations.1039 Due to the fact that 
the state party is a sovereign entity, they are entitled to hold large corporations 
accountable for breaches of investment treaties and obligations which adversely affect 
boader public interests or human rights norms.1040 As Adeleke states, this is a fine 
 
1033 103. 
1034 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 27. See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above.  
1035 27. See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above. 
1036 28.  
1037 See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above for a discussion on what attracts foreign investment to a country. 
1038 RJ Jere “The State of Foreign Direct Investments in Africa” (2019) New African 
<https://newafricanmagazine.com/19037/> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
1039 F Adeleke International Investment Law and Policy in Africa: Exploring a Human Rights Based 
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balance because while “human rights are fundamental to human dignity”, investment 
opportunities are instrumental in the achievement of certain policy objectives which 
indirectly affect human dignity.1041 
In terms of the framework for generating resources, state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol are recommended to adopt progressive tax structures.1042 Taxation policies 
should be cognisant of the impact that different types of tax, such as indirect tax, have 
on women and the poor. Indirect tax may appear neutral as it is attached to goods and 
services, however as Budlender argues, poorer households spend a higher 
percentage of their household income on disposable goods.1043 Women also carry the 
disproportionate burden of poverty, thus indirect tax has the most adverse effect on 
poor women. Decreasing indirect taxation should not have an impact on the tax base 
as state parties to the Maputo Protocol can increase direct tax on higher-income 
groups as well as increase corporation tax, as discussed above.1044 As also argued 
above, having progressive taxation systems is key to generating maximum available 
resources in terms of the ICESCR.1045 The CESCR reiterates the importance of having 
taxation systems which consider the most marginalised citizens and that are focused 
on equality.1046  
It is further suggested that state parties to the Maputo Protocol make a conscious 
effort to combat tax evasion. Tax evasion is particularly concerning for African 
countries because the average tax to GDP ratio is much lower in developing 
countries.1047 Anti-essentialist feminist legal theory illuminates the effect tax evasion 
has on diverse women, as wealthy individuals or corporations who abuse the taxation 
system force state parties to increase other forms of taxation, such as indirect tax, 
which, as discussed above, results in poorer households bearing the greatest taxation 
burden.1048 State parties to the Maputo Protocol should review their national tax 
legislation and policies, as well as funding institutions which can hold multinational 
 
1041 31. 
1042 See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above for a discussion on progressive tax structures.  
1043 Budlender & Hewitt Engendering Budgets 103. 
1044 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 32. 
1045 See chapter four part 4 3 1 1. 
1046 CESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South Africa (2018) UN Doc 
E/C.12/ZAF/CO/1 para 16. See chapter four part 4 3 1 1 above.  
1047 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes “Tax Transparency 
in Africa: Africa Initiative Progress Report 2018” (2019) 6.  
1048 MS Carmona Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2014) 
A/HRC/26/28 para 60. See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above.  
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corporations accountable to tax evasion.1049 State parties should also ensure that they 
do not offer unregulated tax havens to big corporations and wealthy individuals.1050 
Thus, international cooperation between African countries is paramount to combatting 
tax abuse and ensuring that there is adequate public revenue to meet the obligations 
set out in the Maputo Protocol.  
 
5 3 2 2 International cooperation 
To ensure that state parties to the Maputo Protocol have adopted all necessary 
measures to realise women’s rights, they also need to engage in international 
cooperation. The supervisory bodies must encourage African countries to actively 
pursue these extraterritorial agreements in order to realise their obligations in terms of 
the Maputo Protocol. Should cases or communications regarding resource constraints 
reach the African Court and the African Commission, these supervisory bodies need 
to enquire whether the state parties have sought relief outside of their borders.1051 The 
African Commission should raise this issue in their concluding observations on state 
reports, especially, where state parties have not made any mention of international 
cooperation as part of their gender responsive budgeting. The African Commission 
should also emphasise the significance of international cooperation and the potential 
for resources achieved through international cooperation as part of gender responsive 
budgeting in a general comment focused on article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol1052  
In terms of the ICESCR, the CESCR stated that the resources gained through 
international assistance form part of the resources that state parties have to meet their 
human rights obligations.1053 The CESCR has also reiterated that the extent of 
international cooperation is particularly acute when state parties raise resource 
constraints as a reason for not meeting their obligations.1054 Resource constraints are 
an issue which many state parties to the Maputo Protocol raise when women’s rights 
are not effectively realised.1055 Thus, state parties should be held liable for a failure to 
 
1049 See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above.  
1050 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 34. 
1051 See part 5 2 above for the interpretative role of the supervisory bodies. 
1052 See part 5 2 2 1 above for a discussion on the African Commission releasing a general comment 
focused on interpreting article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. 
1053 Statement of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (thirty-sixth session, 2007) 
An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum available resources” under an optional 
protocol to the covenant UN Doc E/C. 12/2007/1 para 5. 
1054 See chapter four part 4 3 1 5 above.  
1055 See part 5 3 5 below for a discussion on resource constraints and African countries. 
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seek the necessary resources extraterritorially.1056 However, when state parties 
engage in extraterritorial agreements, it has to be executed in a way that would 
facilitate, and not impede, debt relief.1057 When foreign debt is relieved, state parties 
will be able to focus their resources on realising the rights in the Maputo Protocol 
instead of redirecting resources to reimburse debts.1058 State parties would also not 
be able to use foreign debt as a reason for resource constraints which impedes their 
efforts to realise women’s rights.  
In terms of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, 
state parties are recommended to negotiate extraterritorial gender responsive 
budgeting agreements within their sub-regional economic communities.1059 The sub-
regional economic communities are already established to cooperate with 
governments, civil society and the AU in raising the standard of living of African 
people.1060 Thus, state parties to the Maputo Protocol should look to their sub-regional 
economic communities to begin gender responsive budgeting initiatives.  
As discussed above, the SADC Guidelines1061 are an example of a sub-regional 
economic community expressing sub-regional unity and cooperation through the 
formulation of joint budgeting guidelines.1062 A joint gender responsive budgeting 
initiative could prove useful if all countries in a sub-regional economic community have 
ratified the Maputo Protocol, and are thus working towards realising the same 
obligations. For example, fifteen countries out of the sixteen SADC member states 
have ratified the Maputo Protocol, thus the SADC state parties must ensure that their 
sub-regional gender responsive budgeting initiatives are in line with realising the 
provisions in the Maputo Protocol.1063 State parties that implement similar gender 
 
1056 See chapter four part 4 3 1 5 above. 
1057 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 39. See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 above. 
1058 40. 
1059 Africa’s sub-regional economic communities include eight sub-regional bodies namely, The Arab 
Maghreb Union, The Economic Community of West African States, The East African Community, The 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, The Southern African Development Community, The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, The Economic Community of Central African States 
and The Community of Sahel-Saharan States. 
1060 Office of the Special Advisor on Africa “The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the Africa 
Union” (2016) UN <https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml> (accessed 07-07-2020). 
1061 The SADC Guidelines are not binding on member states, however, they are discussed in this thesis 
because of the interpretative value they add to gender responsive budgeting frameworks in Africa. It is 
also noted that the member states have suspended the SADC Tribunal. Individuals and NGOs are thus 
not able to challenge these guidelines or gender responsive budgeting initiatives at the SADC level.  
1062 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above. 
1063 AU “List of countries which has signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2018) AU 
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responsive budgeting initiatives within a sub-regional group would also be able to turn 
to their regional groups for financial and technical training.  
As established above, the CESCR will consider whether a state party sought 
international aid should that state party use resource constraints as a reason for not 
being able to meet their obligations in terms of the ICESCR.1064 The African 
Commission would also be able to assess whether state parties, that claim they cannot 
realise the rights in the Maputo Protocol due to resource constraints, have turned to 
their sub-regional group for assistance and extraterritorial cooperation. In terms of 
maximum available resources in the ICESCR, it was confirmed that the available 
resources to a state party include those within the state party as well as those available 
from the international community.1065 
Gender responsive budgeting initiatives should pay careful attention to how state 
parties generate and spend their resources to ensure that all women in the regions 
are protected and empowered. The expenditure side of the gender responsive 
budgeting initiative forms the next crucial part of the interpretative framework for article 
26(2) of the Maputo Protocol and is addressed in the following part.  
 
5 3 3 Spending resources 
The expenditure side of the gender responsive budgeting initiative requires state 
parties to contextually examine the rights of women recognised in the Maputo Protocol 
and how they are applicable in their countries. These initiatives would be established 
differently in every member state. Thus, it would not be practical for this research to 
recommend an exact strategy that would work effectively in the context of every 
country.1066 However, there are a few identifiable areas where state parties to the 




_7.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2020). Botswana is the only SADC member state which has not ratified the 
Maputo Protocol, however, it has ratified CEDAW and the ICESCR. Thus, the SADC sub-regional 
community can still form a comprehensive gender responsive budgeting initiative because there is 
enough cross-over with the obligations for resource mobilisation for human rights in the Maputo 
Protocol, CEDAW and the ICESCR.   
1064 An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum available resources” under an optional 
protocol to the covenant para 10(f). See chapter four part 4 3 1 5. 
1065 See chapter four part 4 3 1 1 above for a discussion on maximum available resources.  
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multiple forms of discrimination, are protected and empowered. Most gender 
responsive budgeting strategies, as discussed in chapter 3, do not encompass 
theories of anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. Thus, state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol must ensure that their gender responsive budgeting initiatives are formulated 
and implemented to be sensitive to the needs of the diverse women in their countries. 
The gender responsive budgeting strategies of South Africa, as an example, prioritised 
the socio-economic needs of poor women and ensured they remained at the forefront 
of further budgeting strategies.1067  
Chapter 2 established that full and effective implementation of the rights contained 
in the Maputo Protocol, require extensive resources as well as realisation over 
time.1068 Thus, constant progression towards the full realisation of these rights is 
required. State parties should identify the immediate steps which they will take in their 
gender responsive budgeting strategies as well as how the rights in the Maputo 
Protocol will be realised over time. It was argued above that, while article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol does not directly mention progressive realisation, the full and 
effective implementation of the rights in the Maputo Protocol will require concrete and 
targeted steps.1069 These concrete steps also create an obligation on state parties to 
take immediate steps.1070 This was established by the African Commission in the 
Purohit communication.1071 Immediate steps are also established as essential by the 
CESCR with regard to progressive realisation in article 2(1) of the ICESCR.1072 As 
argued above, while realising human rights progressively may be long term, there are 
deliberate, concrete and targeted steps which can be made in the short term.1073 
The first step in most gender responsive budget strategies includes the state 
gathering information and statistics about gender disparities.1074 The purpose of such 
 
1067 See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 2 above. Republic of South Africa “Combined Second Periodic Report 
under the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and Initial Report under the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa” (2015) ACHPR 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/58th/state-reports/2nd-2002-
2015/staterep2_southafrica_2003_2014_eng.pdf>. 
1068 See chapter two part 2 2 1 above.  
1069 See chapter two part 2 3 1 above. 
1070 Amin A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights 293. See chapter two 
part 2 3 1 above.  
1071 Communication 241/01 (2003). 
1072 See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 above. 
1073 CESCR General Comment 3 The nature of states parties’ obligations (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 
para 2. See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 above.  
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fact-finding and analysis is to gain a deeper understanding of the specific context of 
different groups of  women in the country.1075 It is important that state parties account 
for the resource-intensive nature of the collection of disaggregated data. Thus, before 
a comprehensive gender responsive budget can be designed, state parties need to 
allocate sufficient resources to the gathering of information and statistics of gender 
disparities within their country.  
By gaining a better understanding of the specific needs of the women in the country, 
the state party would be better equipped to establish and implement a context-specific 
gender responsive budgeting strategy. Information regarding diverse women should 
be included in these statistics. This includes information about poverty, sexuality, race, 
language, rural areas, culture, and religion. Thus, in terms of the interpretative 
framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, state parties should assess how 
current budgetary allocations affect all women in the country.1076 Following these initial 
steps, state parties would be able to design gender responsive budgeting strategies 
which ensure the protection and empowerment of all women. Through an assessment 
of the current state of diverse women in the country, they would also be ensuring that 
they adhere to their obligations to protect vulnerable women.1077 
As mentioned above, SADC has released its own guidelines in which it encourages 
its member states to implement gender responsive budgeting initiatives.1078 The other 
sub-regional economic communities are also encouraged to establish and implement 
their own gender responsive budgeting guidelines for expenditure. The creation of 
sub-regional strategies encourages joint objectives to realise women’s rights within a 
sub-regional group. While these sub-regional gender responsive budgeting strategies 
are non-binding, as the SADC Guidelines are, the African Commission can make use 
of sub-regional benchmarks to monitor progress and resource allocation when 
assessing state reports within that sub-region.1079  
The most significant point, as illuminated by gender responsive budgeting theory, 
is that state parties take a holistic approach to their national budget expenditure. Thus, 
 
1075 Budlender & Hewitt Engendering Budgets 92. 
1076 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above. Budlender & Hewitt Engendering Budgets 97. 
1077 Article 22 of the Maputo Protocol (special protection of elderly women), article 23 (special protection 
of women with disabilities) and article 24 (special protection of women in distress).  
1078 Southern African Development Community Guidelines on Gender Responsive Budgeting (2014) 
31. 
1079 See part 5 3 2 above for a discussion on regional economic communities. 
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a gender analysis should be conducted on every aspect of a country’s budgets and 
polices.1080 State parties to the Maputo Protocol should ensure that every category of 
expenditure is reviewed in terms of its impact on diverse groups of women. For 
example, when considering health care expenditure, state parties must be cognisant 
of the fact women have specific sexual and reproductive needs which should be 
accounted for in national budgets and policies. The state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol must manage their expenditure for health care accordingly while keeping 
these issues at the forefront.  
As part of Rwanda’s gender responsive budgeting strategy, pilot sectors were 
selected to trial the new budgeting strategy.1081 The leaders and task teams within the 
pilot sectors were provided with in-depth training and support.1082 Thus, once success 
was exhibited in the pilot sectors, plans could be put into place to roll out the strategy 
to more sectors. The following section considers specific resource-intensive provisions 
which should be carefully and holistically addressed in state parties’ gender 
responsive budgeting initiatives. These provisions are specifically addressed because 
they require extensive resources and, thus, cannot be considered in isolation from 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. The CEDAW Committee and CESCR have 
correspondingly recognised these provisions as resource intensive, as discussed in 
chapter 3. State parties to the Maputo Protocol could arguably elect these provisions 
as pilot sectors for their gender responsive budgeting initiatives, as Rwanda had 
done.1083  
 
5 3 4 Resource-intensive provisions 
In order to effectively allocate resources to realise women’s rights, state parties should 
undertake a detailed analysis of the obligations imposed by each of the rights in the 
Maputo Protocol. The state parties should then ensure that their gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives enable them to fulfil these obligations. The following sub-sections 
 
1080 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above for a further discussion on the holistic nature of gender 
responsive budgeting.  
1081 See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 1 above for an analysis of Rwanda’s gender responsive budgeting 
initiatives. 
1082 Kabaya “Presentation to “Gender in MENA Projects: Promoting Women’s Economic 
Empowerment”” (2009) Worldbank 8.  
1083 See chapter two part 2 2 4 2 1 above. 
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briefly addresses the substantive contents of some of the more resource-intensive 
provisions in the Maputo Protocol.1084  
  
5 3 4 1 Prohibition of discrimination 
Article 2(1) of the Maputo Protocol provides that state parties are obligated to “combat 
all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional 
and other measures”. As shown in APDF, the African Court requires state parties to 
ensure that their national laws are harmonised with relevant international 
instruments.1085 The African Court ordered Mali to amend the Malian Persons and 
Family Code1086 due to its discriminatory nature against women.1087 The African Court 
also emphasised the importance of nationwide educational programmes and initiatives 
which would address the changes in legislation and ensure all citizens are aware of 
the amendments.1088 Thus, as argued above, state parties have an obligation to 
ensure that resources are allocated towards, not only the amendment of discriminatory 
legislation but also to the changing of national perceptions and attitudes.1089  
The CEDAW Committee has also commented, through the use of general 
recommendations, on the need for women and NGOs to be involved in the 
development of non-discrimination policies.1090 Thus, state parties are required to 
allocate sufficient resources to ensure the active participation of women’s groups and 
NGOs.1091 The CEDAW Committee has reiterated the need for an understanding of 
intersectional discrimination and the multiple identities of women when formulating 
and implementing non-discrimination policies.1092 As shown above, the CESCR 
highlighted the importance of ensuring that non-discrimination legislation serves the 
most vulnerable or marginalised groups in society.1093 Marginalised groups of people, 
 
1084 It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss the substantive interpretation of each of the rights 
in the Maputo Protocol. See chapter one part 1 3 above.  
1085 See chapter two part 2 2 2 above.  
1086 Law No 2011 – 087 of 30 December 2011.  
1087 APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali Application No 046/2016 para 130. 
1088 Para 131. 
1089 Chapter two part 2 2 2 above. 
1090 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 The Core Obligations of State Parties under 
Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010) para 27. See chapter four part 4 2 2 1 above. 
1091 See part 5 3 1 above. 
1092 Para 18.  
1093 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20 (forty second 
session, 2009) Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para 2, of the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
  163 
 
particularly women facing multiple levels of discrimination, require a state party’s full 
commitment to ensuring that national legislation and policy are non-discriminatory and 
support substantive equality.1094 
The Kell communication further demonstrated how imperative an understanding of 
anti-essentialist feminist legal theory is when interpreting the discrimination that 
women face.1095 The author in Kell, as an aboriginal woman, was in a vulnerable 
position claiming her property rights and reporting domestic violence, and the state 
party is obligated to ensure the elimination of such discrimination.1096 The CEDAW 
Committee stated that temporary special measures, such as the creation of task teams 
and supervisory bodies, would be necessary to identify and address the multiple layers 
of discrimination that women face.1097  
Therefore, as part of the framework for interpreting article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol state parties should allocate resources to the elimination of discrimination 
against women, including multiple levels of discrimination in three main ways. This 
involves, firstly, utilising temporary special measures, such as the creation of task 
teams and involving women’s interests NGOs in identifying the multiple levels of 
discriminations; secondly, amending discriminatory legislation; and thirdly, investing 
into educational programmes which assist in changing national perceptions and 
attitudes.  
 
5 3 4 2 Gender-based violence 
Eradicating violence against women is resource intensive and requires full 
commitment from state parties. Article 4(2) of the Maputo Protocol provides for the 
right to security of the person and particularly states that “state parties shall take 
appropriate and effective measures to: (i) provide adequate budgetary and other 
resources for the implementation and monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and 
eradicating violence against women”.  
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20. See chapter 
four part 4 3 1 6. 
1094 CESCR General Comment 5 Persons with Disabilities UN Doc E/1995/22 (1994) para 9. 
1095 Communication No 19/2008, CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 (27 April 2012). See chapter four part 4 2 2 
1 above. 
1096 Para 10.3. 
1097 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 27 para 12. Article 4 of CEDAW refers to temporary 
special measures. See chapter four part 4 2 2 1 below. 
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The crucial issue of eliminating gender-based violence has to be included in state 
parties’ gender responsive budgeting initiatives. As discussed above, resources need 
to be deployed to, for example, increase police training, provide women’s shelters, 
provide services for survivors of sexual or domestic violence and equal access to 
justice for all women.1098 In chapter 4, the response of the CEDAW Committee and 
state parties to the allocation of resources to the eradication of gender-based violence 
was analysed.1099 The CEDAW Committee reiterated that where a state party does 
not provide adequate shelters for women and children, counselling services, and 
psychological treatment centres, it constitutes a violation of the state party’s obligation 
to protect women.1100 Attention needs to be paid to intersecting areas of discrimination 
which can result in violence against women. This includes violence against women 
due to, for example, homophobia, racism or xenophobia.  
As discussed above, the CEDAW Committee emphasised the importance of 
ensuring that police personnel, law enforcement, judges, and prosecutors receive 
adequate and appropriate gender sensitivity training to ensure they can effectively 
deal with cases of gender-based violence.1101 Thus, to ensure that state parties to the 
Maputo Protocol protect their citizens against gender-based violence, nationwide 
gender sensitivity training would need to form part of their gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives. These training and educational programmes would also need to 
incorporate information on how intersecting degrees of discrimination can compound 
the gender-based violence that some women experience.1102  
State parties are required to actively work to eliminate the stigmatisation around 
domestic violence as many women who have experienced violence are often forced 
by their community, in particular rural communities, or the police to remain with their 
perpetrators as they are considered “tainted” women.1103 Thus, state parties to the 
 
1098 Mutiithi “An analysis of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa” in B Kombo et al Journey to equality: 10 years of the Protocol on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (2013) 44. See chapter two part 2 2 1 above.   
1099 See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above.  
1100 VK v Bulgaria Communication No 20/2008, CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (27 September 2011) para 
9.13; X and Y v Georgia Communication No 24/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/61/D/24/2009 (2015) para 
11(b)(i). See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above. 
1101 Jallow v Bulgaria Communication No 32/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (28 August 2012) 
para 8.8(2)(c). See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above. 
1102 See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above.  
1103 OHCHR “’Break the Cycle of Silence and Acceptance of Violence Against Women’ Expert Urges 
Georgia” (2016) United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
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Maputo Protocol must ensure the availability of not only shelters for victims of domestic 
violence, but also resources to be allocated to housing and employment opportunities. 
These opportunities would assist in women not being rendered more vulnerable, which 
could result in them returning to their perpetrators.1104 This could also protect victims 
of domestic violence from further abuse.  
State parties to the Maputo Protocol are recommended to ensure that their police, 
courts and judicial personnel are free from gender stereotypes which would deter 
women from reporting cases of gender-based violence and receiving the justice 
required.1105 The eradication of such gender stereotypes will be resource intensive for 
state parties because it will involve educational programmes and training for judicial 
personnel and the police. The CEDAW Committee further elaborated upon the 
gender-sensitive training which is required to ensure that women are better protected 
in cases of domestic violence in RPB, Vertido and Jallow.1106  
Women who face intersecting levels of discrimination are more at risk of gender-
based violence.1107 Thus, as part of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol, it is recommended that state parties allocate resources towards the 
adoption of appropriate legal and policy responses which ensure that all women are 
protected against gender-based violence. In response to increased gender-based 
violence against women with multiple identities, the CEDAW Committee stated that 
state parties have to adopt measures which would prevent, investigate, prosecute and 
adequately punish these crimes, as well as providing reparations to the victims.1108 
This could, once again, require state parties to the Maputo Protocol to adopt temporary 
special measures in the form of task teams or monitoring bodies which specialise in 




(accessed 07-07-2020). See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above. 
1104 1. 
1105 The existence and eradication of gender stereotypes is further addressed in part 5 3 4 1 above and 
5 3 4 3 below.  
1106 Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (21 February 2014); 
Communication No 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 September 2010); Communication 
No 32/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (28 August 2012). See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above.  
1107 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 Gender-based Violence Against Women, 
Updating General Recommendation No. 19 UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35 (2017). 
para 12. See chapter four part 4 2 2 2 above. 
1108 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Costa Rica (2017) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/7 para 17(f). 
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5 3 4 3 Prohibition of harmful stereotyping 
Article 2(2) of the Maputo Protocol provides that “state parties shall commit themselves 
to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through public 
education, information, education and communication strategies”. As argued above, 
the persistence of gender stereotypes can lead to harmful practices against 
women.1109 Article 5 of the Maputo Protocol provides that “state parties shall prohibit 
and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights 
of women and which are contrary to recognised international standards”.  
As shown in APDF, ensuring the prohibition of harmful stereotyping has numerous 
resource implications for state parties.1110 This includes educational programmes, 
awareness campaigns, amending legislation, setting up task teams as well as 
ensuring that victims of harmful stereotyping have effective avenues to justice. Thus, 
state parties need to understand that an important part of their obligation to prevent 
harmful stereotyping involves mobilising resources as per article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol. As required by article 5(a) of the Maputo Protocol, state parties are obligated 
to prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which includes the “creation of 
public awareness in all sectors of society regarding harmful practices through 
information, formal and informal education and outreach programmes”. The African 
Court reiterated the significance of widespread educational programmes to eradicate 
harmful stereotyping in APDF.1111 However, it is still concerning that the African Court 
founded this remedy in terms of article 25 of the ACHPR and not the Maputo Protocol.  
Article 12(1)(b) furthermore requires state parties to eliminate all harmful 
stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and the media. As argued above, state parties to 
CEDAW are obligated to adopt educational and public information programmes which 
would eradicate harmful prejudices, stereotypes and practices.1112 These educational 
initiatives have to include information on multiple levels of discrimination and 
stereotypes which can affect diverse African women. The CEDAW Committee also 
reiterated how harmful stereotypes and practices can lead to women facing increased 
gender-based violence and inhibited access to justice.1113 
 
1109 See chapter four 4 2 2 3 above.  
1110 Application No 046/2016. See chapter two part 2 2 2 above. 
1111 Application No 046/2016. See chapter two part 2 2 2 above.  
1112 See chapter four part 4 2 2 3 above.  
1113 See chapter four part 4 2 2 3 above.  
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5 3 4 4 Access to justice 
Article 8 of the Maputo Protocol provides that state parties are obligated to ensure that 
“women and men are equal before the law and shall have the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law”. State parties to the Maputo Protocol must therefore allocate 
resources to realise women’s right to access to justice through the elimination of 
gender stereotypes, ensuring women have knowledge of their rights under the Maputo 
Protocol, and the provision of low-cost or free legal aid.  
As stated above, harmful gender stereotypes can negatively affect women’s right 
to access to justice.1114 The CEDAW Committee reiterated that women are often 
discriminated against when seeking justice because of the perceived role that women 
must remain silent and obedient to men.1115 In the RPD Communication, the court 
system had discriminated against the author, who was a rape victim, based on 
preconceived stereotypes of how rape victims should act when confronted with 
violence.1116 State parties are obligated to ensure their justice systems undergo 
capacity-building programmes to strengthen gender responsiveness and gender 
sensitivity, especially focused on women who face intersecting forms of 
discrimination.1117 As part of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol, it is recommended that state parties allocate sufficient resources to 
ensure their justice systems receive appropriate gender sensitivity capacity-building 
training.  
Another issue which state parties to the Maputo Protocol need to address, is 
women, especially those belonging to disadvantaged groups, not being aware of their 
rights under the Maputo Protocol, and thus, not being able to pursue justice. The 
CEDAW Committee has addressed this issue and recommended that state parties, in 
cooperation with civil society groups enhance awareness of CEDAW and the remedies 
that are available to women.1118 One of the ways in which state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol can ensure more women have access to justice is, addressing language 
 
1114 See part 5 3 4 2 above. 
1115 See chapter four part 4 2 2 6 above.  
1116 Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (21 February 2014) para 8.8. 
1117 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic 
Reports of the Philippines (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/PHL/CO/7-8 para 16(a) & (b). See chapter four 
part 4 2 2 6 above. 
1118 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the Bahamas (2018) 
UN Doc CEDAW/C/BHS/CO/6 para 14(c). 
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barriers and ensuring women have access to information regarding the legal remedies 
available to them.1119  
Finally, as part of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol, state parties should provide adequate budgetary and technical assistance to 
the provision of low-cost or free legal aid, advice and representation. This has been 
identified by the CEDAW Committee as a way for state parties to ensure that all justice 
systems are economically accessible to women.1120 These low-cost or free services 
have to be sensitive to the needs of diverse women so that when women seek justice, 
they are met with appropriate and effective assistance.  
 
5 3 4 5 Non-monetised care work 
Article 13 of the Maputo Protocol (economic and social welfare rights) provides that 
“state parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and other measures to guarantee 
women equal opportunities in work and career advancement and other economic 
opportunities. In this respect, they shall: (h) take the necessary measures to recognise 
the economic value of the work of women in the home”. The supervisory bodies need 
to pay special attention to the needs of women who partake in non-monetised care 
work. The African Court and African Commission have not yet heard complaints 
regarding non-monetised care work. When these supervisory bodies are confronted 
with a case or communication on non-monetised care work, they should make 
progressive decisions regarding the resources that state parties need to mobilise to 
support and protect women who partake in the non-monetised care economy. This 
would include budgeting for childcare facilities and public transport, as further 
discussed in this section. The African Commission has not yet released a general 
comment on non-monetised care work which could add immense interpretative value 
to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.1121  
Particular attention should be paid to women living in poverty. African women still 
bear a disproportionate burden of poverty, non-monetised labour, discriminatory land 
ownership, discriminatory inheritance rights as well as limited access to education and 
 
1119 See chapter four part 4 2 2 6 above. 
1120 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33 para 36. See chapter four part 4 2 1 3 above.  
1121 See chapter two part 2 2 3.  
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adequate health care services.1122 Thus, when African states establish a gender 
responsive budgeting strategy which is adequate in their context, the needs of women 
in poverty, carrying out the bulk of the non-monetised care work, should be at the 
forefront of these plans. As argued above, state parties to CEDAW need to pay 
attention to the particular needs of rural women, especially those involved in non-
monetised care work.1123 Thus, for African countries, where a large majority of rural 
women partake in the non-monetised care economy, non-monetised care work needs 
to be directly addressed in national expenditure. Anti-essentialist feminist legal theory 
assists in unearthing the significant impact of non-monetised care work on women and 
girls in poorer communities. African countries need to invest in childcare facilities, 
agricultural technology, public transport and infrastructure such as water, sanitation 
and energy, which all has the potential to reduce the amount of non-monetised care 
work done by women in poorer communities.1124 
The non-monetised care economy is an important area where state parties to the 
Maputo Protocol need to invest resources. Non-monetised care work should be 
regarded as work and states should conduct time-use studies which would quantify 
the amount of non-monetised care work currently being done.1125 Elson argues that 
substantive equality can only be achieved if non-monetised care work is recognised, 
reduced and redistributed.1126 A recent Oxfam study on non-monetised care work in 
Africa moreover suggested the meaningful inclusion of non-monetised care workers 
in “national, community and household budgets, planning, policy and decision-making 
processes”.1127 The inclusion of non-monetised care workers in these processes is a 
requirement of gender responsive budgeting.1128 As part of the interpretative 
framework for article 26(2), state parties to the Maputo Protocol should collect national 
time-use data on non-monetised care work to inform their policy and budget 
decisions.1129 Specific resources must be allocated to “affordable, accessible and 
 
1122 Chiwara “Situating the Maputo Protocol in Key Issues: Changing the narrative for women in Africa” 
in AU “Women’s Rights in Africa” 20. See chapter three part 3 3 1 above.  
1123 See chapter four part 4 2 2 6. 
1124 Elson & Sharp “Gender Responsive Budgeting and Women’s Poverty” in The International 
Handbook of Gender and Poverty 526. 
1125 See chapter three part 3 4 5 above.  
1126 Elson (2017) New Labor Forum 52. See chapter four part 4 2 2 6. 
1127 Oxfam Policy Brief “Unlocking Sustainable Development in Africa by Addressing Unpaid Care and 
Domestic Work” (2020) 4.  
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quality care-supporting infrastructure and public services such as clean water, 
renewable energy, childcare, health care and public transport”.1130 
Non-monetised care work also needs to be addressed in state parties’ expenditure 
on social security. As women who partake in non-monetised care work do not earn an 
income, they will not be able to contribute to retirement funds and, subsequently, could 
be discriminated against when receiving social security.1131 Ensuring the equal 
enjoyment of social security requires significant resources from state parties.1132 As 
addressed in Calero, public policies and legislation pertaining to social security needs 
to take account of the unique circumstances and inequalities faced by women who do 
non-monetised care work.1133 As required by article 13 of the Maputo Protocol, state 
parties need to ensure that the expenditure on social security is reassessed and all 
women who partake in non-monetised care work are protected.   
In terms of the Solemn Declaration, state parties also agreed to increase the 
budgetary allocations to health care sectors with the aim of alleviating women’s burden 
of care for the sick and elderly.1134 This was specifically stated with regard to those 
living with malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other related infectious diseases. 
Unfortunately, the Solemn Declaration makes no further mention of resource 
allocation, despite addressing resource-intensive obligations such as state parties 
having to address gender-based violence. Eradicating gender-based violence requires 
profound budgetary commitments from state parties.1135 Thus, it is problematic that 
the Solemn Declaration does not emphasise the role that resources play in realising 
these obligations.  
 
5 3 4 6 Health care  
Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol provides for extensive health and reproductive rights 
for women. This includes the obligation on state parties to respect and promote 
women’s right to health and to take all appropriate measures to provide adequate, 
 
1130 12. 
1131 Rubin & Bartle (2005) Public Administration Review 259 260. See chapter four parts 4 2 1 6 and 4 
3 1 6 above.  
1132 See chapter four part 4 3 1 6 above. 
1133 Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant concerning 
communication No. E/C.12/63/D/10/2015 (2018) para 13.3.  
1134 Solemn Declaration para 1. 
1135 See part 5 3 4 2 for a discussion on the resources required to address gender-based violcence. 
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affordable and accessible health services.1136 The African Commission has released 
two general comments on article 14 of the Maputo Protocol, in which it reiterates the 
importance of mobilising resources to realise women’s right to health care.1137 This 
forms an interpretative tool as state parties have more clarity of their obligations in 
terms of article 14 and article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. These obligations include 
ensuring that there are adequate budgetary allocations at national and local level to 
strengthen public health services.1138 It is recommended that the African Commission 
refer back to these general comments when considering state reports and assessing 
how state parties have allocated resources to ensure women have access to health 
care. 
As discussed above, barriers to women’s access to health care, particularly sexual 
and reproductive health services, should be eliminated to ensure substantive equality 
within health care.1139 In order to achieve this, the CEDAW Committee reiterates that 
state parties overall budget allocated to women’s health care should be comparable 
to men’s health, while being cognisant of the different health needs of men and 
women.1140  
Thus, in terms of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol, state parties should allocate resources to ensure women’s specific health 
needs are met. This includes ensuring that there are specialised health care services 
for victims of gender-based violence and sexual assault.1141 Specialised health care 
services include psychologists and trained health care workers who have undergone 
gender-sensitive training. Thus, state parties to the Maputo Protocol are obligated to 
allocate significant resources to the provisions of health care services which provides 
adequate protection to victims of gender-based and sexual violence.  
 
1136 Article 14(1) and 14(2)(a) respectively.  
1137 General Comment 1 on Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (2012) Adopted at the 52nd Ordinary Session; General Comment 2 on Article 14(1)(a), (b), (c) 
and (f) and Article 14(2)(a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2014) Adopted 
at the 55th Ordinary Session. 
1138 General Comment 2 on Article 14(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14(2)(a) and (c) of the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2014) Adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session para 62. 
1139 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24 Women and Health UN Doc A/54/38/Rev.1, 
chap1 (1999) para 31(b). See chapter four part 4 2 2 4. 
1140 Para 30.  
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State parties to the Maputo Protocol must ensure that their health budgets have 
provided for women’s access to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric services. 
The CEDAW Committee stated that maternal mortality must be prominent in national 
health care budgets.1142 One of the main ways to do this is to allocate sufficient 
resources to establish duly equipped hospitals, especially in rural and remote 
areas.1143 Women in poorer or remote areas are more vulnerable without adequate 
health care. State parties to the Maputo Protocol must ensure that diverse women, 
particularly those in poorer or remote areas have access to appropriate and adequate 
health care.  
 
5 3 5 Resource constraints 
State parties have an obligation to progressively realise the rights in the Maputo 
Protocol, even when there are apparent resource constraints.1144 The African Court 
and the African Commission have not made concrete decisions on the implications of 
article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. However, the African Commission took a firm 
stance in SERAC1145 where it stated that there is no right in the ACHPR that cannot 
be made effective, despite apparent resource constraints.1146 By taking a similar 
stance concerning the Maputo Protocol, the African Commission and African Court 
would need to establish, on an individual basis, whether a state party has done 
everything in their power to realise the rights in the Maputo Protocol. This is significant 
where poverty and scarce resources are a reality.1147  
As established above, state parties to the ICESCR are obliged to progressively 
realise the rights in the ICESCR.1148 The two norms of progressive realisation are, 
firstly, that deliberately retrogressive measures require careful consideration and 
justification and, secondly, that state parties, when facing resource constraints, should 
at least ensure the minimum essential levels of the rights in the ICESCR.1149 The 
 
1142 Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil Communication No 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 (27 
September 2011) para 7.3. 
1143 CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2019) UN Doc CEDAW/C/COD/CO/8 para 37(a). 
1144 Chenwi (2013) De Jure 742 743. See chapter two part 2 2 1 above.  
1145 Communication 155/96 (2001).   
1146 Para 68. See chapter two part 2 3 1 above.  
1147 Ssenyonjo (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 388. 
1148 See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 above. 
1149 De Schutter (2018) Friederich Ebert Stiftung 10. 
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CESCR engaged with retrogressive measures in the Djazia communication and stated 
that budgetary adjustments affecting the rights in the ICESCR must be “temporary, 
necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory.”1150 State parties have a heavy 
burden of justification for retrogressive measures and any retrogressive measure 
needs to be considered and justified.1151 These measures should also ensure that the 
rights of disadvantaged and marginalised groups are not adversely affected.1152  
Thus, when considering resource constraints of the state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol, the African Commission and the African Court should, similarly, consider 
what state parties were able to achieve with limited resources as well as their 
justification for retrogressive measures as a result of resource constraints. State 
parties should also have a heavier burden of justification if these retrogressive 
measures adversely affected disadvantaged or marginalised groups, such as women 
in poorer communities.1153 In this way, the retrogressive measures would be under a 
strict review process to ensure they are proportional and non-discriminatory.  
In Endorois,1154 the African Commission stated that the state party bears the burden 
of proving whether an action is reasonable.1155 Thus, the African Commission and 
African Court can, correspondingly, require state parties to the Maputo Protocol to 
show that, even in the context of resource constraints, they  took reasonable measures 
to realise the rights, including prioritising minimum core obligations of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, and engaging in participatory planning for progressively 
achieving the full realisation of the relevant rights. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the African Court and African Commission should also evaluate whether state parties 
have sought extraterritorial agreements where they have apparent resource 
constraints.1156 
 
1150 Djazia and Bellili v Spain (2017) “Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with regard to communication No. 
5/2015” UN Doc E/C. 12/61/D/5/2015 para 17.6. See chapter four part 4 3 1 3 above. 
1151 OHCHR “Report on austerity measures and economic and social rights” (2013) The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RightsCrisis/E-2013-82_en.pdf> (accessed 
07-07-2020); CESCR General Comment 3 para 9. See chapter four part 4 3 1 3 above for a further 
discussion on retrogressive measures. 
1152 Statement of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (fifty-eighth session, 2016) 
Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights UN Doc E/C. 12/2016/1 para 4. See chapter four part 4 3 1 3 above. 
1153 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 190. See chapter four part 4 3 1 3 above. 
1154 Communication 276/03 (2010).  
1155 Para 172. See chapter two part 2 3 1 above. 
1156 See part 5 3 2 2 above for a discussion on international cooperation.  
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This is supported by the CESCR, as resource constraints need to be taken into 
consideration to assess whether the states have discharged their minimum core 
obligation.1157 However, there is a “heavy burden of justification” on the state to show 
that it has exhausted its resources to fulfil its minimum core obligation.1158 Here it is 
necessary to establish whether the state has taken all available steps to the maximum 
of its available resources as per article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The CESCR makes the 
final determination about whether state parties have undertaken all appropriate means 
to realise the rights in the ICESCR.1159 Thus, the African Commission and the African 
Court should make the final decision where state parties argue that they cannot realise 
the rights in the Maputo Protocol because of resource constraints.  
 
5 4 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to establish a new interpretative approach for article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol. This was done through the lens of gender responsive budgeting and 
anti-essentialist feminist legal theory. The role of the supervisory bodies were 
discussed first as they provide the core interpretation of resource allocation through 
their various mandates.1160 The African Court can provide interpretation to article 26(2) 
through referring to its application in the cases that come before it involving rights in 
the Maputo Protocol. Particularly, the African Court should state what resource 
implications their decisions will have.1161  
The African Commission can further strengthen the interpretation of article 26(2) 
through general comments, decisions on communications and concluding 
observations on state reports. The African Commission has not yet released a general 
comment focused on the interpretation of article 26(2) and this would prove beneficial 
as the role of gender responsive budgeting, to realise the rights of diverse women, 
could be reiterated.1162 The role of state reporting is crucial in ensuring that state 
parties abide by their obligations in the Maputo Protocol.1163 State parties need to take 
the reporting more seriously and follow the reporting guidelines which are made 
 
1157 CESCR General Comment 3 para 10. See chapter four part 4 3 1 4 above. 
1158 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 149. 
1159 CESCR General Comment 3 para 4.  
1160 Part 5 2 above. 
1161 Part 5 2 1 above.  
1162 Part 5 2 2 1 above.  
1163 Part 5 2 2 2 above. 
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available. In particular, state parties need to extensively report on their gender 
responsive budgeting initiatives and how anti-essentialist feminist legal theory forms 
a part of those strategies. The Special Rapporteur was also discussed as a significant 
supervisory body which can affect change in state parties through holding regular 
conferences and training sessions.1164 The Special Rapporteur needs to hold sessions 
on gender responsive budgeting, as well as how anti-essentialist feminist legal theory 
can play a greater role in these strategies. 
The transformation of the budgetary process to one of gender responsive budgeting 
was considered in part 5 3. Effectively allocating resources for the realisation of 
women’s rights can be achieved through a comprehensive gender responsive 
budgeting strategy which is sensitive to the contexts of different African women. The 
importance of the involvement of NGOs and civil society who represent diverse women 
was further reiterated.1165 NGOs and civil society are able to ensure the interests of 
diverse women are considered at every stage of the budgetary process. There are 
various strategies for generating resources and spending resources.1166 For state 
parties under the Maputo Protocol, a holistic approach to gender responsive budgeting 
with a focus on the significance of an evaluation of the impact that national budgets 
have on diverse women is ideal. Revenue strategies, such as taxation policies, have 
the possibility of adversely affecting poor women, thus state parties need to examine 
their taxation policies with the needs of diverse women in mind. State parties also 
need to justify their expenditure strategies with due consideration for the multiple levels 
of discrimination that women face.1167  
There are specific resource-intensive provisions which state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol need to provide for in their gender responsive budgeting strategies.1168 The 
prohibition of discrimination, gender-based violence, access to justice, health care, 
harmful stereotypes and non-monetised care work economy need to remain at the 
forefront of state parties’ expenditure strategies or form part of pilot sectors to be 
addressed first. The final part of this chapter explained the significant burden of proof 
 
1164 Part 5 2 3 above. 
1165 Part 5 3 1 above. 
1166 See parts 5 3 2 and 5 3 3 above respectively. 
1167 Part 5 3 3 above. 
1168 Part 5 3 4 above. 
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which state parties would face if they argued that they could not realise women’s rights 
because of resource constraints.1169  
  
 
1169 Part 5 3 5 above. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6 1 Overview of the research 
This thesis sought to establish the nature of states’ obligations under article 26(2) of 
the Maputo Protocol. The primary hypothesis which guided the research 
acknowledged that the relevant supervisory bodies did not adequately interpret article 
26(2) of the Maputo Protocol to effectively realise women’s rights. This hypothesis was 
confirmed correct as it was established in chapter 2 that state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol do not adequately allocate resources to realise women’s rights. This is due 
to the lack of an interpretative framework which state parties can utilise, as well as a 
lack of political will from state parties. To engage effectively with the primary research 
question, three secondary research questions, along with three secondary hypotheses 
were put forward. These were addressed in turn in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively.   
Chapter 2 assessed the current interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol 
by establishing how the African Commission and African Court have interpreted 
resource allocation for the effective realisation of human rights in terms of the Maputo 
Protocol and the ACHPR. This chapter found, as a point of departure, that there has 
been no direct interpretation of article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol by the supervisory 
bodies responsible for overseeing its implementation. The Maputo Protocol has only 
been referred to in two cases that came before the African Court, one of which was 
held to be inadmissible. Thus, the African Court has, in its jurisprudence, provided a 
limited interpretation of the Maputo Protocol as a whole.  
The analysis of state reports filed under the Maputo Protocol furthermore showed 
that state parties are unclear as to how resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol 
should be interpreted and states made very few references to gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives, as is required by the reporting guidelines. Apart from being 
uncertain as to how to allocate resources to realise the rights in the Maputo Protocol, 
some state parties also lacked the political will to design effective budgetary policies 
which protects women’s rights. Where state parties referred to gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives, the African Commission was reluctant to refer to these initiatives 
and comment on best practices among state parties.  
In addition, the interpretation of resource allocation under the ACHPR has been 
sparse and has not provided adequate guidance to state parties. However, where the 
African Commission did comment on resource allocation in terms of the ACHPR, it 
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was reiterated that there are no rights in the ACHPR that cannot be realised, despite 
resource constraints, and there are always concrete steps that can be taken towards 
the full realisation of these rights. Chapter 2 showed that a lack of sufficient and 
rigorous interpretation of resource allocation under the Maputo Protocol has led to 
discrepancies and gaps in the guidance provided to state parties to fulfil their 
obligations under the Maputo Protocol.  
Chapter 3 analysed the significant role that feminist legal theory and gender 
responsive budgeting can play as a theoretical lens in developing the interpretation of 
the obligations in article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol to remedy some of the defects 
identified in chapter 2. The secondary research question guiding the research in this 
chapter considered to what extent feminist legal theory and gender responsive 
budgeting could be used to assist in the interpretation of the resource allocation 
instruction under article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.  
Particular attention was paid to anti-essentialist feminist legal theory because of its 
responsiveness to intersecting grounds of discrimination such as gender, race, class, 
sexual orientation, culture, and religion. It was shown that anti-essentialist feminist 
legal theory is relevant to the Maputo Protocol since it includes the lived experiences 
of a large diversity of women in Africa.  
The second part of this chapter examined the role of gender responsive budgeting 
in interpreting budgetary and resource allocation obligations under the Maputo 
Protocol. Gender responsive budgeting represents a practical governance tool to give 
effect to some of the key insights of feminist legal theory. Gender responsive 
budgeting was shown to be an initiative which resulted from feminist legal theory. The 
contrasting definitions and purposes of gender responsive budgeting illustrated how 
the mainstreaming of prominent issues that women face in every aspect of a state 
budget is required. However, the potential for further development of anti-essentialist 
legal theory and its relevance in the gender responsive budgeting frameworks was 
prominent in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 established that an analysis of the interpretation of resource allocation 
for the effective realisation of human rights under CEDAW and the ICESCR can assist 
in guiding supervisory bodies to interpret and evaluate article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol. The secondary research question guiding this chapter focused on how an 
analysis of the interpretation of resource allocation for the effective realisation of 
human rights under CEDAW and the ICESCR can assist in guiding supervisory bodies 
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to interpret and evaluate article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. This analysis confirmed 
the hypothesis that resource allocation for the realisation of human rights has been 
thoroughly interpreted and analysed under CEDAW and the ICESCR and can 
accordingly provide guidance to interpret article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol.  
The general recommendations, as well as concluding observations on state reports, 
of CEDAW show that there are clear obligations on state parties to ensure that 
sufficient resources have been allocated to realise the rights in CEDAW. The CEDAW 
Committee has also provided state parties with guidance, through various 
communications, on how certain rights in CEDAW can be realised by allocating 
sufficient resources. Gender responsive budgeting has, importantly, been established 
as a strategy for state parties to realise their obligations in terms of CEDAW. The 
CEDAW Committee has furthermore analysed and applied elements of anti-
essentialist feminist legal theory, however, there is still an opportunity for further 
development.  
The ICESCR has an operating provision in article 2(1) which creates clear resource 
obligations on state parties. The CESCR has, through general comments, 
communications and statements, elaborated on these obligations. Elements of article 
2(1) such as maximum available resources, progressive realisation, retrogressive 
measures, minimum core obligations and extraterritorial obligations were analysed to 
establish best practices of state parties under the ICESCR. Particular strategies for 
generating resources and spending resources in terms of the ICESCR were analysed 
and shown to have broad application. 
Finally, chapter 5 developed an interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol. The first part of chapter 5 considered how article 26(2) of the Maputo 
Protocol should be interpreted by the supervisory bodies. It was argued that the 
African Court should address resource allocation within cases specifically referring to 
the Maputo Protocol. Further that it should, specifically, address the needs of diverse 
women who face multiple levels of discrimination. The African Commission was shown 
to have great potential to further interpret article 26(2) through its general comments, 
communications and concluding observations on state reports. Particularly, it was 
shown that the African Commission must address resource allocation in a general 
comment specifically focused on article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol which 
contextualises the role of state parties in protecting and empowering women with 
multiple identities through their gender responsive budgeting initiatives. The role of the 
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Special Rapporteur was discussed and improvements were suggested to ensure the 
most effective implementation mechanisms.  
The issues that were identified in chapter two were addressed through the 
theoretical lens of gender responsive budgeting and anti-essentialist feminist legal 
theory. The lessons from CEDAW and the ICESCR, as discussed in chapter 4, were 
utilised in chapter 5 to ensure that state parties to the Maputo Protocol would 
effectively and efficiently realise women’s rights. As part of the gender responsive 
budgeting strategy, particular attention was paid to the involvement of NGOs and civil 
society in the budgeting process, strategies for generating and spending resources, 
as well as how state parties should approach resource constraints. As resource 
constraints are an issue that many African states face, this formed a central point of 
state parties’ obligation to make resources available to realise women’s rights. It was 
established that a comprehensive gender responsive budgeting strategy, which is 
sensitive to the contexts of different African women is needed. These strategies would 
need to be adapted depending on the needs of women in a specific country.  
 
6 2 Recommendations 
In light of the findings of this research, it is recommended that the African Court and 
the African Commission make clear references to article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol 
within their cases and communications, respectively. These references need to be 
contextualised to the facts of the cases and communications, as well as the needs of 
the particular group of women affected within the cases and communications. It is 
furthermore recommended that the African Commission release a general comment 
specifically addressing article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol. This general comment 
should articulate the need for state parties to adopt gender responsive budgeting, as 
well as reiterate the importance of protecting and empowering the most marginalised 
groups of women. It is also recommended that the African Commission refer to article 
26(2) of the Maputo Protocol in all general comments referring to other provisions in 
the Maputo Protocol. The African Commission must state the specific resources and 
budgetary allocations which would be required to realise the right being discussed in 
the general comment, as well as the groups of women who would be most adversely 
affected by insufficient resource allocations.  
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In addition, it is recommended that state parties report timeously to the African 
Commission on their efforts to realise women’s rights. State parties should ensure that 
they include detailed references to their gender responsive budgeting initiatives. State 
reports must include information regarding the status of implementation of gender 
responsive budgeting strategies, how it affects diverse women and monitoring and 
evaluation strategies. In this way, the African Commission will be able to provide 
extensive feedback regarding current gender responsive budgeting strategies and 
potential areas of improvement. It is recommended that the African Commission 
establish gender responsive budgeting as a priority for state parties to the Maputo 
Protocol by providing feedback on proposed strategies in their concluding 
observations on state reports and questioning state parties on its absence if there is 
no reference made to these strategies in the state reports. It is also recommended that 
the Special Rapporteur perform comparative studies on the situation of women in 
different African countries (preferably within sub-regional economic communities) as 
well as the effect that gender responsive budgeting has on women’s rights. 
It is moreover recommended that state parties to the Maputo Protocol fulfil their 
obligations in terms of article 26(2) by establishing gender responsive budgets that 
can effectively mobilise resources to realise women’s rights. These gender responsive 
budgets need to be contextualised to address the diverse needs of women within a 
specific country. State parties are also recommended to develop gender responsive 
budgeting goals and objectives within sub-regional economic communities.  
State parties to the Maputo Protocol are recommended to ensure the active 
participation of NGOs and civil society at every stage of the budgetary process. In this 
way, state parties can ensure that their gender responsive budgets adhere to human 
rights principles, such as participation and accountability.1170 It is recommended that 
state parties first conduct a fact-finding evaluation of the current condition of women 
in their country. This evaluation must be assessed against disaggregated data to 
provide an accurate depiction of the needs of diverse women and how resource 
allocation is currently affecting them. This will guide the state parties in designing 
gender responsive budgets which are responsive to the needs of the women in their 
country. 
 
1170 See chapter five part 5 3 1. 
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In terms of the interpretative framework for article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol, as 
established in chapter 5, gender responsive budgets have to be holistic in how they 
propose to generate and spend resources.1171 It is recommended that state parties 
provide, in their budgets, for comprehensive gender-sensitive revenue and 
expenditure strategies. In terms of revenue strategies, it is recommended that state 
parties re-evaluate their taxation systems to ensure that they do not adversely affect 
poorer communities, and in particular, poorer women. State parties are also 
recommended to establish mutually beneficial international cooperation strategies 
which would assist in combatting resource constraints. These cooperation strategies 
would be most effective in sub-regional economic communities. 
In terms of expenditure strategies, state parties should ensure that they take 
immediate steps towards the realisation of the rights in the Maputo Protocol which 
creating long terms strategies to progressively realise the full rights in the Maputo 
Protocol. State parties are also recommended to focus on core resource-intensive 
provisions in the Maputo Protocol or establish a few sectors as pilot sectors. The 
prohibition of discrimination, gender-based violence, access to justice, health care, 
harmful stereotypes and non-monetised care work economy needs to remain at the 
forefront of state parties’ expenditure strategies, as these areas require significant 
resources and they have extensive gender implications. 
 
6 3 Areas for potential further research 
This research would be complemented by further research into resource allocation 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child. More extensive case studies into particular state parties, 
such as Rwanda and South Africa, could moreover provide clarity on state parties’ 
implementation of budgeting for the Maputo Protocol, as well as other international 
treaties. Rwanda and South Africa have already indicated their use of gender 
responsive budgeting in their state reports to the African Commission, thus these 
strategies could become the subject of further research and comparison. The gender 
responsive budgeting strategy of the SADC could also form the basis of further 
research to establish whether member states have applied the strategy and what the 
results have been. 
 
1171 See chapter five parts 5 3 2 and 5 3 3 respectively. 
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6 4 Concluding reflections  
The situation of women’s rights in Africa is one in need of great attention and 
improvement. The Maputo Protocol provides an encouraging step towards the full 
empowerment of African women. For this to become a reality, resources, which are 
targeted at the full realisation of the rights of diverse African women need to be 
deployed. However, article 26(2) of the Maputo Protocol is still underutilised. The lack 
of an interpretative framework for resource allocation results in state parties not 
understanding their obligations in terms of the Maputo Protocol, or simply not 
prioritising this area of law.  
This research has shown that effective resource allocation is crucial to the full 
realisation of women’s rights. It is clear that the African Court, the African Commission, 
the Special Rapporteur, civil society and state parties need to work together to ensure 
that women’s rights are fully protected and resources are allocated effectively to 
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